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Abstract 
The etiological explanations for depression, along with the received views of the way the 
brain and body function, have shifted from an excess of black bile to impaired neuroplasticity 
and neuroimmune functions.   A common biological explanation for depression is the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis, which posits that depression is caused by a deficiency of monoamines, 
particularly serotonin, in the depressed person’s brain.  Many scholars have argued that the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis is unable to adequately explain depression and antidepressant 
treatment.  However, while the etiological understanding of depression is complex and 
incomplete, the chemical imbalance hypothesis remains pervasive and persuasive among 
laypersons and clinicians.   
I begin this dissertation with an introduction to biological psychiatry and neuroscience.  
The dissertation includes a brief history of Western/English approaches to the diagnosis and 
etiology of depression, a chapter on my ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
assumptions, two manuscript-style research studies, and concludes with a general discussion.  In 
the two studies, I demonstrate how a sample of family physicians and neuroscientists accounted 
for using the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression and other explanations of depression, 
the persuasive rhetorical features in their arguments, and the functions achieved by these 
accounts.   
In study 1, I analyzed an interview data set with 11 family physicians.  Using a discursive 
analytic approach, I argue that these physicians are utilizing the chemical imbalance hypothesis 
as a persuasive rhetorical device to motivate patients toward treatment, to attempt to minimize 
self-blame and stigma, to instill hope and confidence in the treatment, and to contribute generally 
to scientific knowledge among patients.  In the discussion I provide a critique of the general 
assumptions upon which their arguments rely.  For study 2, I interviewed 10 neuroscientists who 
conduct depression research.  Using a discursive analytic approach, I present how a sample of 
neuroscientists working on a biological understanding of depression argue for and/or against the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression.  I argue that they maintain support for the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis through the construction of depression as a brain-based disorder 
and the brain as functioning through chemical transmissions, and that they argue against the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis by defining this hypothesis as a specific deficiency of serotonin 
and drawing attention to the failings and shortcomings of the hypothesis.  I argue that their 
rhetorical construction of a distinction between a general chemical imbalance and a specific 
serotonin deficiency allows for the maintenance and support of the fundamental assumption that 
depression is a brain-based disorder, while simultaneously denying that depression is exclusively 
a problem with the serotonin system.  I discuss alternative explanations of depression proposed 
by the scientists and show how they construct the serotonin hypothesis as a persuasive rhetorical 
device resistant to replacement. 
 The results of studies 1 and 2 suggest that the chemical imbalance hypothesis of 
depression, while limited in its specific form to explain the cause of depression, has value and 
merit in scientific and lay discourses.  In the general discussion, I summarize the arguments for 
and against the chemical imbalance hypothesis and suggest ways that the general chemical 
imbalance explanation can be augmented with additional ideas from contemporary neuroscience.  
I discuss the discipline of translational neuroscience, which aims to bridge the gap between 
science and practice, and provide commentary using extracts from the interviews.  I conclude 
with a reflexive examination of my position.    
 iii 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, I want to thank my research supervisor, Dr. Linda McMullen, for her 
warm and wise mentorship throughout the program.  You provided support, guidance, and 
inspiration that has been invaluable for both research and life.  Thank you to my advisory 
committee members, Dr. Erika Dyck, Dr. John Howland, and Dr. Ulrich Teucher, for your 
thoughtful critique, encouragement, and patience.  Your unique perspectives toward this topic 
expanded my view and contributed immensely to the final product.  Thank you to my external 
examiner, Dr. Kieran O’Doherty, for your challenging questions and valuable feedback.  To the 
qualitative research team members, thank you for your contributions to my knowledge of 
qualitative research and discourses, and my analysis of the data. Thank you to the physicians and 
scientists who volunteered their time to participate in this research.  Last but not least, thank you 
to my family for your support and encouragement throughout this process.   
 
  
 iv 
Table of Contents 
 
Permission to Use.................................................................................................................................... i 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. iii 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................. iv 
Chapter One: Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Outline ........................................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Neuroscience, Psychiatry, and the Study of Depression .............................................................. 1 
1.3 References .................................................................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter Two: The Diagnosis and Etiology of Depression in Canada and the United 
States of America ................................................................................................................................... 6 
2.1 The Diagnosis of Depression ................................................................................................................. 6 
2.1.1 DSM-5 controversy. ........................................................................................................................................... 6 
2.2 Biologically-Based Etiologies of Depression.................................................................................... 7 
2.2.1 Humoral explanations. ..................................................................................................................................... 8 
2.2.2 Mechanical explanations. ................................................................................................................................ 9 
2.2.3 Influence of antidepressants. ........................................................................................................................ 9 
2.2.4 The monoamine hypothesis. ....................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.5 The amine-receptor hypothesis. ................................................................................................................ 14 
2.2.6 Genetics and heritability hypotheses. ..................................................................................................... 14 
2.2.7 The neuroendocrine hypotheses. .............................................................................................................. 15 
2.2.8 The neuroplasticity hypotheses. ................................................................................................................ 16 
2.2.9 The neuroimmunity hypothesis. ............................................................................................................... 18 
2.2.10 Summary of biologically-based etiological explanations.............................................................. 19 
2.3 Additional Factors in the Etiology of Depression ........................................................................ 19 
2.3.1 Biopsychosocial model. ................................................................................................................................. 19 
2.3.2 Psychological factors. ..................................................................................................................................... 19 
2.3.3 Social factors. ..................................................................................................................................................... 20 
2.4 Summary .................................................................................................................................................... 20 
2.5 References ................................................................................................................................................. 21 
Chapter Three: General Methods for Manuscripts 1 and 2 .................................................. 26 
3.1 Analytical Perspective: Discursive Psychology and Social Constructionism .................... 26 
3.1.1 Social construction of depression. ............................................................................................................ 26 
3.2 General Methods of Data Analysis .................................................................................................... 27 
3.3 References ................................................................................................................................................. 30 
Chapter Four: Manuscript One ....................................................................................................... 31 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 32 
4.1.1 The Chemical Imbalance Hypothesis ....................................................................................................... 32 
4.1.2 Chemical Imbalance: Patients ..................................................................................................................... 33 
4.1.3 Chemical Imbalance: Physicians ................................................................................................................ 36 
4.1.4 Communicating a Diagnosis of Depression ........................................................................................... 37 
4.2 Analytical Perspective: Discursive Psychology............................................................................ 38 
4.3 Method ........................................................................................................................................................ 38 
4.3.1 Participants ........................................................................................................................................................ 38 
 v 
4.3.2 Procedures .......................................................................................................................................................... 39 
4.4 Analysis ...................................................................................................................................................... 39 
4.4.1 Using the Biochemical Explanation to Reduce Blame and Promote Treatment .................... 40 
4.4.1.1 Extract 1. ........................................................................................................................................... 40 
4.4.1.2 Extract 2. ........................................................................................................................................... 41 
4.4.2 Using the Biochemical Explanation to Promote Treatment Adherence .................................... 42 
4.4.2.1 Extract 3. ........................................................................................................................................... 42 
4.4.3 Using the Biochemical Explanation to Promote Depression as a Brain Disorder ................. 43 
4.4.3.1 Extract 4. ........................................................................................................................................... 43 
4.4.4 Depression as Biopsychosocial Illness .................................................................................................... 45 
4.4.4.1 Extract 5. ........................................................................................................................................... 45 
4.4.4.2 Extract 6. ........................................................................................................................................... 46 
4.4.5 Biopsychosocial Model and Treatment Options ................................................................................. 47 
4.4.5.1 Extract 7. ........................................................................................................................................... 47 
4.4.5.2 Extract 8. ........................................................................................................................................... 48 
4.4.6 Social Causes and Treatment Options ..................................................................................................... 50 
4.4.6.1 Extract 9. ........................................................................................................................................... 50 
4.4.6.2 Extract 10. ......................................................................................................................................... 51 
4.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................................................. 52 
4.5.1 Uses of the Biochemical Model ................................................................................................................... 52 
4.5.1.1 Motivating patients. ........................................................................................................................... 52 
4.5.1.2 Reducing self-blame and stigma; building knowledge in the community. ........................................ 53 
4.5.1.3 Instilling hope and confidence. .......................................................................................................... 54 
4.5.2 Biopsychosocial Model of Depression: Treatment Limitations .................................................... 55 
4.6 References ................................................................................................................................................. 56 
Chapter Five: Manuscript Two ....................................................................................................... 61 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 62 
5.1.1 Biologically-Based Etiologies of Depression......................................................................................... 62 
5.1.1.1 Humoral explanations. ....................................................................................................................... 62 
5.1.1.2 Mechanical explanations. .................................................................................................................. 62 
5.1.1.3 Influence of antidepressants and the monoamine hypotheses. .......................................................... 63 
5.1.1.4 Genetics and heritability hypotheses. ................................................................................................ 64 
5.1.1.5 The neuroendocrine hypotheses. ....................................................................................................... 64 
5.1.1.6 The neuroplasticity hypotheses. ........................................................................................................ 64 
5.1.1.7 The neuroimmunity hypothesis. ........................................................................................................ 65 
5.1.1.8 Summary of biologically-based etiological explanations. ................................................................. 65 
5.2 Analytical Perspective: Discursive Psychology............................................................................ 66 
5.3 Method ........................................................................................................................................................ 66 
5.3.1 Participants ........................................................................................................................................................ 66 
5.3.2 Procedures .......................................................................................................................................................... 66 
5.4 Analysis ...................................................................................................................................................... 67 
5.4.1 Depression and the Chemical Imbalance Hypothesis ....................................................................... 67 
5.4.1.1 Chemical imbalance as a general problem with brain function. ........................................................ 67 
5.4.1.1.1 Extract 1a. .................................................................................................................................. 67 
5.4.1.1.2 Extract 1b. .................................................................................................................................. 68 
5.4.1.1.3 Extract 2. .................................................................................................................................... 69 
5.4.1.1.4 Extract 3a. .................................................................................................................................. 70 
5.4.1.1.5 Extract 3b. .................................................................................................................................. 71 
5.4.1.2 Chemical imbalance as a specific problem with serotonin function. ................................................. 72 
5.4.1.2.1 Extract 4a. .................................................................................................................................. 72 
5.4.1.2.2 Extract 4b. .................................................................................................................................. 73 
5.4.1.2.3 Extract 5a. .................................................................................................................................. 74 
5.4.1.2.4 Extract 5b. .................................................................................................................................. 75 
 vi 
5.4.1.3 Chemical imbalance and the science of depression. .......................................................................... 76 
5.4.1.3.1 Extract 6. .................................................................................................................................... 76 
5.4.1.3.2 Extract 7a. .................................................................................................................................. 77 
5.4.1.3.3 Extract 7b. .................................................................................................................................. 78 
5.4.1.3.4 Extract 8. .................................................................................................................................... 79 
5.4.1.3.5 Extract 9. .................................................................................................................................... 79 
5.4.1.3.6 Extract 10a. ................................................................................................................................ 81 
5.4.1.3.7 Extract 10b. ................................................................................................................................ 82 
5.4.1.3.8 Extract 10c. ................................................................................................................................ 82 
5.4.2 Alternative Explanatory Models ................................................................................................................ 84 
5.4.2.1 Modifying the chemical imbalance explanation. ............................................................................... 84 
5.4.2.1.1 Extract 11. .................................................................................................................................. 84 
5.4.2.2 Replacing the chemical imbalance explanation. ................................................................................ 85 
5.4.2.2.1 Extract 12. .................................................................................................................................. 85 
5.4.2.2.2 Extract 13. .................................................................................................................................. 86 
5.4.2.2.3 Extract 14. .................................................................................................................................. 87 
5.4.2.3 Depression etiology as an unknown. ................................................................................................. 88 
5.4.2.3.1 Extract 15. .................................................................................................................................. 88 
5.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................................................. 90 
5.5.1 Arguments in Defense of the Chemical Imbalance Explanation ................................................... 90 
5.5.2 Arguments in Opposition to the Chemical Imbalance Explanation ............................................ 91 
5.5.3 Possible Alternative Explanations ............................................................................................................ 92 
5.5.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................... 92 
5.6 References ................................................................................................................................................. 93 
Chapter Six: General Discussion .................................................................................................... 97 
6.1 The Chemical Imbalance Hypothesis: Challenges and Opportunities ........................................... 97 
6.2 The Intersection of Neuroscience and Clinical Practice ...................................................................... 99 
6.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research ................................................................................. 100 
6.4 Reflexivity ............................................................................................................................................................ 101 
6.5 References ............................................................................................................................................... 103 
Appendix A ......................................................................................................................................... 105 
Appendix B ......................................................................................................................................... 106 
Appendix C .......................................................................................................................................... 110 
Appendix D ......................................................................................................................................... 111 
Appendix E .......................................................................................................................................... 112 
Appendix F .......................................................................................................................................... 113 
Appendix G ......................................................................................................................................... 114 
 
 
 
  
 
1 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Depression is a common mental illness with an unknown and debated etiology. 
Explanations often range from biological, to social, to psychological, or to a combination of 
these foci.  A common biological explanation is the chemical imbalance hypothesis, which posits 
that depression is caused by a deficiency of monoamines, such as serotonin and norepinephrine, 
in the depressed person’s brain.  In the mid-1960s, scientists hypothesized that medications 
thought to alleviate depression functioned by increasing the amount of serotonin and/or 
norepinephrine in the brain (e.g., Schildkraut, 1965; Coppen, 1967).  The pharmaceutical 
industry promoted antidepressants on the grounds of this hypothesis (Lacasse & Leo, 2005); 
however, scholars have argued that the chemical imbalance hypothesis is unable to adequately 
explain depression and have criticized direct-to-consumer advertising for promoting it as a causal 
explanation (e.g., Healy, 1997; Kirsch, 2010; Leo & Lacasse, 2008).  The chemical imbalance 
hypothesis has been called “the potentially dominant cultural story of depression” (p. 411, 
France, Lysaker, & Robinson, 2007) and laypersons generally report that depression is caused by 
a chemical imbalance in the brain (Pescosolido et al., 2010).  However, the etiology of 
depression (or perhaps the etiologies of depressions) is largely unknown, with many different 
causes at many different levels purported to explain the condition (e.g., Kendler, 2012).   
1.1 Outline 
This dissertation is built around two manuscript-style research papers on the topic of the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis (Chapters 4 and 5).  In this introductory chapter, I introduce the 
disciplines of neuroscience and psychiatry.  In Chapter 2, I provide an overview of the historical 
and current ideas on the biological causes of depression, including the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis, as well as a brief overview of prominent psychological and social models of 
depression.  In Chapter 3, I present my ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
assumptions that pertain to the two research studies that follow.  In the two studies, I present my 
analyses of discourses on depression etiology, focusing on the chemical imbalance hypothesis, 
from interviews with family physicians and neuroscientists.  Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize 
and discuss the arguments for and against the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression and 
suggest ways that the chemical imbalance explanation can be augmented with additional ideas 
from contemporary neuroscience.  I discuss the discipline of translational neuroscience, which 
aims to bridge the gap between science and practice, and provide commentary using extracts 
from the interviews.  I conclude the final chapter of the dissertation with a reflexive examination 
of my position as a researcher and a trainee clinician in psychology.    
1.2 Neuroscience, Psychiatry, and the Study of Depression 
Neuroscience is a relatively new scientific discipline and there is much interest and 
excitement in brain research.  Neuroscience has been described as a hybrid discipline with 
origins in molecular biology, chemistry, genetics, and anatomy and physiology (Abi-Rached & 
Rose, 2010; Abi-Rached, Rose, & Mogoutov, 2010).   Explanations implicating the brain are 
widespread in Western society, from descriptions of how babies learn to how people age.  
Former United States President George H. W. Bush delivered a proclamation that the 1990s 
would be the “decade of the brain” (p. 1, Bush, 1990).  His proclamation proposed that 
individuals suffering from disorders of the brain such as Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s 
disease, Huntington’s disease, spinal cord injuries, stroke, autism, schizophrenia, depressive 
disorder, speech and language disorders, and epileptic seizures, “are justifiably hopeful, for a 
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new era of discovery is dawning in brain research” (p.1, Bush, 1990).  Neuroscience research 
since has proliferated and it continues to be a pervasive enterprise in science and medicine with 
great optimism for clinical breakthroughs.  
Psychiatry, the medical discipline concerned with the diagnosis, treatment, and 
management of conditions labelled as mental illnesses, is presently coupled with the rise in 
neuroscience.  For over two millennia, depression, or melancholia, was thought to be caused by 
an excess of black bile, and in the beginning of the 19th century, poor blood circulation in the 
brain and sluggish nerve fluid were proposed as causative (Jackson, 2008).  However, near the 
turn of the 20th century, psychiatrists, without comprehensive knowledge of the function of the 
nervous system, turned away from the biological bases of mental disorders in favour of 
psychoanalytic conceptualizations, which proffered such disorders as being the result of 
repressed unconscious drives (Shorter, 1997).  Shorter (1997), a medical historian, described the 
period in psychiatry up to the mid-1960s as the psychoanalytic ‘hiatus,’ and argued that the 
decades of psychoanalytic thinking were a mere and misguided interruption to the “smashing 
success” (p. vii) of biological psychiatry; he opined that psychiatry is most fruitful when on the 
“high road of science” (p. 295).  While there are certainly dissenting views within psychiatry, 
and some psychoanalytic concepts and treatments remain, biological psychiatry appears to be the 
dominant paradigm for the diagnosis, treatment, and management of mental illnesses in Canada 
and the United States.   
Psychiatry presently appears to be aligned with neuroscience research as the scientific 
foundation for mental health research, and prominent and influential psychiatrists have argued 
that it is the “future of psychiatry” (p. 1, Reynolds, Lewis, Detre, Schatzberg, & Kupfer, 2009).  
In the forward to the sixth edition of Goodwin and Guze's Psychiatric Diagnosis (North & Yutzy, 
2010), Charles Zorumski, a professor of psychiatry, wrote, “Where do we go from here?  Again, 
psychiatry seems to be at a crossroad.  Most importantly the field has to decide whether or not it 
is really a branch of neuroscience” (p. xxviii).  Zoromski conceptualized the current “crossroad” 
as a problem of diagnostic validity in psychiatry.  He argued that the proliferation of diagnostic 
categories in each iteration of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders has occurred without the research required to validate each 
diagnosis.  While he does not go on to directly answer his question of where to go from here, he 
espoused the merits of neuroscience and posited, “Eventually, the scientific hope is that we will 
revise our diagnostic system based on neuroscience and genetics” (p. xxviii).  It seems that 
influential individuals and associations in psychiatry have chosen the path of neuroscience.   
Psychiatry, with no biological markers or definitive diagnostic tests for conditions with 
largely unknown etiologies, is an anomaly among the medical disciplines.  Psychiatric diagnoses, 
such as those contained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), 
are clusters of mostly subjective symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Reynolds 
et al. (2009), however, have argued that the division between psychiatry and neurology, which is 
primarily based on whether a condition’s etiology is known or unknown, is becoming an 
“artificial... boundary” (p. 2).  They argued that psychiatry and neurology should be united as the 
discipline of clinical neuroscience because researchers are learning more about the mechanisms 
underlying psychiatric conditions.  Michael Fitzgerald, a professor of psychiatry, also argued for 
the reintegration of neurology and psychiatry (Fitzgerald, 2015).  However, diversity and 
variability abound among psychiatrists, and psychiatrist Ronald Pies (2005), for example, argued 
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that combining neurology and psychiatry will not be a straightforward task and will require the 
creation of a new common language.     
With regard to depression, current hypotheses in clinical neuroscience propose that its 
causes and correlations are manifold, and involve the endocrine system, the immune system, and 
neuroplastic mechanisms.  These and other etiological hypotheses are presented in detail in 
Chapter 2.  While the exact causes of depression are still unknown and no reliable biological 
markers currently exist, we seemingly know more about depression and the nervous system than 
ever before due to the proliferation of neuroscience research in the past few decades.  Despite the 
accumulating knowledge regarding depression, the chemical imbalance hypothesis, which posits 
that depression is caused by a deficiency of neurotransmitters, remains the most publicly popular 
explanation of the cause of depression, and is the focus of the chapters in this dissertation.   
My interest in this topic originated in the apparent disconnect between scientific research 
in depression and clinical and lay understandings of the causes of depression, most notably the 
hypothesis that depression is caused by a deficiency of serotonin.  Knowledge translation in 
clinical science is generally conceptualized as going from bench to bedside, i.e., applying 
findings, techniques, and treatments from scientific laboratories to clinical populations.  
Potentially, the knowledge that scientists are building about depression is not being translated 
effectively to clinical and lay society.  This lack of knowledge translation seems evident in the 
way the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression persists, at least among laypersons, despite 
the existence of scientific observations that do not support the hypothesis.  How primary 
clinicians explain the etiology of depression is not well known.  Additionally, while scientists are 
accumulating a great deal of knowledge about the brain and depression, the etiology of 
depression largely remains a mystery.  I was interested in the following questions in particular: 
How do family physicians, who are responsible for the vast majority of the diagnosis and 
treatment of depression in Canada, describe and account for their etiological explanations of 
depression and what discursive resources do they draw on when presenting how they explain 
depression to their patients?  How do scientists who are working toward a biological 
understanding of depression account for the use of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of 
depression, and structure arguments for or against it?  It is these questions that form the basis of 
my empirical investigations in this dissertation. 
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Chapter Two: The Diagnosis and Etiology of Depression in Canada and the United States 
of America 
Depression is notoriously difficult to define.  People use the term to refer to a variety of 
conditions, from a disabling chronic disease to a temporary state of mind.  For nearly two and a 
half millennia, depression, or melancholia, has been understood as encompassing a wide range of 
“dejected states” (p. 443, Jackson, 2008), including a distinct clinical pathology, a non-
pathological mood state, a symptom of another disease, and a temperament or personality type.  
Some (e.g., Wilson, 2009) have argued for conceiving of depression as melancholic realism and 
a creative, innovative, and insightful force in life.  Currently, in Canada and the United States, 
the term ‘depression’ is often used to refer to a clinical syndrome known as Major Depressive 
Disorder in the nomenclature of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).   
2.1 The Diagnosis of Depression 
In the latest version of the DSM (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), a 
diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder requires the presence of at least five symptoms 
occurring during a two-week period, with at least one of the symptoms being either depressed 
mood or loss of interest or pleasure, and the remainder being either significant weight loss/gain, 
insomnia/hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation/retardation, fatigue, or feelings of worthlessness 
or excessive/inappropriate guilt.  Consistent with almost all diagnoses in the DSM-5, the 
symptoms must be accompanied by distress or impairments in important areas of functioning and 
must not be attributable to an effect caused by a substance or another medical condition.  The 
diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder in North America has remained largely unchanged since 
the major shift that occurred with the publication of the DSM-III (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980), when psychoanalytic concepts like neurosis were eschewed and attempts 
were made to improve the reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses.   
Prior to the introduction of the DSM-III, Major Depressive Disorder was diagnosed as 
Depressive Reaction (DSM-I; American Psychiatric Association, 1952) or Depressive Neurosis 
(DSM-II; American Psychiatric Association, 1968).  In the DSM-II, a Depressive Neurosis was 
defined simply as “an excessive reaction of depression due to an internal conflict or to an 
identifiable event such as the loss of a love object or cherished possession.” (p. 40).  The DSM-II 
also contained a diagnosis of Neurasthenic Neurosis, which is a condition characterized by 
weakness, fatigue, and exhaustion, accompanied by chronicity and moderate depression, which 
might be classified as Major Depressive Disorder or Persistent Depressive Disorder (Dysthymia) 
in DSM-5.   
2.1.1 DSM-5 controversy. 
There was much controversy at the release of the DSM-5.  Psychiatrist Allen Frances, 
who chaired the task-force for the DSM-IV, was one of the most vocal critics of the DSM-5.  He 
argued that the DSM-5 expanded diagnostic categories too far, and would medicalize normality 
and result in unnecessary and potentially harmful treatment (Frances, 2013).  With Major 
Depressive Disorder, for example, the DSM-5 no longer contains a bereavement exclusion; in 
DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), a depressive episode that occurred 
within two months of losing a loved one was considered the result of bereavement and not a 
psychiatric disorder.  The change to Major Depressive Disorder is one example of how Allan 
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Frances and others expected the DSM-5 to further pathologize normal human suffering 
(Pickersgill, 2014).   
Thomas Insel, Director of the US National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) at the 
time, criticized the DSM-5 for being unscientific (Insel, 2013).  Insel argued that the DSM, 
rather than being based on objective laboratory measures as is the case in other medical 
disciplines, is based on “consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms” (para. 2) that have 
questionable validity.  He argued that DSM diagnoses have limited the scientific search for 
biomarkers of mental disorders because a potential biomarker of an underlying disease may be 
discarded when it does not align with a DSM symptom cluster.  Insel championed the Research 
Domain Criteria (RDoC) as a new and improved approach to studying mental disorders, and he 
stated that the NIMH would only fund research that cuts across or reduces diagnostic clusters to 
core elements as found in the RDoC.  For example, rather than studying a group of individuals 
with Major Depressive Disorder, researchers would study all patients seeking treatment for a 
mood disorder, or examine a particular symptom, such as anhedonia, that is shared by more than 
one diagnosis.  While he described the RDoC as a framework for guiding research and not a 
clinical tool, he also described it as “a first step towards ‘precision medicine’” (para. 6).  
Precision medicine, sometimes referred to as personalized medicine, refers to the ideal of 
tailoring treatment based on the underlying causes of a specific disease process within the 
individual; it is currently utilized in oncology and the treatment of cancers.  Thus, while the 
RDoC is not about to replace the DSM in clinical practice, it aims to “transform clinical practice 
by bringing a new generation of research to inform how we diagnose and treat mental disorders” 
(para. 6).   
The ultimate goal of the RDoC is to improve diagnostic validity in biological psychiatry 
by understanding the etiological mechanisms at play across various levels of analysis.  The DSM 
is devoid of etiological statements.  It does report on incidence, prevalence, and features 
statistically associated with a diagnosis, but does not make any claim as to the underlying 
pathology.  The etiology of depression is largely unknown, but researchers are following several 
ideas regarding the underlying pathology of depression.   
2.2 Biologically-Based Etiologies of Depression 
Recent developments in the science of depression have led to a more detailed and 
sophisticated understanding of the potential biological mechanisms underlying depression.  The 
scientific community has moved the discourse from depression being caused by an excess of 
black bile to being caused by a complex interaction of environmental and constitutional factors, 
genetic vulnerabilities, neuroplasticity, neurotransmitter functioning, endocrine functioning, and 
immune functioning.  The idea that depression is caused by a simple deficiency of serotonin and 
norepinephrine at the synapse, which has dominated both public and medical discourses for 
decades, and spurred the invention of the SSRIs and related antidepressants, has been abandoned 
in favour of more sophisticated explanations and explorations of the biological effects of stress 
and antidepressant medications.   
In the sections below, I present the major historical and contemporary biologically-based 
etiological explanations for depression, followed by a brief overview of prominent psychological 
models of depression and social risk factors.  I focus primarily upon the biologically-based 
etiologies of depression in this chapter because this is where the chemical imbalance hypothesis 
is situated.  I briefly present psychosocial explanations to orient the reader to concepts discussed 
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later in the dissertation.  With regard to the chemical imbalance hypothesis, I rely upon the 
writings of controversial scholars to construct my argument, including David Healy and Irving 
Kirsch.  David Healy is a psychiatrist and psychopharmacologist who has written extensive 
critiques of antidepressants and the pharmaceutical industry.  In his book, The Antidepressant 
Era, Healy (1997) argues that pharmaceutical companies have promoted and expanded the 
concept of depression as a disease in order to sell antidepressants.  He is also well-known for his 
argument that antidepressant use is associated with an increased risk of suicide.  Healy cited his 
controversial views on depression and antidepressants as leading to a job offer being rescinded 
(Dyer, 2000; Spurgeon, 2002)1.  Similarly, Kirsch (2010), a research psychologist, constructs a 
particular version of depression in his polemic against antidepressant efficacy.  In his book he 
states, “Depression may not even be an illness at all.  Often, it can be a normal reaction to 
abnormal situations” (p. 238).  I acknowledge that there are a variety of positions on depression; 
my intention in the following sections is to present the major ideas about the biological causes of 
depression as defined by contemporary biological psychiatry.    
2.2.1 Humoral explanations. 
The clinical features of depression, or melancholia, have been described similarly for 
over two millennia (Healy, 1997; Jackson 1986; Jackson, 2008).  From the time of the Ancient 
Greeks up until the early 18th century, the humoral conception of illness was dominant.  
Melancholia, originally a Greek term but also transliterated in Latin, was used to describe a state 
of “prolonged fear and depression” (p. 444, Jackson, 2008).  The Greek melancholia was derived 
from melaina chole, or black bile.  In the humoral theory of illness, diseases are caused by 
imbalances of the four humors, i.e., blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile.  The four humors 
were also associated with personality features or temperaments.  Melancholia was thought to be 
caused by an excess of black bile in the blood, which had an effect upon the brain.  The spleen, 
which was thought responsible for filtering black bile that formed in the liver, was also seen as a 
central organ in the pathophysiology of depression since the time of Galen (Jackson, 2008).  In 
the humoral system of medicine, remedies generally revolved around countering the inherent 
properties of the illness.  Treatment of melancholia revolved around removing the excess of 
black bile.  Bloodletting with leaches was a popular method, as was using black hellebore, a 
purgative herb (Healy, 1997).  Melancholia, a dry and cold illness, was treated with hot baths and 
prolonged exposure to moisture.   
                                                 
1 In 2000, Healy accepted a professorship at the University of Toronto (UofT) that included the 
position of clinical director of the mood disorders unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental 
Health (CAMH).  After delivering a lecture critical of SSRIs, the UofT rescinded the offer and 
claimed that Healy’s views were extreme and incompatible with scientific evidence.  Supporters 
of Healy noted that CAMH received significant funding from the pharmaceutical industry, which 
might have played a role in the job being rescinded and Healy subsequently filed a defamation 
lawsuit for $9m CAD (Dyer, 2000).  Healy settled his dispute and, according to a report in the 
British Medical Journal, Healy, CAMH, and the UofT provided a joint statement that “Dr Healy 
accepts assurances that pharmaceutical companies played no role in either CAMH's decision to 
rescind his clinical appointment or the University of Toronto's decision to rescind his academic 
appointment” (p. 1177, Spurgeon, 2002).  
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The humoral system was a general framework to explain and treat illnesses, including 
depression.  The treatments, which today appear misguided, were congruent with the etiological 
conceptualization.  In the humoral system, the brain was implicated in depression but was not 
seen as a central location of pathology.  In etiological explanations that follow the humoral 
system, the brain becomes a central figure.   
2.2.2 Mechanical explanations. 
By the 18th century, mechanical and hydrodynamic explanations, popular in other realms 
of science, became prominent explanations for melancholia (Jackson, 1983; 2008).  Jackson 
(2008), a psychiatrist and medical historian, summarized the mechanical explanations during this 
time as being first vasocentric then neurocentric.  Vasocentric explanations of melancholia 
blamed sluggish blood or reduced circulation; neurocentric explanations blamed sluggish nerve 
fluid or depleted energy levels in the brain.  Jackson (2008) concluded that the mechanical 
explanations had little effect on the overall conceptualization and treatment of melancholia; 
treatments such as bloodletting and purging continued to be prescribed.   
In the beginning of the 19th century, a reconciliation of vasocentric and neurocentric 
explanations was prominent, with a focus on the blood circulation within the brain, and 
hereditary factors were posited to play a large role (Jackson, 1986; 2008).  The neurocentric 
explanations rose in prominence over the century, with the cause of mental illnesses attributed to 
the effect cerebral blood flow had upon nerve cells in the brain.  Decreased blood flow to the 
brain resulted in a decay of brain cells and caused melancholia.  Mental disorders, including 
melancholia, were increasingly viewed as brain diseases rather than diseases of the soul.  Prior to 
the beginning of the 19th century, a person inflicted with a mental disorder was deemed “wholly 
insane, in the sense of someone who had lost complete possession of all his or her faculties” 
(Healy, 1997, p.  28), and this conception was due to a particular understanding of mind and 
body: the soul as an indivisible entity.  During this period, scientific discoveries changed the 
conception of the mind, and, in effect, contributed to a different understanding of mental 
disorders.  For example, in 1823, learning of the reflex arc demonstrated that things could 
happen in the body automatically, without control of the soul (Healy, 1997).  The dysfunctional 
brain was now seen as the principal cause of mental illnesses.   
In the 18th and 19th centuries, brain-based understandings of depression began to take 
shape, first through the influence of reduced blood circulation to the brain and then to 
dysfunctions in nerve cells.  The developing scientific understanding of the nervous system was 
influential but treatments for depression remained the same as those congruent with the humoral 
system.  In the 20th century, the advent of drugs that became known as the antidepressants made 
an impact upon the etiological explanation of depression.    
2.2.3 Influence of antidepressants. 
The “serendipitous discovery” (Ban, 2006, p.  341) of the drugs that became known as 
the antipsychotics and antidepressants had a massive influence on psychiatry.  To understand the 
subsequent biological explanations, it is important to briefly review the invention of the 
antidepressants.  In 1957, scientists Roland Kuhn and Nate Kline independently discovered the 
first tricyclic antidepressant (TCA, imipramine) and the first monoamine oxidase inhibitor 
(MAOI, iproniazid), but, as Healy (1997) reported, the discovery of antidepressants owed much 
to the 1952 discovery of the first antipsychotic (chlorpromazine).   
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The discovery of chlorpromazine began with antihistamine research in the 1930s and 40s 
(Healy, 1997).  Researchers noted that antihistamines seemed to change behaviour, and some 
suggested that they might have a sedative effect.  Scientists began research with animals to test 
the behavioural effects of different antihistamine-like molecules.  There were sedative-like 
effects found for chlorpromazine.  Rats that had been trained to climb a rope to get food would 
no longer do so.  However, the behavioural effects were different from sedatives; the rats would 
display a complete lack of interest in seeking the food, while their motor abilities were seemingly 
unimpaired.  The application to mental disorders did not happen immediately.  The 
pharmaceutical company Smith, Kline & French focused on possible anesthetic uses, perceived 
to be more financially rewarding.  Despite the pharmaceutical company’s reluctance to pursue 
development as a psychiatric drug, chlorpromazine was about to make an impact in the 
psychiatric world.  Reports of the marked effects in clinical settings were growing; clinicians in 
asylums reported that patients treated with chlorpromazine emerged from hallucinations and 
delusions that had previously persisted for years.  Word travels fast, and chlorpromazine use was 
soon widespread in asylums.   
The discovery of reserpine was also an important event that especially contributed to the 
monoamine hypothesis of depression (Healy, 1997).  Reserpine was extracted from a root plant 
popular in India for the treatment of hypertension, snakebites, and insanity.  The drug had 
tranquilizing effects in animals: their eyelids drooped, they were sedated, and sometimes 
spasmodic.  As reported by Healy (1997), a clinical study with 710 psychiatric patients compared 
reserpine with a placebo.  The effects were noticeable even by hospital staff; for example, the 
maintenance workers reported they found fewer windows to repair in the wards where patients 
were receiving reserpine treatment.  Clinical reports also suggested that reserpine caused a 
depressed state, and occasionally made people suicidal.  
Like chlorpromazine, the discovery of imipramine also stemmed from research with 
antihistamines (Healy, 1997).  Chlorpromazine and imipramine share a similar chemical 
structure, and the psychiatric effects of chlorpromazine prompted Roland Kuhn to revisit 
imipramine, an antihistamine compound he recalled having had interesting properties.  
Imipramine was trialed on schizophrenic patients with no effect.  However, patients suffering 
depressive symptoms appeared to show signs of remittance, with a restored interest in social 
interaction and activities.  Kuhn noted that it sometimes took four weeks to see the effects, which 
was notably different from the psychosis-lifting effects of chlorpromazine, which were typically 
evident within an hour.  Kuhn described the antidepressant effects of imipramine.  While his 
reports contained no quantitative data, he described the “potent antidepressant action” (Kuhn, 
1958, p.  464) he observed in patients, who were, sometimes within days, cured of their 
depression.  The pharmaceutical company Geigy did not think there was much point pursuing the 
development of imipramine because, unlike schizophrenia, there were simply not enough 
depressed patients to make it worthwhile.  Eventually, it was a Geigy board member, whose wife 
had successful remission of depression using imipramine, who convinced Geigy to market the 
drug (Healy, 1997). 
Iproniazid as an antidepressant was discovered independently at virtually the same time 
as imipramine (Healy, 1997).  In World War II, German rockets were powered by oxygen and 
ethanol, but by the end of the war, they were running low on these chemicals.  The Germans 
produced hydrazine to use as rocket fuel, and there were massive stocks left over at the end of 
the war.  Pharmaceutical companies benefited; hydrazine was a compound that could be altered 
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to produce a series of chemical derivatives, and some of these derivatives were tested as a 
treatment for tuberculosis.  Iproniazid, one of the derivatives, was found to be an effective 
treatment, and was released as a tuberculostatic in 1952.  Physicians became aware of the mood 
elevating properties when treating sick patients, and researchers subsequently examined the 
chemical properties (Loomer, Saunders, & Kline, 1957).  Research demonstrated iproniazid to be 
useful for treating certain forms of depression.  Like Geigy, the pharmaceutical company Roche 
was reluctant to market iproniazid, but since the pills were already being pressed and distributed 
as a tuberculostatic, they felt the risk was minimal (Healy, 1997).   
It was the next antidepressant to come on the market, amitriptyline, that made a real 
impact (Healy, 1997).  First trialed as a treatment for schizophrenia in 1958, clinicians noticed 
amitriptyline had similar effects to imipramine.  In 1961, Merck released amitriptyline as an 
antidepressant.  Merck, unlike Geigy and Roche, took a proactive marketing approach.  Frank 
Ayd had recently published a book, Recognizing the Depressed Patient, which described 
depression as common and easily diagnosed in primary care.  Merck bought 50,000 copies of the 
book to distribute to physicians as promotional material. Amitriptyline became the best-selling 
antidepressant at the time, and perhaps more significantly, it opened a new era in the treatment 
and the understanding of depression (Healy, 1997). 
Moncrieff (2008), in an historical analysis of the rise of the antidepressant as a medical 
concept, argued that the discipline of psychiatry was transformed in the 1950s with the invention 
of the antidepressant drugs.  During the 1950s and 1960s, the drugs we now know as 
antidepressants were increasingly viewed as drugs that counter or correct an underlying disease 
state, rather than as drugs that induce abnormal states that produce beneficial results in 
psychiatric symptoms, such as sedation or stimulation (Moncrieff & Cohen, 2006).  Searching 
MEDLINE articles from 1957 to 1965, Moncrieff (2008) reported that the term ‘antidepressant’ 
went from being mentioned in a handful of articles in 1958, to over 100 in 1959, and 500 to 600 
articles in 1963 to 1965.  The concept of an antidepressant as a disease-specific drug grew in 
popularity despite a lack of understanding regarding the underlying pathology of depression and 
a lack of evidence that the drugs had disease-specific effects (Moncrieff, 2008).   
The discovery that certain drugs seemed to have antidepressant properties marks an 
important shift in the etiology of depression.  Previously, etiological understandings were 
proffered and treatments followed.  In the 20th century, scientists, encouraged by the clinical 
effects these drugs, turned their attention to studying the mechanisms of action.  It was from 
these empirical efforts that influential hypotheses, such as the monoamine imbalance hypothesis, 
were offered as explanations for depression. 
2.2.4 The monoamine hypothesis. 
Driven by a desire to explain the disease-specific actions of the antidepressants, the 
monoamine hypothesis of depression, also known as the chemical imbalance hypothesis, was 
proposed.  In a seminal paper, Schildkraut (1965) argued that the antidepressants of the time, 
tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) and monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), function by 
increasing the concentrations of monoamines, specifically the catecholamines, which are 
epinephrine, norepinephrine, and dopamine, in the synaptic cleft by either preventing enzymes 
from breaking them down or by preventing their reuptake into the releasing cell.  Schildkraut 
also argued that reserpine, a drug thought to induce a depressed state, functions by reducing 
levels of norepinephrine available in the synaptic cleft.  Schildkraut proposed norepinephrine as 
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the main catecholamine responsible for depressive states.  Two years later, Coppen (1967) 
similarly argued that a lack of serotonin at important receptor sites in the brain was responsible 
for depression.  Like Schildkraut, a core tenet of his argument was that reserpine depletes 
monoamines, and that if a person without a psychiatric illness takes reserpine, he or she will 
“suffer from a depression not distinguishable from severe endogenous depression” (Coppen, 
1967, p.  1258).   
Schildkraut (1965) and Coppen (1967) both admitted that the evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that depression is caused by a deficiency of norepinephrine and/or serotonin at certain 
receptor sites in the brain was preliminary and incomplete.  Schildkaut wrote, “Although the 
hypothesis may not be directly testable by currently available experimental methods, this 
formulation is nonetheless of considerable heuristic value” (Schildkaut, 1965, p.  509). Coppen 
wrote, “the weight of evidence, although it is by no means conclusive, suggests that biochemical 
changes are the most important in the aetiology of affective disorders” (Coppen, 1967, p.  1237), 
but concluded, “we must face the very real possibility that we are far from the primary 
disturbance in depression” (p. 1258).  Thus, these scientists, while convincing in their argument 
in support of a monoamine/catecholamine hypothesis of depression, cautioned that the 
hypothesis might be incorrect.   
The shortcomings of the monoamine hypothesis of depression have been well 
documented (e.g., Bentall, 2009; France, Lysaker, & Robinson, 2007; Healy, 1997; Kirsch, 
2010; Leo & Lacasse, 2008; Valenstein, 1998; Whitaker, 2010).  In a comprehensive review of 
depression and depression treatments appearing in Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Wong and 
Lucino (2001) wrote that there are “serious gaps and limitations in the monoamine hypothesis” 
(p. 347), and pointed to research indicating that there is increased norepinephrine output in 
depression and that antidepressant drugs affect neurotransmitters within hours but treatment of 
depression takes weeks.  In addition, a search for the biological marker of depression, such as 
depleted monoamines or a defective serotonin or norepinephrine system, has been elusive.  
Healy (1997) presented additional problems with the hypothesis.  He argued that reserpine, the 
compound that supposedly causes depression by depleting brain amines, was an effective 
treatment for depression.  Isoniazid, a related compound to iproniazid, was also an 
antidepressant, but unlike iproniazid, isoniazid did not inhibit monoamine oxidase.  For the 
TCAs, animal researchers demonstrated that monoamine levels decreased with chronic usage, 
and there was no correlation between the amount of reuptake blocked, or enzyme inhibited, with 
behavioural antidepressant effects (Healy, 1997).   
Kirsch (2010), in his polemic against antidepressants, provided a comprehensive 
argument against the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  He argued against the hypothesis, first by 
undermining the idea that reserpine induces a state of depression, which was presented by 
Coppen and Schildkraut as an essential piece of evidence for the hypothesis, and by challenging 
the idea that reserpine depletes monoamines.  Kirsch reported that the evidence for reserpine 
causing a state of depression was based on observational clinical reports, and that when the 
clinical reports were later analyzed, only 6% of patients on reserpine had developed clinical 
depression.  While this research was presented after Coppen and Schildkraut’s papers, Kirsch 
(2010) argued that a decade earlier, Davies and Shepherd reported that reserpine was effective as 
a treatment for depression (Shepherd, 1956).  Further, Kirsch argued that Coppen and 
Schildkraut ignored a key piece of evidence regarding reserpine.  Coppen (1967) and Schildkraut 
(1965) both cited the works of Julius Axelrod, Nobel Laureate, and colleagues, who 
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demonstrated that imipramine functioned to inhibit the uptake of norepinephrine and serotonin 
back into the releasing cell (Hertting, Axelrod, & Whitby, 1961).  Kirsch wrote that Axelrod, in 
the same papers cited by Schildkraut and Coppen, had reported that reserpine, amphetamine, and 
chlorpromazine, in addition to imipramine, reduced the reuptake of serotonin and 
norepinephrine.  Kirsch argued, “acknowledging that reserpine had the same effect as 
imipramine on the reuptake of neurotransmitters would have demolished one of the two 
empirical pillars of the theory, the supposed fact that reserpine decreased levels of 
norepinephrine and serotonin and thereby caused depression (p. 90, Kirsch, 2010).   He argued 
that the scientists in question ignored key evidence contrary to their hypotheses. 
Next, Kirsch argued that the chemical imbalance hypothesis is untenable because 
depleting monoamines such as serotonin does not induce depression.  He argued that at least 90 
studies have attempted to cause depression symptoms in healthy people by reducing levels of 
monoamine neurotransmitters in the brain, and that the conclusion is that experimentally 
decreasing monoamines has no effect on mood.  If depression was indeed caused by a deficiency 
of monoamines, rapid depletion of serotonin and norepinephrine would result in non-depressed 
participants becoming depressed.   
Kirsch (2010) then turned his attention to undermining the other pillar of the chemical 
imbalance argument: that antidepressants treat the specific disease process underlying 
depression.  Kirsch argued that too many different types of antidepressants work equally well.  
For example, SSRIs (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) and NDRIs (norepinephrine 
dopamine reuptake inhibitors) are all estimated to work at approximately the same rate – 59% of 
patients respond to NDRIs and 60% to SSRIs (Kirsch, 2010).   Kirsch argued that if each drug 
treated a specific underlying monoamine pathology, the benefits of these antidepressants would 
not account for 119% of patients who respond.  He further argued that when people fail to 
respond to an initial antidepressant treatment, they can be switched to a SSRI or a NDRI with 
equivalent results.  He then addressed a potential counter-argument: that some depressed people 
have a deficiency of serotonin, some norepinephrine, and some both.  He argued that, if that were 
the case, antidepressants that selectively block the reuptake of serotonin and norepinephrine 
(SNRIs) would be the most effective antidepressant, but data suggest that the treatment response 
rate is equivalent to the other antidepressants.  Kirsch utilized the efficacy equivalence data to 
support his claim that antidepressants function because they are “active placebos” (p. 96), i.e., 
antidepressants show benefit over placebo in severe cases of depression because the side-effects 
of the medication signal to the participant that they are taking the active drug and thereby 
increase their hope for improvement.   
Finally, Kirsch proposed that the chemical imbalance hypothesis is untenable because a 
recent antidepressant, tianeptine, is a selective serotonin reuptake enhancer (SSRE).  According 
to the hypothesis, tianeptine should induce depression.  In clinical trials, tianeptine produced an 
antidepressant response in 63% of patients with depression.  Kirsch referred to this as “the last 
nail in the coffin” (p. 96), and concluded that the chemical imbalance hypothesis is an historical 
relic that was born from a selective presentation of the data and from incorrectly attributing 
placebo effects to drug effects, and propagated because of its simple medical narrative.  
However, researchers have since noted that tianeptine may not act upon the serotonin system at 
all and suggest that its antidepressant properties are due to action upon the glutamate system 
(McEwen et al., 2010).  Kirsch’s ‘last nail’ may have been based on an inaccurate understanding 
of tianeptine’s mechanism of action.  
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Kirsch’s argument against the efficacy of antidepressants is controversial and faces 
considerable challenge from other scholars. In addition, researchers continue to publish analyses 
claiming that antidepressants are more effective than placebo (Cipriani et al., 2018).  However, 
Kirsch and others’ claims against the chemical imbalance hypothesis are, for the most part, 
accepted as uncontroversial by scientists who study the biological bases of depression.  Despite 
the widespread endorsement of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression among the 
public, the scientific community no longer describes depression as caused by a chemical 
imbalance of monoamines in the synaptic cleft.  It is this disjunction that is the focus of this 
dissertation.   
2.2.5 The amine-receptor hypothesis. 
In the 1970s, some difficulties with the monoamine hypothesis led scientists to propose 
that antidepressants function at the receptor level (Healy, 1997).  It was claimed that all 
antidepressants, including novel drugs whose action was not explained by the monoamine 
hypothesis, down-regulated beta-adrenergic receptors (e.g., Extein, Tallman, Smith, & Goodwin, 
1979; Siever & Davis, 1985) .  This action took approximately two weeks, which could account 
for the delayed onset of antidepressant effects.  Healy (1997) reported that the receptor research 
was limited, mostly by an inability to clearly distinguish proper receptors (those that elicit 
change) from proteins that drugs bind to but are not receptors, and a difficulty detecting small 
amounts of receptors and neurotransmitters in specific areas when they are present all over the 
brain.  Wong and Lucino (2001) summarized that theories which proposed long-term changes in 
receptor sensitivity have been unsuccessful.    
2.2.6 Genetics and heritability hypotheses.   
Genetic factors have long been purported to play an important role in depression.  Rees 
(1960) wrote, “Depressive illnesses are the resultant of the interaction of genetic and 
constitutional factors on one hand with environmental and other exogenous influences on the 
other” (p. 114).  Based on data from twin studies, the heritability of depression is estimated to 
account for approximately 30 to 42 percent of the lifetime risk for developing depression 
(Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & Pedersen, 2006).  Unlike disorders that display classic Mendelian 
inheritance, such as Huntington’s disease, depression is a genetically complex disorder, similar 
to heart disease and diabetes.  Although depression has been long assumed to be caused by the 
interaction of environmental stressors and genetic vulnerability (e.g., Lewis, 1934), there has 
been no confirmed or replicated genetic association.   
The most extensively studied gene potentially related to depression is 5-HTTLPR, which 
is responsible for promoting the coding of the serotonin transporter protein.  Serotonin 
transporter is responsible for the reuptake of serotonin at synapses.   The 5-HTTLPR gene has 
several variants, but it is generally categorized into long or short allele variants, with the 
long/long genotype associated with greater transcriptional efficiency of serotonin transporter 
when compared to the short/long or short/short genotype (Capsi et al., 2003).  Caspi et al. (2003) 
proposed that depression is caused by an interaction of stressful life events and a genetic 
vulnerability, specifically two short alleles or one short allele at the promoter region of 5-
HTTLPR.  They argued that individuals who have two short alleles display more self-reported 
and informant-reported depressive symptoms, higher probability of suicidal ideation, and higher 
probability of meeting criteria for a major depressive episode than those with two long alleles, 
but that the effect was evident only when accompanied by multiple stressful life events.   
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A great deal of research attention has been dedicated to studying 5-HTTLPR and the 
effect of stressful life events.  While some researchers (e.g., Kendler, Kuhn, Vittum, Prescott, & 
Riley, 2005) replicated the Caspi et al. (2003) study, others have not.   Risch et al. (2009) 
conducted a meta-analysis of published data on the association between 5-HTTLPR genotype 
and frequency of stressful life events.  The authors reported that, while stressful life events were 
associated with depression, the 5-HTTLPR genotype was not associated with depression, even at 
higher levels of stressful life events.  Many replications and meta-analyses followed, with 
inconsistent results.  In an attempt to settle the conflicting results, Culverhouse et al. (2017), 
working as a large consortium of scientists who had previously published on the topic, 
reanalyzed a large corpus of published and unpublished data.  They reported that there was no 
evidence for an interaction between stressful life events and 5-HTTLPR genotype.  They 
concluded, “This lack of evidence for a strong, robust effect should be taken into account before 
planning future research on this topic” (p. 7).    
While there appears to be a consistent effect of genetic heritability associated with 
depression, there has yet to be clear evidence of the genes responsible for depression.  Wong and 
Licinio (2001) had predicted that the advancements in genetic studies would “yield results in the 
next few years” (p. 349).  Despite these new techniques and the mapping of the genome, the 
specific genetic vulnerabilities remain elusive.   
2.2.7 The neuroendocrine hypotheses. 
Stress is considered a risk factor for developing a number of distinct mental illnesses, 
including depression.  The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis is implicated in the body’s 
response to stress, which involves a cascade of hormones released from the hypothalamus to the 
pituitary gland, and from the pituitary gland to the adrenal cortex, where the hormones cortisol 
and corticosterone are released.  The HPA axis is central to the body’s sympathetic, or fight-
flight response.  Sustained elevated activity of the HPA axis can lead to hypercortisolaemia, 
which is associated with disturbances in anxiety regulation and monoaminergic systems, 
cognitive impairments, and volume reductions in limbic brain structures, similar to those 
observed in depressed individuals (de Kloet, Joels, & Holsboer, 2005).   
Among the correlational data for stress as a risk factor in the etiology of depression is the 
impaired suppression of cortisol following an injection of dexamethasone, a synthetic form of 
cortisol.  The dexamethasone suppression test typically involves an injection of dexamethasone 
followed by a measurement of cortisol levels 12 to 24 hours later; persons with depression tend 
to have higher cortisol levels following the test than persons without depression, which is 
thought to indicate a hyperactive HPA axis (Stetler & Miller, 2011).  Once thought to be a 
potential diagnostic biomarker for depression, the dexamethasone suppression test lacked the 
specificity to differentiate depression from comorbid conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease, 
alcohol withdrawal, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia (Nierenberg & Feinstein, 
1988).  However, the effect of the dexamethasone suppression test suggests the presence of HPA 
axis disturbances in persons with depression when compared to non-depressed individuals (de 
Kloet, Joels, & Holsboer, 2005).  After a comprehensive meta-analysis of studies assessing 
depression and stress hormones, Stetler and Miller (2011) concluded that HPA hyperactivity in 
depression varies across patient groups and depression subtypes, with the greatest effect 
observed in older patients with more severe symptoms.   
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Stress as a risk factor for depression is present in most models of depression, and acute 
and chronic stress is widely used as a precipitant of depression-like behaviour in animal models 
of depression (e.g., forced-swim test; tail-suspension test; social-defeat stress; chronic restraint 
stress).  Acute stress models such as the forced-swim test were developed to test the efficacy of 
antidepressants and aid the search for new antidepressants (e.g., Porsolt, Le Pichon, & Jalfre, 
1977).  However, in acute stress models, antidepressant administration was observed to rapidly 
reverse the effect of the stress (i.e., immobility or ‘behavioural despair’), whereas in human 
patients antidepressants are known to take several weeks for effects to be observed.  Later, 
chronic stress models, such as chronic social defeat stress (e.g., Tsankova et al., 2006) and 
chronic unpredictable stress (e.g., Monteiro et al., 2015), were preferred due to observations that 
these chronic stress models produced depression-like behaviours (i.e., lack of interest in novel or 
sweet foods; social avoidance) that were not rapidly ameliorated by antidepressant 
administration, but rather required chronic antidepressant administration.  Current pre-clinical 
animal models of depression utilize chronically administered stressors to precipitate depression-
like behaviours, and are a foundation for experimental studies of depression, and signal the 
primacy of stress as a precipitator of depression.   
In summary, stress has been shown to affect the neuroendocrine system, which involves 
the hypothalamus and pituitary gland in the brain and the adrenal cortex in the adrenal glands, 
and is a risk factor for developing depression.  The data are correlational in humans but 
preclinical researchers use stress as a causative precipitant of depression-like behaviour in animal 
models.  However, research examining the primacy of the body’s response to cortisol as a 
biomarker for depression has not produced firm, replicable results.   
2.2.8 The neuroplasticity hypotheses. 
Neuroplasticity is an umbrella term that describes the brain’s ability to adapt and change, 
functionally and structurally, to environmental stimuli and experiences throughout the lifespan 
(Pascual-Leone, Amedi, Fregni, & Merabet, 2005).  Synaptic plasticity and neurogenesis are two 
forms of neuroplasticity.  Synaptic plasticity refers to the strengthening and weakening of neural 
connections in the brain based on the activity of neurons, and is most apparent during neural 
development.  Neurogenesis refers to the creation of neurons and is also most apparent during 
early development.  Synaptic plasticity and neurogenesis, once thought to be principally the 
domain of early development, are also present in adulthood, and are often implicated in the 
pathophysiology of depression 
Neuroscientists have stated that “the cause of depression is far from being a simple 
deficiency of central monoamines” (Krishnan & Nestler, 2008, p.  895), but monoamines such as 
serotonin may still play an important role.  Krishnan and Nestler (2008) summarized that an 
increase in monoamines after administration of an antidepressant eventually influences 
neuroplasticity, which may account for the therapeutic delay of antidepressants.  Kraus, Castrén, 
Kasper, and Lanzenberger (2017) argued that the interaction of serotonin and its receptors with 
proteins supporting synaptic plasticity and neurogenesis might contribute to the cause of 
depression. 
Castrén (2005) presented the network hypothesis of depression and he proposed that 
increased monoamines in turn have an impact on the plasticity of the brain.   The network 
hypothesis attempts to bring in brain development for a more encompassing understanding of 
depression.  Serotonin and other monoamines contribute significantly to brain development, and 
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in critical periods, long-term structural adaptations create relatively stable information networks.  
The monoamine hypothesis does not incorporate the effects of development, while the network 
hypothesis places them in the domain of activity-dependent modification.  The adult brain, while 
not as structurally plastic as the developing brain, continues to change in an activity-dependent 
fashion susceptible to environmental influences.  Antidepressants are hypothesized to function 
by improving the activity-dependent state of the brain by increasing synaptic plasticity and 
neurogenesis. 
While Castrén (2005) admitted that supporting evidence is “limited and mostly indirect” 
(p. 242), he argued that the best evidence to support the network hypothesis is the discovery that 
antidepressants increase hippocampal neurogenesis in rodents.  Castrén purported that the 
newborn neurons correlate with the behavioural effects seen with antidepressants, and the 
delayed onset of antidepressant effects is due to the time it takes new neurons to be integrated 
and functioning in a network.  The increased proliferation of neurons is accompanied by 
increased apoptosis (the death of cells that occurs as part of normal development), so rather than 
creating additional neurons to the network, Castrén hypothesized that antidepressants enhance 
the efficiency of information networks through activity-dependent plasticity, increasing the 
connectivity of neurons while selectively trimming defective neurons.   
Castrén (2005) posited that brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), which plays a role 
in the maintenance of neurons and the survival of new neurons, was a possible mechanism for 
altering activity-dependent neural plasticity.  Krishnan and Nestler (2008) summarized the 
support for the BDNF hypothesis of depression, noting that scientists have measured reduced 
postmortem hippocampal BDNF in people who were depressed, reduced BDNF expression 
following chronic stress in animal models of depression, and increased BDNF expression 
following antidepressant treatment in animal models of depression.  However, Krishnan and 
Nestler (2008) reported that the research on BDNF and depression is complex and sometimes 
contradictory, and they concluded that “BDNF-mediated signaling is involved in neuroplastic 
responses to stress and antidepressants, but these effects are both region-specific and 
antidepressant specific and function in the background of other potent genetic and environmental 
modifiers” (p. 897).  Much like the monoamine hypothesis, the BDNF hypothesis does not 
provide an overall explanation for the underlying cause of depression, but does demonstrate the 
complexity of the disorder. 
Over the past two decades, the drug ketamine, an anesthetic drug known to inhibit N-
methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) glutamate receptors, has gained attention for its rapid 
antidepressant effects in patients with treatment-resistant depression (e.g., Berman et al., 2000; 
Zarate et al., 2006), and scientists have posited that the antidepressant effect is due to increased 
synaptic plasticity (Krystal, Sanacora, & Duman, 2013; Zanos & Gould, 2018).  Li et al. (2010) 
argued that, in an animal model, ketamine administration rapidly increases synaptic plasticity 
through enhancing the number and function of dendritic spines.  Krystal et al. (2013) 
summarized that ketamine might function as an antidepressant by disinhibiting glutamate, 
sending off a signaling cascade stemming from an increase in alpha-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-
4-isoxazole propionic acid (AMPA) receptors and a decrease in NMDA receptors.  They 
proposed that AMPA receptors stimulate the mammalian target of rapamycin (mTOR) pathway 
while decreased NMDA receptors suppress BDNF levels, and both contribute to a rapid increase 
in dendritic spines.  Ketamine, a rising star among depression treatments, appears to enhance 
neuroplasticity and overcome the effects of stress on the brain.   
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The scientific accumulation of evidence for neurogenesis and neuroplasticity displaced 
the previously common conception that the structure and function of the brain was generally 
fixed throughout adulthood.  These concepts have been applied in an attempt to explain the 
causes of depression, but much remains unknown.  Like the monoamine hypothesis, the network 
hypothesis of Castrén utilizes the scientific understanding of the brain at the time to hypothesize 
about the nature of depression.  And like Schildkraut and Coppen, Castrén has used cautious 
language to present the idea.  As scientists gain new insights and knowledge into how the brain 
works, we can expect additional hypothesizing about the causes of depression. 
2.2.9 The neuroimmunity hypothesis. 
Another recent proposal for the pathophysiological mechanism of depression involves 
inflammation and the immune response.  Wong and Lucinio (2001) described the immune 
system as a “key mediator of brain-body interactions” (p. 348), and reported that cytokines, 
small signaling proteins created by immune cells, influence a number of basic functions that are 
disturbed during a depression, namely sleep, appetite, and cognition.  Krishnan and Nestler 
(2008) summarized that cytokines appear to influence mood in humans and rodent models, but 
that the effect is inconsistent, and the neural circuitry and pathways to behaviour are largely 
unknown.  Hodes, Kana, Menard, Merad, and Russo (2015) reviewed the scientific evidence 
from studies with humans and animal models of depression and proposed that 
neuroinflammation contributes to the precipitation of a mood disorder.   
Michal Schwartz (2015) argued that the immune system is a central component in the 
functioning and homeostatic maintenance of the brain.  She proposed, “Immune cells control 
formation of the brain’s stem cells, shape cognitive performance such as learning and memory, 
and affect our mood and our ability to cope with stress” (p. 13).  She hypothesized that the 
immune system interacts with the brain during stress response and is central to fighting the 
neuropathology induced by chronic stress states, which includes depression and anxiety.   
Schwartz (2015) argued that during acute stress, immunity is boosted in the short term, 
fear response is decreased, and physical/mental performance is increased.  In support of this 
contention, she referred to research with immune deficient mice, who, after exposure to an acute 
stress, displayed an increased fear response and a longer lasting startle response.  She equated the 
anxious and avoidant behaviour observed in the mice to individuals experiencing post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), and suggested that the immune system may play a key role in protecting 
an individual from developing PTSD.  Further, she argued that the immune response assists the 
brain in restoring levels of BDNF, a protein responsible for cell growth and survival, and 
critically important for neurogenesis and synaptic plasticity.  Thus, the immune system, under 
periods of acute, short-term stress, might facilitate recovery.   
With regard to chronic stress, Schwartz (2015) argued that long-term, unrelenting stress 
disrupts the immune response by reducing the number and quality of immune cells available.  
She cites evidence in rodent and human studies of increased susceptibility to disease under states 
of chronic stress, and concludes that chronic stress creates a “vicious cycle” (p. 69) by reducing 
the body’s ability to recover from stress and in turn rendering the body less capable of dealing 
with future stressors.  She suggested that restoring or improving immune response might be the 
key to treating depression.   
The immune system plays a significant role in the brain, and inflammation and immune 
response may be an etiological factor in the development of depressive illness.  The idea that 
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depression recovery could be facilitated through improving immune response and reducing 
inflammation is a novel approach but it is not yet clear what novel treatments this hypothesis will 
lead to.  Implicating the immune system as among the causes of depression, and linking the 
immune system response to other factors in the development of depression, such as BDNF 
production and synaptic plasticity, appears to position the immune system as a mediator of 
disease and recovery in depression. 
2.2.10 Summary of biologically-based etiological explanations. 
Current scientific thought and research on depression etiology demonstrates that it is 
likely caused by a complex interaction of environmental and constitutional factors, genetic 
vulnerabilities, neuroplasticity, neurotransmitter functioning, endocrine functioning, and immune 
functioning, that are not fully understood.  The hypothesis that depression is caused by a 
deficiency of serotonin and norepinephrine at the synapse has been displaced by more complex 
explanations and explorations of the biological effects of stress and antidepressant medications.  
Despite the accumulation of knowledge surrounding depression, much remains to be known.  I 
agree with Kendler (2012), who described these potential causes and interactions as “the dappled 
nature of causes of psychiatric illness” (p. 377), and proposed that researchers must attend to the 
widely-distributed causes, from molecules to culture, of illnesses such as depression.   
2.3 Additional Factors in the Etiology of Depression 
2.3.1 Biopsychosocial model. 
The biopsychosocial model provides clinicians with a framework to conceptualize 
illnesses that have widely-distributed causes and risk factors.  Engel (1977) proposed the 
biopsychosocial model as a way for psychiatry to integrate the biomedical model, which he 
argued is inadequate for understanding psychiatric presentations, with psychosocial factors.  
Engel argued that the reductionistic biomedical model fails to account for the presentation and 
subjective experience of illness, which is influenced by biological, individual, and social factors 
in a complex interaction.  The biopsychosocial model encourages clinicians to consider multiple 
factors to guide treatment to the specific needs of the patient (Borrell-Carrio, Suchman, & 
Epstein, 2004).  In the sections below, I present some of the psychological and social factors that 
are associated with depression. 
2.3.2 Psychological factors. 
In the early 20th century, thoughts in psychiatry about the etiology of depression were 
dominated by psychoanalytic explanations, and psychological explanations in general were more 
prominent throughout the century than at any other point in history (Jackson, 1986).  
Psychoanalytic theorists posited that melancholia or depression was caused by inadequate 
nurturing in infancy and childhood, and Freud (1957) described melancholia as a type of 
mourning for the loss of a love-object.  Research conducted after the psychoanalytic heyday has 
since suggested that early loss in life, such as the death of a parent, especially a mother, before 
the age of 9, increases vulnerability to developing psychiatric disorders such as Major 
Depressive Disorder later in life (Agid et al., 1999).  Psychological theories of the causes of 
depression typically follow a diathesis-stress model of illness, which posits that illness is caused 
by the interaction of an underlying vulnerability with stressful life events (Schotte, Van Den 
Bossche, De Doncker, Claes, & Cosyns, 2006).    
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Aaron Beck’s (1979) cognitive model of depression has been extremely influential in 
medical discourses of depression.  It contends that depression is caused by the combination of 
maladaptive schemas, which are patterns of thought that organize and categorize experience 
regarding the self, the future, and the world, automatic negative thoughts about the self, and 
stressful life events (Dozois & Beck, 2008).  The cognitive model of depression proposes that 
these psychological vulnerabilities interact with precipitating stressors to produce emotional 
dysregulation and symptoms of depression.  Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, based on Beck’s 
model, is frequently referred to as the default psychological treatment for depression. 
Another prominent evidence-based treatment for depression is Interpersonal Therapy.  
The interpersonal model of depression (Coyne, 1976; Evraire & Dozois, 2011) posits that 
individuals that are susceptible to developing depression engage in excessive reassurance 
seeking, i.e., repeatedly seeking affirmations from others about their worth.  When others 
respond with support and reassurance they doubt the sincerity and continue to seek reassurance, 
placing a burden on the relationship, which deteriorates.  Close and supportive relationships are a 
protective factor for depression (Evraire & Dozois, 2011).  Like the cognitive model of 
depression, the interpersonal model constructs depression as a result of diathesis-stress.   
2.3.3 Social factors. 
Researchers studying the link between adverse life events and depression have noted a 
strong correlation between serious losses, traumatic events, and other acute and chronic stressors.  
In a review of the research literature on the role of stress, Harkness (2008) concluded that 
stressful life events are strongly associated with the onset of depression, especially three to six 
months prior to a depressive episode, among individuals who have a genetic vulnerability, an 
experience of childhood adversity, and/or a cognitive vulnerability.  Early life experiences such 
as loss of a parent, inadequate parenting, and abuse and neglect, result in a greater risk of 
developing depression later in life (Goodman & Lusby, 2015).      
Exposure to a wide-range of social factors, often referred to as the social determinants of 
health, are associated with increased risk of depression.  According to the Canadian Mental 
Health Association (n.d.), the social determinants of health in Canada include aboriginal status, 
disability, early life experience, education, employment conditions, food insecurity, health 
services, gender and gender identity, housing, income and income distribution, race, sexual 
orientation, social exclusion, social safety net, and unemployment and job security, with freedom 
from discrimination and violence, social inclusion, and access to economic resources being 
particularly salient for mental health.  The World Health Organization (2014) has argued that 
improving mental health outcomes will require a reduction in social inequality, discrimination, 
and poverty across the lifespan of individuals.   
2.4 Summary 
While depression appears to be caused by an interaction of multiple biological, 
psychological, and social factors, the idea that depression is caused by a chemical imbalance in 
the brain remains prominent in Canadian and American society.  Next, I present the framework 
that guided my research and analysis (Chapter Three), and then, in Chapters Four and Five, I 
present my discursive analyses of talk of etiology and the chemical imbalance hypothesis that 
was generated in interviews with family physicians and scientists.    
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Chapter Three: General Methods for Manuscripts 1 and 2 
3.1 Analytical Perspective: Discursive Psychology and Social Constructionism 
The following research is situated within the theoretical perspective of discursive 
psychology, with an epistemological position consistent with social constructionism (Edley, 
2001; Potter, 2003).  According to social constructionists such as Gergen (1985) and Burr 
(1995), knowledge is built and shared in social interactions; objective reality is unknowable 
because any form of knowing requires language and the perception of the human mind, and one 
can never separate oneself from the object of study.  Rather than language being representative 
of reality or of the thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes of the speaker, language is conceptualized as a 
performative social action (Burr, 1995).  With regard to ontology, social constructionists do not 
deny the existence of a reality outside of language, but instead focus upon the epistemic position 
that discourses construct and constrain versions of reality (Edley, 2001).  This social 
constructionist position informs my discursive analysis.  
The analytical perspective for this dissertation is located in discursive psychology, which 
is a discipline that applies concepts and ideas from discourse analysis to questions in social 
psychology (Potter, 2003; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  Discourse analysis in social psychology 
(DASP) involves a systematic examination of how language communicates content and performs 
functions, while drawing attention to contradictions and assumptions within a text (Wood & 
Kroger, 2000).  DASP involves examining accounts for content, the style in which participants 
construct and present the content, and the social actions that it performs (Wood & Kroger, 2000).  
The goal of a DASP is to demonstrate how talk and text is structured to accomplish various 
effects or consequences.  Consistent with social constructionism and DASP, I maintain that we 
are born into already-discoursed worlds and that we orient to these discourses in daily life, 
perhaps by agreeing with, disagreeing with, and/or nuancing the discourses.  While my analysis 
focuses on particular statements from the interviewees, I assume that the interviewees’ advocacy 
for a particular stance derives from their orientating to socially-available discourses.  
The study of persuasive rhetoric has an ancient history. Aristotle (trans. 2007) promoted 
the systematic study of the art of rhetoric, which he defined as an ability to see all possible 
means of persuasion for a particular case, and classified rhetorical strategies as appeals to the 
character of the speaker (ethos), appeals to logic (logos), and appeals to emotion (pathos).  Billig 
(1996), drawing upon the work of the ancient scholars, proposed that a rhetorical approach to 
social psychology involves an examination of how people construct arguments for and/or against 
issues of contention.  Billig stated that “a basic rhetorical motive... is the motive to justify a 
position and ward off criticism” (p. 191). In the analyses, I make inferences about possible 
functions for the use of specific rhetorical strategies and means of persuasion.    
3.1.1 Social construction of depression. 
I rely on social constructionism to inform my perspective on the diagnosis and etiology of 
depression.  The current diagnosis of depression is a construct created in social interaction and is 
historically and culturally produced.  Horwitz (2011) detailed the social and contextual forces 
that led to the creation of the diagnosis known as Major Depressive Disorder.  He noted that 
research-oriented clinicians gained a foothold within the American Psychiatric Association in the 
1970s and displaced the traditional psychoanalytic practitioners in the decision-making 
processes.  He also noted that the diagnoses were created during a time of competing interests 
from other disciplines, such as social work and psychology, and criticisms of psychiatric 
  
 
27 
diagnostic validity.  Horwitz argued that the diagnostic system introduced in DSM-III was 
created to provide legitimacy and to align psychiatry with the other medical specialties.  He 
argued that the consequences of this redefined diagnosis of depression were the vast proliferation 
of the diagnosis of depression, including the medicalization of sadness and short-lived reactions 
to stressors, and the rise in antidepressant use by encompassing a vast array of symptoms that 
responded to antidepressant medication.  By aligning with this perspective, I view the diagnosis 
and etiological descriptions of depression as contingent upon social and contextual forces.   
3.2 General Methods of Data Analysis 
In this section I outline my general approach to data analysis for the two studies that 
follow.  Further details regarding the method specific to each study can be found in the 
respective Method sections.  Here I focus on the process of the analyses and provide a 
description of the link between the methods of the two studies. 
I honed my general approach to data analysis through reading articles and methodology 
texts on discourse analysis in social psychology, participating in research team meetings, and 
involving myself with the research of my supervisor, Dr. Linda McMullen.  Dr. McMullen, 
along with one of her former graduate students, conducted interviews with family physicians 
about their diagnostic and treatment practices for depression.  My introduction to the family 
physician interview data occurred in the context of my work as a research assistant that involved 
checking the fidelity of the interview transcripts, which were transcribed by a typist.  I was 
intrigued by the way the family physicians talked about defining depression and, in particular, 
how the physicians described using the chemical imbalance explanation with patients.  I chose to 
examine this talk and presented a paper as part of a symposium with Linda McMullen and fellow 
graduate students at the Canadian Psychological Association Annual Convention (Sigurdson & 
McMullen, 2010).  Concurrently, I was also developing a proposal for a program of research to 
conduct interviews with scientists conducting neuroscientific depression research.   
In the proposal phase of my study with neuroscientists, I conducted a literature review 
focusing on Western/English approaches to depression.  I searched for review articles on 
depression written in high impact journals such as Nature, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 
Science, Neuron, et cetera.  I focused on review articles because they contained what I deemed to 
be an appropriate level of detail along with general statements about the state of depression 
research at a given time.  I used some of this content in Chapter 2, The Diagnosis and Etiology of 
Depression in Canada and the United States of America.  I also read articles and books critiquing 
neuroscience and biological psychiatry in order to hear dissenting voices and to begin to 
understand the main challenges and dilemmas in the fields of clinical neurosciences and 
biological psychiatry. Brief reviews of those writings pertinent to the research questions posed in 
Studies 1 and 2 are in their respective literature review sections.  The literature informed my 
creation of a semi-structured interview schedule with follow-up prompts to interview 
neuroscientists for Study 2.   
Analyses of both sets of data started with listening to the audio recordings and, in the 
case of the physician interviews, verifying the transcripts.  While I had done a preliminary 
analysis of the family physician data presented in Study 1, it was not until after transcribing the 
neuroscientist interviews that I chose to return to those transcripts for further analysis.  After 
conducting the neuroscientist interviews, I listened to the audio recordings of them several times 
before transcribing the interviews verbatim.  I approached the listening and reading of the 
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transcripts broadly, noting questions or concerns that struck me as intriguing (McMullen, 2011).  
Several of the questions posed of the neuroscientists concerned dilemmas in research and 
controversies in the field with one follow-up prompt where I specifically oriented the 
interviewees to comment on the pervasiveness of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of 
depression among laypersons and clinicians.  Out of all the potential directions I considered for 
detailed analysis, I found the responses to questions regarding the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis most intriguing and began noting sections of the interviews relevant to the topic.  I 
was interested in how the interview data generated with the scientists compared to the data I had 
chosen to analyze from the interviews with family physicians, so before continuing the analysis 
of the scientist interviews, I returned to my analysis of the family physician interviews and to the 
complete set of audio recordings and transcripts.   
I was principally interested in how the physicians and neuroscientists accounted for their 
use of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression or other explanations, the persuasive 
rhetorical features of the discourses, and the functions achieved by these accounts (Billig, 1996; 
Wood & Kroger, 2000).  My analysis of the family physician data was done with printed 
transcripts and printed quotations, while I chose to work mostly paperless using NVivo software 
for the analysis of neuroscientist data.  NVivo is program for qualitative researchers working 
with text and multimedia data to assist in the storage, organization, categorization, and 
visualization of data (QSI International, n.d.).  I chose to use NVivo software for the analysis of 
the second study because it allowed for more efficiency in transitioning between specific 
quotations chosen for further analysis and the entire corpus of interview data, and for searching 
keywords within the transcripts.  I employed the software in a manner consistent with the way I 
conducted the analysis of family physician data; for example, multi-coloured sticky tabs were 
replaced with NVivo “nodes.”   
The analysis proceeded similarly for each set of interviews. In general, I noted sections of 
the transcripts related to talk of etiology and the chemical imbalance hypothesis and printed or 
tagged all relevant content.  I read and re-read the content many times, returning to the whole 
transcript and occasionally the audio data in an iterative fashion.  I compared and contrasted 
discursive patterns across participants and attended to content, style, interpretative repertoires, 
and forms of arguments (McMullen, 2011).  I grouped the quotations into discursive themes and 
eventually eliminated those that I deemed did not add anything further to the analyses, such as a 
repetition, which was a process that developed during the writing of the analyses.  I reorganized 
the presentation of interview extracts several times and continued writing and rewriting the 
analyses until I was satisfied that I had produced an account of the discourses, grounded in the 
interview data, that addressed my research questions (Kelley, 2002).   
Supervision with Dr. McMullen and research team meetings with her and fellow graduate 
students contributed immensely to the analysis.  Interview extracts I chose for further analysis 
and my interpretations and assumptions were discussed in research team meetings and in 
individual supervision meetings.  Individual supervision also involved written commentary with 
suggestions for further analysis and ways to rhetorically focus the arguments I was trying to 
make.  Discussing and defending the analyses in these socially mediated ways helped me to 
clarify and refine the interpretations within.   
In the following two studies and general discussion, using interview data with family 
physicians and neuroscientists studying depression, I demonstrate the discursive resources they 
draw upon to construct persuasive arguments about depression and the chemical imbalance 
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hypothesis, and the functions achieved by such arguments.  I argue that the discourses that the 
family physicians take up demonstrate how they utilize the chemical imbalance hypothesis to 
motivate their patients to take antidepressants, reduce self-blame and stigma, build knowledge in 
the community, and promote hope and confidence in the treatment.  I argue that the discursive 
constructions of the neuroscientists demonstrate how the notion of a chemical imbalance in the 
brain can be maintained or denied by constructing the chemical imbalance in general or specific 
ways.  Ultimately, I conclude that despite the limitations of the chemical imbalance hypothesis, 
the discourses espoused by scientists and family physicians suggest that there is value and 
veracity to maintaining some aspects of the chemical imbalance explanation, while augmenting 
the explanation with new ideas from the science of depression.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Depression is a common and disabling condition that affects an estimated 350 million 
people worldwide (World Health Organization, 2015).  In terms of healthy years lost to a 
disability, depression is the leading cause of disability worldwide and has been described as “the 
biggest blight on human society – bar none” (Nature, 2014, p. 163) and a “global crisis” (World 
Federation for Mental Health, 2012, p. 1).  A diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder is marked 
by low mood, loss of interest or pleasure in activities, disturbed sleep and appetite, decreased 
energy, and feelings of guilt or low self-worth, that persist for at least two weeks and are 
accompanied by distress or impairments in important areas of functioning (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  Depression is also associated with an increased risk of suicide (Ferrari et al., 
2013).   
In Canada, depression is commonly diagnosed by family physicians.  In 2014, there were 
8.5 million office visits for depression (IMS Health, 2015).  Office visits for depression grew by 
60% between 1995 and 2004, which resulted in depression being the fastest rising diagnosis in 
Canada (IMS Health, 2004).  While the rate of increase has somewhat leveled-off since 2004, 
depression remains the third most frequent reason for a physician visit in Canada, preceded only 
by hypertension and diabetes mellitus (IMS Health, 2015). 
Antidepressants are a standard treatment for depression, with office-based physicians 
making drug recommendations in 83% of the visits for depression in Canada (IMS Health, 
2015).  Canadians are among the highest users of antidepressants in the developed world, with 
85 daily doses taken per 1000 people (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2015); monthly antidepressant use in Canada increased 11% from 2005 to 2011 
(Mamdani & Wilby, 2013).  In a Canadian population-based survey, antidepressants were the 
leading class of medication used by women between the ages of 25 to 79, with 13.7% of 
respondents reporting having taken an antidepressant between 2007 and 2011 (Rotermann, 
Sanmartin, Hennessy, & Arthur, 2014).  Overall, antidepressants are ubiquitous in the treatment 
of depression.  
While patients report preferring psychosocial interventions to pharmacotherapy (Deacon 
& Abramowitz, 2005), and psychotherapy is at least as effective as antidepressants for Major 
Depressive Disorder (Cuijpers, van Straten, van Oppen, & Andersson, 2008) and may offer an 
advantage with regard to remission after discontinuation (Parikh et al., 2009), access to 
psychotherapy in Canada is limited (Romanow & Marchildon, 2003; Grenier, Chomienne, 
Gaboury, Ritchie, & Hogg, 2008; Anderssen, 2015).  Physicians have reported that when 
considering referrals for psychotherapy, out-of-pocket expense is a significant barrier for many 
patients (Grenier et al., 2008).  The majority of psychologists in Canada work in private practice, 
where patients pay through health insurance benefits, employee assistance programs, or out-of-
pocket; publicly employed psychologists often have waitlists of one year or longer.  Thus, while 
psychosocial interventions may be preferred, many Canadians do not have timely access to these 
types of treatments.   
4.1.1 The Chemical Imbalance Hypothesis 
The chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression claims that depression is caused by a 
deficiency of neurotransmitters.  In 1965, Joseph Schildkraut put forth the catecholamine (i.e., 
epinephrine, norepinephrine, and dopamine) hypothesis of depression.  He argued that the 
mechanism of function of tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) and monoamine oxidase inhibitors 
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(MAOIs) was to increase synaptic concentrations of the catecholamines by preventing enzymes 
from breaking them down or preventing their reuptake back into the releasing cell.  Schildkraut 
wrote, “some, if not all, depressions are associated with an absolute or relative deficiency of 
catecholamines, particularly norepinephrine, at functionally important adrenergic receptor sites 
in the brain” (Schildkraut, 1965, p.  509). Two years later, Alec Coppen proposed that serotonin 
depletion was also associated with depression (Coppen, 1967).  The two authors provided similar 
arguments from their summary of the literature: the drug reserpine markedly reduced serotonin 
and norepinephrine levels and appeared to cause depressive symptoms, while the antidepressants 
of the time increased levels of these neurotransmitters in laboratory studies and appeared to 
reduce depressive symptoms among patients.  Serotonin later gained primacy and the Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (SSRI) medications were invented to counter the proposed 
chemical imbalance of serotonin (Healy, 1997).   
Healy (1997), a psychiatrist and psychopharmacologist who is known for his critique of 
antidepressants and pharmaceutical marking practices, stated that the popularity of a theory does 
not necessarily rest on its ability to convey an absolute truth, but rather, the truth that people are 
looking for at the time.  The chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression explained a possible 
mechanism by which antidepressants functioned and provided physicians with a simple narrative 
to explain depression and its treatment to patients.  However, the hypothesis could not predict 
many effects.  Most notable is that, while antidepressants often take two to six weeks to bring 
about change, monoamine levels in the brain are altered within an hour (e.g., Wong & Lucinio, 
2001).  In addition, a search for the biological marker of depression, such as a defective 
neurotransmitter system, has proven fruitless.  Lately, research into the efficacy of ketamine as a 
treatment for depression, which acts on the glutamate system (glutamate is a wide-spread 
excitatory neurotransmitter involved in many physiological functions) rather than on the 
serotonin system, suggests that it is a more effective antidepressant than SSRIs (Healy, 2015).  
Additionally, while the SSRIs produce fewer side-effects and are less lethal if the patient 
attempts suicide by overdose, the chemical imbalance hypothesis has not resulted in a more 
effective antidepressant than the original tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs; e.g., Geddes, 
Freemantle, Mason, Eccles, & Boynton, 2000).  The chemical imbalance explanation of 
depression, when referring to a deficiency of monoamines, does not appear to fully account for 
the etiology of depression.  
4.1.2 Chemical Imbalance: Patients  
For many years, the pharmaceutical industry promoted the position that depression is 
caused by a chemical imbalance in the brain that can be corrected with medication (Leo & 
Lacasse, 2008).  While direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertisements no longer refer to 
depression being caused by a chemical imbalance (Lacasse & Leo, 2015), the effect has been a 
widespread adoption of the chemical imbalance explanation of depression among laypersons.  
The chemical imbalance hypothesis, despite a lack of scientific support (Lacasse & Leo, 2016; 
Schultz, 2015), is “the potentially dominant cultural story of depression” (p. 411, France, 
Lysaker, & Robinson, 2007).  In a 2006 study, 80% of a sample of American adults who were 
read a vignette describing a person with Major Depressive Disorder attributed the condition to a 
chemical imbalance in the brain, up from 67% in 1996 (Pescosolido et al. 2010).  These data 
suggest that the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression is being widely endorsed by 
laypersons as a primary explanation.  
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Some individuals diagnosed with depression also report that their depression is due to a 
chemical imbalance in the brain.  Cohen and Hughes (2011) were interested in how patients who 
claimed to have a chemical imbalance justified their position.  They examined data from 
structured interviews with 22 patients that included a question about whether or not medication 
corrects a chemical imbalance in the brain.  According to Cohen and Hughes, many respondents 
cited the efficacy of medication as evidence of having a chemical imbalance; others stated that 
they were told so by their physician, and some reported that they had conducted their own 
research.  The authors concluded that patients will continue to draw upon the chemical 
imbalance explanation to make sense of their condition and their recovery.   
Proponents of the biomedical model of mental illnesses have claimed that it will reduce 
stigma by promoting the view that mental illnesses are medical problems like any other physical 
disease (e.g., Andreasen, 1985; 2001).  However, while biological understandings of mental 
illnesses are becoming more prominent, stigma has not decreased (Pescosolido et al., 2010).  In 
meta-analyses of research articles examining biological explanations of mental illness and 
stigma, Kvaale and colleagues (Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener, 2013; Kvaale, Gottdiener, & 
Haslam, 2013) concluded that biological explanations of mental illnesses were associated with 
reduced blaming of individuals for their condition, but were also associated with increased 
perceived dangerousness and a desire for social distance.  Speerforck, Schomerus, Pruess, and 
Angermeyer (2014) reported that chemical imbalance and brain disease explanations of 
depression were associated with laypersons reporting an increased desire for social distance from 
people with depression and schizophrenia, with no beneficial effect on stigma.  While the claim 
that biomedical explanations of mental illnesses will reduce stigma appears to be face-valid, the 
current data do not support the claim. 
The chemical imbalance explanation of depression appears to influence patients’ views of 
treatment and foster prognostic pessimism – the belief that one’s condition is immutable and that 
recovery will be difficult.  Kemp, Lickel, and Deacon (2014) conducted an experimental study 
involving undergraduate students who self-identified as having a past or current depressive 
episode.  The researchers administered a “bogus but credible” (p. 48) biological test for 
depression, which involved swabbing the inner cheek of each participant and claiming to run a 
laboratory test to determine the participant’s neurotransmitter levels.  The researchers stated to 
half of the participants (n = 37) that their current or past depressive episode was caused by 
depleted serotonin and the other half (n = 36) were told that all neurotransmitters were in the 
normal range.  All participants completed survey items on causal attributions of depression (e.g., 
life stress, negative thinking pattern, genetic predisposition, etc.), self-stigma, prognostic 
pessimism, mood regulation, treatment credibility and expectations, and diagnostic procedure 
credibility.  Only participants who endorsed that they found the diagnostic procedure credible 
were included in the analysis.  The authors reported that there were no differences between the 
two groups with regard to self-stigma, but stated that the chemical imbalance explanation was 
associated with greater prognostic pessimism – i.e., participants who received this explanation 
viewed their depression as more chronic and intractable than did participants who were told that 
their neurotransmitters were in the normal range – and decreased expectations about personal 
ability to regulate mood.  The chemical imbalance group reported that antidepressant medication 
was more credible and effective than psychotherapy, while the control group rated medication 
and psychotherapy to be equally credible and effective.  Kemp at el. (2014) concluded that 
depression should be explained using a biopsychosocial model to reduce the negative effects of 
an exclusively biological explanation.  This research replicated and expanded on prior research, 
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which claimed to have demonstrated that the chemical imbalance explanation has a negative 
influence on expectations of prognosis and mood regulation ability (Deacon & Baird, 2009).   
Lebowitz, Ahn, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2013) conducted a survey-based experiment with 
participants recruited online to determine whether providing education about the plasticity of the 
brain and epigenetic malleability to individuals with depression could promote prognostic 
optimism and agentic control over negative mood states.  After participants completed a 
symptom checklist for depression and rated how much they endorse biomedical etiology of 
depression, Lebowitz et al. (2013) displayed an educational video that highlighted that 
environmental factors and life experiences can influence brain chemistry and genes to a third of 
the participants.  Another third of participants watched a video on the heritability of depression 
and the differences in the brains of depressed and non-depressed individuals.  The final third of 
participants received no intervention. Participants completed questionnaires assessing 
expectations of prognosis, agency, guilt, and future outlook.  Overall, the authors concluded that 
endorsing biomedical etiology of depression was associated with prognostic pessimism, but that 
those who watched the video about the malleability of genes and brain chemistry had lower 
prognostic pessimism, and increased sense of agency and hope.  A more holistic and 
comprehensive view of depression and biology might hold promise for countering the negative 
effects associated with the standard biomedical explanation of depression.  
The chemical imbalance hypothesis might influence how people understand themselves 
(Fullagar, 2009; Rose, 2003).  Rose (2003) theorized that advances in biotechnologies such as 
medications for psychiatric disorders are contributing to a “genetic and neurochemical selfhood” 
(p. 407), where conditions once viewed as being attributed to personality, willpower, or 
upbringing, are recast as diseases of the brain.  Drawing upon the idea of neurochemical 
selfhood, Fullagar (2009) conducted interviews with a community sample of 80 women who 
self-identified as recovered or recovering from depression.  Fullagar noted that 31 women 
reported that antidepressant medication was a positive force in their recovery, and she further 
analyzed these interviews from a critical/Foucauldian discursive perspective.  In relation to the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression, Fullagar argued that these women defined 
themselves as neurochemically-deficient and, as agentic biomedical consumers, sought to correct 
their chemical imbalance through medication.  Fullagar noted that some of these women referred 
to the use of antidepressant medication as providing “breathing space” (p. 398) from negative 
self-evaluations and blame.  However, Fullagar reported that the endorsement of biomedical 
depression discourses did not appear to reduce stigma because women still described themselves 
as fundamentally flawed and dependent on medication to maintain a sense of normalcy.  
Negotiating blame and stigma was thus complex and the women were pulled by paradoxical 
discourses; taking antidepressants provides users the promise of restored function and a sense of 
control over their lives, but also threatens agency and autonomy with notions of dependency on 
medication and uncertainty about the recurrence of depression.   
In a follow up to her 2009 study, Fullagar and O’Brian (2013) analyzed the interviews of 
43 women who reported feeling highly ambivalent about their recovery with antidepressants.  
The authors noted how some women who described themselves as neurochemically deficient 
were caught in a difficult situation when the side-effects of the medication were troubling or 
when multiple medications did not alleviate their depression. In essence, the women constructed 
the process of redefining their recovery from that of correcting a neurochemical deficiency to 
that of working on emotional well-being.  The authors concluded that the biomedical discourses 
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of depression functioned to minimize or make invisible the process of working on the emotional-
self.    
Biological understandings of the self may also lead to neuroessentialist thinking, where a 
person views all psychological phenomena as dependent on the activity and structure of the 
brain, and that mental illnesses are associated with abnormal brains (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; 
Haslam, 2011; Haslam & Kvaale, 2015).  It is theorized that neuroessentialist thinking can lead 
persons with a mental illness to view themselves as abnormal and categorically different from 
the rest of the population.  Haslam and Kvaale (2015) advised neuroscientists, clinicians, and 
patients to be aware of the negative implications of viewing mental illnesses as entirely based in 
the brain and genetics. 
4.1.3 Chemical Imbalance: Physicians 
In a blog post on the website Psychiatric Times, psychiatrist Ronald Pies (2011), in 
response to critics of psychiatry and biomedical explanations of depression, described the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis as an "urban legend" and stated that in 30 years he had never 
"heard a knowledgeable, well-trained psychiatrist make such a preposterous claim, except 
perhaps to mock it" (para. 1).  However, other psychiatrists, medical associations, 
pharmaceutical companies, and popular websites have promoted the biomedical explanation of 
depression for many years (Deacon, 2013; Hickey, 2014; Lacasse & Leo, 2015).  For example, 
the American Psychiatric Association, in a patient information leaflet, stated “Antidepressants 
may be prescribed to correct imbalances in the levels of chemicals in the brain” (p. 2, American 
Psychiatric Association, 2005, as cited in Lacasse and Leo, 2015), and psychiatrist Charles 
Nemeroff stated, “There is truly a real deficiency of serotonin in depressed patients” (Nemeroff, 
2007, as cited in Lacasse and Leo, 2015).  
Despite the claim by Ronald Pies that the chemical imbalance hypothesis is an urban 
legend, physicians are likely utilizing the explanation with their patients.  Among a sample of 
psychology students completing a survey, 46% claimed to have heard of the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis from a physician or medical professional (France et al., 2007).  It is clear that the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression is pervasive in the general population, and at least 
some physicians are using this explanation with their patients.  Lacasse and Leo (2015) drew 
attention to a National Public Radio show from 2010 where psychiatrist Daniel Carlat talked 
about using the chemical imbalance hypothesis with patients, despite not believing the 
hypothesis to be true.  He states,  
I think I say that because patients want to know something.  And they want to know that 
we as physicians have some basic understanding of what we’re doing when we’re 
prescribing medications.  They certainly don’t want to know that a psychiatrist essentially 
has no idea how these medications work (p. 207, Lacasse and Leo, 2015). 
There is a lack of empirical data on the way physicians explain depression to their patients, but 
the above suggests that at least some are using the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  
Lebowitz and Ahn (2014) were interested in the effect that biological explanations of a 
patient’s mental illness symptoms would have on clinicians’ empathy toward a patient.  They 
recruited mental health clinicians, including psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers.  
The clinicians read vignettes about patients with mental illnesses.  Each vignette had two 
explanatory passages: one with biological factors and the other with psychosocial factors.  The 
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vignettes and explanations were counterbalanced among participants.  The clinicians then 
completed a measure of empathy.  The authors reported that the mean empathy scores across all 
vignettes was significantly lower when they were paired with the biological explanatory passage.  
The authors posited that the lowered empathy values could be due to genetic essentialism and 
neuroessentialism, wherein the clinician might view the condition as immutable and the patient 
as abnormal.  This study prescribes an etiological explanation for the situation, but it does not 
address how clinicians negotiate and weigh the multitude of information involved in a diagnostic 
interview.  However, it does suggest that if a clinician views his/her patient’s condition as 
primarily biological, the impact on the therapeutic alliance could be negative.  
The biopsychosocial model is a framework to assist clinicians in considering the multiple 
factors involved in the presentation of mental illnesses, and is an important tool for fostering a 
therapeutic alliance between clinician and patient (Borrell-Carrio, Suchman, & Epstein, 2004). 
Lebowitz, Ahn, and Oltman (2015) examined how lay participants responded to vignettes of 
biologically-oriented clinicians and psychosocially-oriented clinicians on survey measures of 
clinician competence and warmth, and the appropriateness of the treatments the clinician would 
provide.  The authors concluded that laypersons viewed the biologically-oriented clinicians as 
less warm than the psychosocially-oriented clinicians.  When the participants attributed the cause 
of the mental illness to biological factors, they viewed the biologically-oriented clinicians as 
more competent.  Generally, unless the participant constructed the mental illness as primarily 
biological in cause, the participants preferred the psychosocial clinician and viewed his or her 
potential interventions as more effective.  The authors posited that perceiving a clinician to be 
less warm will inhibit the formation of a positive therapeutic alliance, which will reduce help-
seeking and treatment adherence behaviours of individuals receiving treatment from clinicians 
they perceive to be less warm.  
4.1.4 Communicating a Diagnosis of Depression 
Physicians are expected to communicate knowledge and understanding; yet the etiology 
of depression is largely unknown, which places physicians in a difficult situation with patients 
who present with symptoms of depression.  Blease (2014), a social scientist who focuses on 
medical ethics, argued,  
The neglect to inform patients that: (1) the causes of depression are not fully understood; 
(2) the causes are likely to be complex; (3) a range of psychological and social triggers 
are likely to be highly significant; and (4) there is currently lack of scientific consensus 
on how antidepressants work, as well as the extent of their effectiveness—can be deemed 
as a failure to inform patients about relevant facts with regards to depression (p.  227). 
This advice seems especially prudent in the context of evidence-based medicine and the 
responsibility of medical practitioners to provide all the information required for a patient to 
make an informed choice about treatment.  In addition, others have further argued that physicians 
have a heightened duty to provide accurate information regarding depression in light of the 
misconceptions about what is known about depression among the lay public.  Dowrick and 
Frances (2013) argued that physicians should inform patients about the high rates of placebo 
response when informing patients about antidepressants.  They also suggested countering the 
commonly-held view that depression is primarily caused by a deficiency of serotonin in the brain 
by noting the relevance of social and psychological factors.   
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Maxwell (2005) was interested in how patients and physicians accounted for the 
diagnosing and management of depression in primary care.  She interviewed 37 women and 20 
primary care physicians and analyzed the data using a grounded theory approach.  With regard to 
the physician data, the researchers reported that the physicians constructed the diagnosis of 
depression as problematic and subjective, especially for mild depression.  The physicians 
acknowledged that they often were faced with cases that appeared to be the result of a non-
medical problem in the patients’ lives, but were limited in their options for treatment. As such, 
the physicians negotiated a dilemmatic position between understanding a patients’ depression to 
be situationally-based, and their ethical responsibility to offer something to improve the lives of 
their patients, which involved providing an antidepressant.  Several of the physicians stated that 
they were worried about a general trend of over-medicalizing mild depression and over-
prescribing antidepressants.  The authors concluded that primary care physicians require a more 
diverse range of treatment options to provide to their patients.   
While there are anecdotal reports of physicians using biomedical discourse to instill 
confidence, reduce patient stigma, and encourage antidepressant use (Lacasse & Leo, 2015), 
there is a lack of research on how generalist family physicians explain depression to patients.  I 
was interested in how family physicians, who are responsible for the vast majority of the 
diagnosis and pharmacological treatment of depression in Canada, described and accounted for 
their etiological explanations of depression in a research interview and, in particular, how they 
reported on their use of the chemical imbalance hypothesis to explain depression to their 
patients.   
4.2 Analytical Perspective: Discursive Psychology 
The following analysis is situated within the theoretical perspective of discursive 
psychology, which applies concepts and ideas in discourse analysis – the study of the 
performative function of talk and texts – to issues in psychology (Potter, 2003; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987).  Discourse analysis in social psychology involves a systematic examination of 
how talk and text are structured via linguistic resources, the social actions that are performed via 
the use of these resources, and the possible functions of these actions (Potter, 2003).  I assume 
that language is a central component to the creation of knowledge, and that discourses have 
consequences and are used to accomplish social actions.  As recommended by Wetherell (1998) 
and employed in other discourse analytic work (e.g., Lafrance, 2007), I situate the content and 
style of discourse and the social actions it performs within broader social discourses of 
depression in Canadian and American medical and lay society.   
4.3 Method 
The data for the present analysis were derived from 11 semi-structured interviews 
conducted in 2009 with family physicians on their diagnostic and treatment practices for 
depression.  The interviews were conducted one-on-one by Dr. Linda McMullen and one of her 
former graduate students, Jeffery Letourneau.  The University of Saskatchewan Behavioral 
Research Ethics Board approved this research project. 
4.3.1 Participants 
All family physicians (165) listed in the telephone directory of a midsized Canadian city 
received a letter inviting them to participate in “a program of research investigating how 
physicians make decisions to diagnose and treat patients for depression.” Physicians were 
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offered a $150 CDN honorarium for their participation.  Eleven physicians (five women) agreed 
to participate.  They ranged in age from 33 to 73 years (median = 55 years) and had been in 
family practice between 3 and 46 years (median = 18 years).  Six physicians were salaried and 
worked in publicly funded settings and 5 worked in fee-for-service practices.   
4.3.2 Procedures 
Each participant was informed of the purpose of the research and his or her rights both 
verbally and through a written, signed consent form.  The interviews with physicians were 
conducted at the University of Saskatchewan, lasted one to two hours (median = 1.4 hours), and 
consisted of two parts.  The first was conducted by Linda McMullen and focused on questions 
pertaining to how physicians went about diagnosing and treating depression.  The second part 
was conducted by either Linda McMullen or her former graduate student, Jeffery Letourneau, 
and focused on whether and how patients made requests for antidepressants and how such 
requests influenced the physicians’ diagnostic and treatment practices.  There were no specific 
interview questions pertaining to the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression or any other 
explanatory model.  While there were no questions about the etiology of depression in the 
interview, talk of etiology was often in response to the question, “do you ever feel you need to 
motivate your patients to take antidepressants, and if so, how?”   
The interviews were transcribed verbatim with all personally identifying information 
omitted.  The participants were provided with a copy of the transcript and they were permitted to 
modify the transcript before signing a transcript release form; there were no substantial 
modifications to the transcripts.  Jefferson transcription notation was not used because the high 
level of detail it provides was not required for the analysis.  Instead, a more readable form of 
transcript notation was used (see Appendix A) and is similar to the notation used in other 
discursive research articles (e.g., Lafrance, 2007).  
The analysis was an iterative process of reading the transcripts, listening to the audio 
recordings, and extracting segments of text related to the etiology of depression.  These segments 
included talk about the biological, social, and psychological precipitants of depression and talk 
of how the physicians constructed the ways in which they explained depression to their patients.  
I compiled and organized these extracts and chose a final collection that displayed the range of 
talk on etiology and the biochemical explanation of depression and eliminated extracts that were 
similar in content and style to chosen extracts.  I was principally interested in how the physicians 
accounted for their use of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression or other explanations, 
and the functions achieved by these accounts (Wood & Kroger, 2000).   
I acknowledge that the etiological discourses presented in the following analysis are a co-
construction between a physician and a clinical psychologist (or her graduate student). The 
analysis relies upon the reported speech of physicians who are summarizing and presenting their 
diagnostic and treatment practices for depression.  I do not claim that the reported speech 
represents actual communication between patient and physician; however, for the purpose of the 
analysis and conclusions, I assume that the physicians draw upon similar discursive resources 
when speaking to patients as they did when speaking with the interviewers.      
4.4 Analysis 
In the following analysis, I show how family physicians accounted for their use of the 
biochemical explanation of depression and the beneficial functions achieved by explaining 
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depression in this manner (i.e., to reduce blame and stigma, increase treatment adherence, and 
promote depression as a brain disorder) during interviews with a clinical psychologist or one of 
her former graduate students about his or her diagnostic and treatment practices for depression.  I 
present an analysis of extracts wherein physicians constructed depression as a biological, 
psychological, and social illness, and as lacking in available treatment options.  I chose and 
ordered the extracts in the following analysis with the goal of presenting the diverse and nuanced 
ways these physicians present how they explain depression to their patients.  
4.4.1 Using the Biochemical Explanation to Reduce Blame and Promote Treatment 
One of the positive functions of the chemical imbalance explanation of depression widely 
noted in the literature is to reduce or eliminate blame and personal responsibility.  In extract 1, a 
family physician presents how the biochemical explanation is useful to help a patient overcome 
self-blame (in the analysis, “l” refers to line number).   
4.4.1.1 Extract 1. 
Physician 11: And the other thing 1 
that some people struggle with is a 2 
concept of umm {pause} uh I just 3 
need to suck it up and get over it 4 
...  sometimes umm the motivation 5 
comes from taking it from that- 6 
their perception that this is all my 7 
fault and I just gotta do something 8 
different and it’ll go away, to the 9 
more medical model in helping them 10 
kind of externalize it and that uh 11 
it’s not my fault, it’s because of 12 
these changes in my brain and we’ve 13 
just gotta fix those so that I can, 14 
move forward.  15 
This extract is typical of the claim that a biomedical explanation of depression will 
reduce personal blame.  The physician draws attention to a common lay expression, “suck it up 
and get over it” (l. 4), which is a pejorative phrase that suggests a person is responsible for 
moving on despite personal distress.  In this phrase, the physician builds a case for the 
importance of countering such a negative and personally denigrating statement.  She constructs 
her role as motivating a patient toward treatment by explaining the “medical model” (l. 10) and 
that the causes of depression are “changes” in the “brain” (l. 13).  Her reference to “kind of 
externalize” (l. 11) the problem appears not to refer to locating the problem outside of one’s 
body; rather, it is presented as a way to provide psychological distancing from shame and blame 
in order to help her patient.   
In the physician’s depiction of the patient’s narrative at the end of the extract (ll. 12-13), 
she presents that once the patient has accepted the medical model of depression he or she will 
accept a brain-based treatment (“we’ve just gotta fix those,” l.  13).  The use of the first-person 
plural pronoun “we” (l. 13) is in contrast to the use of the singular pronoun “I” throughout the 
majority of the extract and speaks to how the physician constructs the relationship between 
physician and patient with regard to treatment as a collaborative one.  The use of the phrase “just 
gotta fix those” (l. 14) presents the treatment as a simple, clear-cut intervention; i.e., the patient 
might need only to take care of the changes in the brain, presumably by using an antidepressant 
medication, to progress or “move forward” from the depression (l.15).   
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In extract 2, the physician responds to the question about whether she needs to motivate a 
patient to take antidepressant medication similarly to the physician in extract 1.  However, unlike 
the first extract, social/psychological explanations are also implicated in reducing blame.   
4.4.1.2 Extract 2. 
Physician 10: I think probably it’s, 1 
it’s that discussion of it, of, of, 2 
educating them that it is a biologic 3 
disease, that it’s not something 4 
they brought on themselves or it’s- 5 
you know, there’s things they can do 6 
to help change in the ways they 7 
think but it’s just so ingrained.  8 
You know, we talk a lot about the 9 
nature versus nurture and you know, 10 
how you’re raised to deal with 11 
stress and most people, you know, 12 
right away say I was raised to just 13 
shove it down and so then we talk 14 
about that’s how it comes out as 15 
panic attacks and things then, and 16 
then I think they, they don’t blame 17 
themselves as much for it? And, and 18 
I often use the you know if you 19 
broke your leg would you fight 20 
anyone for a cast or if you had 21 
diabetes, would you say no to 22 
insulin necessarily?...  and tell 23 
them that one day, we will be able 24 
to measure your serotonin or 25 
whatever marker we’ll know at that 26 
time just like a thyroid blood test.27 
The physician starts by stating, “I think probably” (l. 1), which suggests some degree of 
uncertainty in her response to the question.  She reports having a “discussion” (l. 2) with her 
patients and “educating them” (l. 3).  She does not detail the content of her educational 
discussion with patients, but she states that depression “is a biological disease” (ll. 3-4), which 
positions depression fully within the medical realm.  The first reference to reducing patient self-
blame, “it’s not something they brought on themselves” (ll. 4-5), is followed by a halt in speech 
(“it’s-” l.  5). The halt in speech is an interruption to the utterance constructing depression as a 
biological disease; she adds that psychological factors – “the ways they think” (ll. 7-8) – play a 
role, but constructs remediating psychological factors as something that “they can do” (l. 6), 
effectively removing herself from such an intervention and placing the onus on the patient.  She 
further constructs the implicating of psychological factors as immutable from the patient’s view 
with the phrase, “it’s just so ingrained” (l. 8).   
Continuing the line of argument that patients view depression as social/psychological and 
not necessarily biological, the physician reports that they talk “a lot” (l. 9) about “nature versus 
nurture” (l. 10).  With the phrase, “most people” (l. 12), she constructs that a typical response 
usually involves a patient claiming that s/he deals with stress through avoidance of the problem: 
“shove it down” (l. 14).  Interestingly, the physician, rather than invoking a typical symptom of 
depression, refers instead to “panic attacks” (l. 16), but also adds the very non-descript catch-all 
term, “things” (l. 16).  The conflation of depression and anxiety likely speaks to the high 
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comorbidity of the two disorders.  The physician then makes a statement that the discussion 
results in reduced blame (ll. 17-18).  However, she prefaces the statement with “I think” (l. 17) 
and concludes the statement with rising intonation, which functions to soften or qualify her 
claim.   
After several lines of talk devoted to social/psychological factors, the physician returns to 
a biological comparison.  She constructs depression as similar to a broken bone (l. 20) and 
diabetes (l. 22).  By comparing depression to conditions with known etiologies and objective 
diagnostic tests, and asking the patient if s/he would refuse treatment, she constructs herself as 
trying to persuade her patient that treatment with antidepressants is a logical choice.  Finally, she 
bolsters her claim that depression is a “biological disease” (ll. 3-4) by stating, “one day, we will 
be able to measure your serotonin or whatever marker” (ll. 24-26).  Since there is no biological 
test for depression, this phrase reinforces the potentially problematic comparison between 
depression and diabetes or a broken leg.  Her promise of a diagnostic marker is future oriented 
and indeterminate – “one day” (l. 24) – but is presented as an eventuality with the phrase, “we 
will be able” (l. 24).   
In extracts 1 and 2, the physicians argue that a medical explanation of depression is 
useful to counter the self-blame and stigma that their patients express.  They make the case that 
convincing patients that depression is due to changes in the brain might lead them to abandon the 
notion that they are personally responsible for their depression.  Providing this argument in the 
context of a question about motivating patients to take antidepressants casts the acts of 
persuasion as beneficial to the patients by reducing personal blame and stigma.  Thus, 
constructing depression as a biomedical disease functions to reduce blame and set up a 
persuasive argument for the use of antidepressant medication.  
4.4.2 Using the Biochemical Explanation to Promote Treatment Adherence 
In addition to reducing blame and increasing acceptance of taking an antidepressant, 
using a biochemical explanation can be presented as a motivating force to encourage treatment 
adherence, which is notoriously problematic in depression because many patients stop taking 
their antidepressant medications.  In the following extract, the physician notes that a value of the 
patient adopting the biochemical explanation of depression is in motivating the patient to 
continue taking the medication.   The following extract occurs in an exchange about patient 
requests for medications. 
4.4.2.1 Extract 3. 
Physician 02: The, the reason to, to 1 
go that way with [the biochemical 2 
explanation of depression], with 3 
somebody who’s depressed is for them 4 
to understand why they would need to 5 
stay on the medication when they 6 
feel better.  That’s when the, that, 7 
that’s the payoff time for all this 8 
conversation.  You know, so it’s 9 
like a topic for conversation....  10 
It’s just another way of us being 11 
together in the same room, me 12 
showing that I don’t really want you 13 
to go immediately, that I’m still 14 
happy to spend time with you.  It’s 15 
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for me more than for- except 16 
eventually I think the knowledge 17 
grows in the community.18 
The physicians who were interviewed generally indicated they face a great deal of 
reluctance from their patients to take antidepressants.  However, in contrast to extracts 1 and 2, 
where the biochemical explanation is presented as a motivating rhetorical device to encourage 
initial treatment with antidepressant medication, in extract 3 the physician reports presenting the 
biochemical explanation to patients to encourage medication adherence over the course of 
treatment.  The physician talks about “the payoff time” (l. 8), suggesting that the work of 
explaining depression as a chemical imbalance is valuable to the physician later, when he or she 
can rely on this prior explanation to encourage the patient to continue taking the medication after 
he or she feels better.  By having the patient “understand” (l. 5) that she or he has an underlying 
chemical imbalance, the physician can further explain that the imbalance is not corrected by the 
time he or she feels well.  The use of the word “need” (l. 5) conveys that continued use of the 
medication is imperative even when the patient begins to feel better. 
After the physician acknowledges this “payoff,” he further accounts for its value as “a 
topic for conversation” (l. 10).  Family physicians are notoriously busy, and appointments 
typically last approximately 15 minutes on average in Canada (Irving et al., 2017).  The 
physician reports that the explanation is useful to demonstrate that he is “happy to spend time” (l. 
15) with the patient.  The chemical imbalance explanation permits the physician to have a 
conversation with the patient that is consistent with a biomedical framework of disease.  He 
appears to suggest that the content of the explanation is less important than communicating care 
and understanding when he states the explanation is “for me more than for” (l. 16) the patient.  
He does not explicitly state why providing the explanation is more for his benefit, but further on 
in his response (not presented above), he refers to talk of the biochemical explanation as “white 
noise” to the patient, suggesting that it is generally incomprehensible or insignificant.  However, 
at the end of this extract (ll. 15-18), he abruptly stops his utterance “for me more than for-” to 
acknowledge that the explanation has an impact upon what is known about depression in the 
community, and this impact is constructed as beneficial and uncontroversial.   
Unlike extracts 1 and 2, in this instance the physician presents the biochemical 
explanation of depression as a rhetorical device to motivate treatment adherence after the patient 
feels an improvement.  The physician also notes that the biochemical explanation is valuable 
simply as a topic of conversation, and might contribute to building medical knowledge among 
the lay public.  Paradoxically, he constructs the content of the explanation as insignificant or 
incomprehensible, while also assuming that the patient will understand and talk to others about 
the biochemical etiology of their depression.    
4.4.3 Using the Biochemical Explanation to Promote Depression as a Brain Disorder 
Many of the physician interviewees, while promoting depression as a brain-based 
disorder, acknowledged that treating depression involves more than medications.  The following 
extract is part of a response to the question on motivation described above. 
4.4.3.1 Extract 4. 
Physician 09: I always say it’s a 1 
chemical disorder.  In part of my 2 
selling by the way is that you have 3 
a- when they have a high score this 4 
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is a, a brain disorder.  I say brain 5 
disorder.  Where- where’s the 6 
disorder? Well I can, I can tell you 7 
if you want and I can show you the 8 
diagrams and I can explain it all to 9 
you, the hippocampus, all the-, 10 
cingulate gyrus and all the 11 
different parts of the brain that 12 
are involved.  You know, I say, but 13 
it’s a brain disorder.  Your brain’s 14 
not working well right now.  And the 15 
chemistry of it and dopamine and 16 
serotonin, nor- norepinephrine, all, 17 
all the different stuff.  And it’s 18 
not working well.  But to get it 19 
back, it’s not just a matter of 20 
pills, you know, that’s-, I-I-I I’m 21 
absolutely convinced of that.22 
In this extract, the physician presents how he communicates knowledge of the biology of 
depression to his patients, and constructs himself as having expertise in the etiology of 
depression.  In the beginning of the extract he states that depression is a “chemical disorder” (l. 
2) and a “brain disorder” (l. 5), which situates depression as a biological entity.  The use of the 
phrase “selling it” (l. 3) constructs his explanation as an act of persuasion.  He equates “high 
scores” on a measure of depression symptoms with evidence of brain dysfunction for the patient.  
In the absence of a biological test, the physician reports using a symptom tally on a questionnaire 
to legitimize the diagnosis and the brain-based nature of the illness.   
The physician conveys expertise with the phrases, “I can tell you; I can show you; I can 
explain it all to you” (ll. 7-10).  While there is no scientific consensus regarding depression 
etiology, the phrase “explain it all” indicates to the patient that he has complete knowledge about 
the biological underpinnings of depression.  He broadly utilizes scientific language to legitimize 
his claim to knowledge, such as “diagrams” (l. 9), and words associated with the scientific study 
of depression: “hippocampus” (l. 10), “cingulate gyrus” (l. 11), “dopamine” (l. 16), “serotonin” 
(l. 17), and “norepinephrine” (l. 17).  In this extract he does not present a detailed account of how 
these neuroanatomical structures and neurotransmitters are deficient, but rather provides a broad 
summary statement, “your brain’s not working well right now” (ll. 14-15), and a catch-all phrase, 
“all the different stuff” (l.18).   
Despite his unequivocal commitment to the biochemical explanation at the beginning of 
the extract – “I always say it’s a chemical disorder” (ll. 1-2); I say brain disorder” (ll. 5-6) – he 
makes an equally strong unequivocal statement in lines 20 to 22 that antidepressant medication is 
not the only path to recovery: “I’m absolutely convinced” (l.  22).  There is a congruence 
between depression as a disorder of brain chemistry and the use of antidepressant medication to 
correct the chemical deficiency.  However, by stating, “it’s not just a matter of pills” (ll. 21-22), 
the physician emphasizes that recovery from depression requires more from the patient than 
simply adhering to a medication regimen, and challenges the notion that antidepressants 
specifically target the underlying cause of depression.   
The physician in extract 4 builds his argument that depression is a brain disorder by 
presenting terminology related to what is known about depression in the scientific literature, 
while also being non-descript and broad.  He claims to have complete knowledge about the 
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etiology of depression but simply presents a list of brain regions and neurotransmitters.  The 
argument invokes an appeal to authority by positioning himself as an expert, despite the etiology 
of depression being unknown and potentially very complex.  
4.4.4 Depression as Biopsychosocial Illness 
While some physicians talked about primarily presenting the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis to their patients, others presented a view of depression that included external factors.  
In extract 5, the physician responds to the question about the need to motivate patients to take 
antidepressants with an explanation of the possible causes, and suggests that the routes to 
influencing biochemistry are diverse. 
4.4.4.1 Extract 5. 
Physician 05: I go through a little 1 
bit of the biochemical theory about 2 
what’s causing depression.  That 3 
their serotonin or norepinephrine or 4 
dopamine are depleted.  And this may 5 
be due to, it may be partly due to 6 
some genetic factor and it may be 7 
due to external stressors.  Not 8 
getting enough sleep and not getting 9 
exercise and maybe not eating 10 
properly.  And say- then I- then I 11 
do say that you know, there is 12 
evidence that, that those 13 
neurotransmitters, can increase 14 
with, psychotherapy.  And umm 15 
perhaps even from exercise and light 16 
exposure.  But that may take quite a 17 
while.  And the quickest way to get 18 
yourself feeling better is to think 19 
about combining some counselling 20 
with some medication.  To take care 21 
of the biochemical side as quickly 22 
as we can.23 
In this extract the physician makes a statement about the biochemical basis of depression 
(ll. 3-5), accommodating for the contribution of genetic factors, external stressors, sleep, diet, 
and exercise (ll. 7-11).  In the opening lines, the physician refers to the cause of depression as the 
“biochemical theory” (l. 2).  The scientific language, i.e., “theory” (l. 2); “serotonin or 
norepinephrine or dopamine” (ll. 4-5); “genetic” (l. 7); “evidence” (l. 13), functions to legitimize 
the physician’s expertise.  Similar to the previous extracts, the physician explains that depression 
is caused by “depleted” (l. 5) neurotransmitters.   
The physician emphasizes (“I do say,” ll. 11-12) that he informs his patients about other 
treatments.  Treatments such as psychotherapy, light exposure, and exercise are woven into the 
biomedical framework by implicating them as capable of (“can increase with,” ll. 14-15) and 
potentially capable of (“perhaps even,” l. 16) changing the chemistry of the brain.  He privileges 
the biochemical level of explanation by reducing the efficacy of these treatments to influencing 
“neurotransmitters” (l. 13).  He appears to elevate and prioritize the use of antidepressants when 
he reports that psychotherapy, exercise, and light exposure “may take quite a while” (ll. 17-18) 
and that adding an antidepressant is the way to “take care of the biochemical side as quickly as 
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we can” (l. 21-22).  While the terms “quickly” and “quite a while” are not specific, these 
contrasting terms serve to persuasively construct antidepressants as a critical component in the 
most immediate route to recovery – a combination of counselling and medication (ll. 20-21).  
Clinical guidelines often recommend a combination of antidepressant and Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy or Interpersonal Therapy as the first-line treatment for depression (e.g., Parikh et al., 
2009), and this physician presents combined treatment as an option for the patient to “think 
about” (ll. 19-20).   
In extract 6, the physician does not specifically state a position regarding the etiology of 
depression, but through talk of treatment recommendations, he endorses a biopsychosocial model 
of depression.  The following extract is in response to a question about how the physician makes 
treatment decisions.   
4.4.4.2 Extract 6.
Physician 08: I say you know there’s 1 
different ways to treat depression.  2 
Umm.  There’s counselling.  Uh just 3 
talking about things kind of helps 4 
deal with stress and your coping and 5 
learning how to cope with situations 6 
or lifestyle depending on what the 7 
scenario is.  I’d say, you know, 8 
sometimes we’ll use medications and 9 
explain briefly how- restore the 10 
balance of the chemicals in the 11 
brain as briefly as you can.  12 
{chuckling} Kind of thing.  De- it’s 13 
all dependent on the person’s 14 
knowledge.  And intellect.  And then 15 
I usually recommend actually a 16 
combination.  If someone’s, 17 
definitely got a major depressive 18 
disorder, and we’re leaning towards 19 
medications I say okay well and they 20 
don’t want counselling I say we can 21 
start on medications but at some 22 
stage, you have either formal 23 
counselling or he’s just coming back 24 
and talking to me, is really 25 
important.26 
The physician responds by explaining how he approaches treatment decisions with his 
patients and he talks about offering counselling and medication.  For counselling, he constructs it 
as a simple and easy intervention with the phrase, “just talking” (ll. 3-4).  However, he also states 
that it “kind of helps” (l. 4), which constructs the effectiveness of the intervention as partial.  He 
acknowledges external factors, e.g., “stress” (l. 5), “situations” (l. 6), and “lifestyle” (l. 7), and 
psychological factors, e.g., “coping” (l. 5) and “learning” (l. 6) involved in the treatment of 
depression.   
With regard to medication, the physician reports, “sometimes we’ll use medications” (l. 
9).  The use of the word “sometimes” constructs the practice of prescribing medications as an 
occasional occurrence rather than routine.  Paired with the introduction of medications as 
treatment, the physician alludes to the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression (ll. 10-12).  
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He abruptly stops his utterance, “explain briefly how-” (l. 10), and chuckles after “as briefly as 
you can” (l. 12).  There is a clear contrast between the complexity of depression etiology and the 
need to provide an explanation to a patient in a short amount of time.  The physician adds that 
the explanation is “all dependent on the person’s knowledge.  And intellect” (ll. 14-15), which 
suggests that he presents more or less information to different patients based on his perception of 
their ability to understand the content, and that the explanation might be too difficult to 
comprehend for some of his patients.   
When recommending treatment, as in extract 5, the physician endorses a combination of 
counselling and an antidepressant.  The use of the term “actually” (l. 16) emphasizes the 
recommendation of combined treatment as somewhat surprising or unusual.  The physician then 
constructs a situation where his patient “definitely” (l. 18) has a diagnosis of major depressive 
disorder and both he and the patient are collaboratively “leaning towards” (l. 19) antidepressant 
treatment.  In this scenario, he adds that the patient is not interested in counselling, and he states 
that the patient has two options: “either formal counselling” (ll. 23-24) or “talking to me” (l. 25).  
While the physician constructed a collaborative path to treatment, counselling or, at minimum, 
talking to the physician, is presented as imperative and non-negotiable.  
In extracts 5 and 6, the physicians endorse a biopsychosocial view of depression.  When 
talking about discussing treatment options with their patients, they describe a collaborative path 
toward deciding on treatment.  A combination of talk therapy and medication is presented as the 
optimal treatment, which might or might not be accepted by the patient.   
4.4.5 Biopsychosocial Model and Treatment Options 
In the following extracts, the physicians acknowledge an incongruence between illness 
model and treatment.  Endorsing a biopsychosocial model of depression does not necessarily 
mean that psychological and social interventions are available.  Extracts 7 and 8 are from the 
same physician. The following extract is in the context of an interview question about whether or 
not depression is over-treated and/or under-treated in the population.   
4.4.5.1 Extract 7. 
Physician 04: So yeah, I mean, the 1 
people who are, who have bad life 2 
circumstances, they don’t have money 3 
to pay for depression medication so 4 
if they’re on it, it’s probably 5 
because someone told them to go on 6 
it.  And it’s futile because they’re 7 
not depressed because they have low 8 
serotonin, they’re depressed because 9 
uh things are happening to them, so 10 
it’s, it’s sort of stupid to think 11 
that a drug is going to treat that 12 
but we do anyways.  Yeah, so, we’re 13 
over-treating with drugs, under-14 
treating with the other modalities, 15 
if you want to look at it that 16 
way....  If somebody’s depressed 17 
because crappy things are happening 18 
in their life, why not take care of 19 
the crappy things and odds are 20 
{chuckling} you won’t need the 21 
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drugs.  You won’t need to intervene 22 
any more than that.  But I, I, you 23 
know, I feel like I have 24 
surprisingly little power in that 25 
regard.   26 
In the opening of extract 7, the physician begins to construct an argument regarding the 
over-prescription of antidepressant medications.  His use of the term “people” (l. 2) is vague and 
might refer to many individuals, but the term broadly constructs it as a widespread phenomenon.  
He again uses a vague term, “someone” (l. 6), to describe the person who initiated the 
antidepressant treatment, but one can assume that the physician is referring to another physician 
because physicians are the gatekeepers of prescription medications.  He subtly indicts the 
“someone” by describing the treatment with antidepressant medication in these particular cases 
as “futile” (l. 7) and “sort of stupid” (11).  By using the term “we” (l. 13), which he most likely 
uses to refer to the profession of family physicians, he extends the indictment to himself and his 
profession as a whole (“we do anyways,” l.  13; “we’re over-treating with drugs” (ll. 13-14)).  
With these phrases he constructs medication as a resource likely to be used by physicians even 
when it is unlikely to be useful.   
The physician in extract 7 constructs a distinction between two types of depression: 
depression as caused by a deficiency of “low serotonin” (ll. 8-9) and depression as caused by 
“bad life circumstance” (ll. 2-3).  Rather than reduce the non-biological factors involved in 
depression to biochemistry as was done in extract 5, he appears to present the biochemical 
explanation as existing independently of life circumstances.  He states, “they’re not depressed 
because they have low serotonin, they’re depressed because uh things are happening to them” (ll. 
7-10).  This statement evokes the distinction between endogenous and reactive depression that 
was prevalent prior to DSM-III.    
The physician acknowledges the lack of correspondence between illness model and 
treatment recommendations (ll. 17-22).  He presents a rhetorical question, “why not take care of 
the crappy things” (ll. 19-20), which suggests treatment should correspond directly to the 
perceived cause of the depression.  He chuckles as he states the answer, “odds are you won’t 
need the drugs” (ll. 20-22).  The chuckle appears to acknowledge the absurdity of not following 
what he constructed as a simple and direct relation between cause and intervention.  However, in 
lines 23 to 26, he articulates a counter position and defends his own practice as constrained.  The 
physician laments the lack of power he has to improve the lives of his patients.  It is unclear why 
he refers to this as ‘surprising’ (l. 25), but it does speak to the lack of congruence between an 
illness model like the biopsychosocial model of depression and the available interventions to 
target the perceived causes.  Access to counselling, financial resources, and social supports are 
limited, especially in private practice clinics, and writing an antidepressant prescription might be 
the only immediate intervention available to the physician.   
In the following extract, similar to extract 5, the physician again separates biological 
depression from situational depression in the context of a response about treatment decisions.  
Despite acknowledging that antidepressants are not always a preferred treatment, they are 
presented as a standard, fallback treatment. 
4.4.5.2 Extract 8. 
Interviewer: You mentioned just a 1 
few minutes ago that if you sense 2 
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that there’s something organic going 3 
on.  So how do you make that 4 
determination? 5 
Physician 04: It’s a diagnosis of 6 
exclusion.  So if you, if you’re 7 
depressed and I can’t tease out an 8 
obvious cause in your life, you 9 
know, marital conflict, lost your 10 
job, somebody died.  If you can’t 11 
find any other reason then you’re 12 
sort of left with the conclusion 13 
that boy, it must be something 14 
organic, serotonin deficiency.  The 15 
other interesting thing is you’ll 16 
see a lot of depression in people 17 
with other medical conditions....   18 
And because of all the limitations 19 
that are placed on his life he’ll 20 
become depressed as a reason, as a 21 
result.  I don’t find in that 22 
situation that treating him with uh- 23 
I’ll offer it to him obviously.  But 24 
I don’t find medications are very 25 
useful in that case because the 26 
depression isn’t from a deficiency 27 
of serotonin, it’s because bad 28 
things are happening in his life.29 
In this extract, we see again a separation of the social causes of depression from 
biochemical causes through the “diagnosis of exclusion” (l. 6-7).  The physician excludes life 
stressors from the diagnosis of depression (“marital conflict, lost your job, somebody died” ll. 
10-11), which he might otherwise diagnose as an adjustment disorder or bereavement in DSM-
IV nosology (current at the time of the interview).  The physician makes the assumption that a 
depression that occurs without any obvious stressors is “organic” (l. 15) in cause and in these 
cases it is appropriate to treat the patient with antidepressant medication.  The physician alludes 
to an endorsement of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression when he refers to such 
depression as a “serotonin deficiency” (l. 15).   
The physician continues his line of reasoning on the diagnosis of exclusion with an 
example of people with medical conditions who also display symptoms of depression.  He 
constructs the depression as being caused by lifestyle “limitations” (l. 19) as opposed to an 
organic deficiency.  Interestingly, the physician begins to state that he does not find 
antidepressants useful in these situations, but interrupts his statement to add, “I’ll offer it to him 
obviously” (l. 24).  The use of the term “obviously” seems to construct the practice of 
prescribing antidepressant medication as standard and routine, but it could also suggest that the 
physician constructs the interviewer as somebody who might expect him (as a physician) to 
provide biomedical treatment.  Offering medication, even when he does not “find medications 
are very useful” (ll. 25-26), places the decision about whether or not to use them as the 
responsibility of the patient.  The physician again reinforces the chemical imbalance hypothesis 
of depression when he adds that antidepressant treatment is not useful when there is no 
“deficiency of serotonin” (ll. 27-28) to correct.  
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Extracts 7 and 8 exemplify the limitations of the biopsychosocial model of depression 
when making treatment recommendations in primary care.  The physician constructs offering 
antidepressant medication routinely and laments his lack of influence into the social lives of his 
patient.  A full range of treatment options is constructed as limited and incomplete and an 
antidepressant prescription might be the only option that this physician has to offer his patient.  
4.4.6 Social Causes and Treatment Options 
In the following two extracts, the physicians do not talk about the underlying biochemical 
etiology of depression, but instead focus on the social factors involved in depression.  In extract 
9, the physician responds to a question about whether antidepressants are over-prescribed, under-
prescribed, or appropriately prescribed at the population level.   
4.4.6.1 Extract 9. 
Physician 01: That prescription I’m 1 
never in favour of it unless there’s 2 
no choice left....   3 
Everybody doesn’t need 4 
antidepressant.  If somebody needs a 5 
chit-chat or needs exercise or help 6 
or financial thing, how is the 7 
antidepressant prescription enough 8 
if they have a financial problem and 9 
I prescribe them seventy-dollar drug 10 
for a month? It’s, it’s, compounding 11 
their problem.  It’s not helping 12 
their problem.  So it’s a question 13 
of what is, what the background 14 
problem is there. 15 
Interviewer 2: Okay. Any final 16 
comments or questions about my 17 
questions ... or anything else you 18 
think we might want to know? 19 
Physician 01: I think laughter is a 20 
good medicine. People should 21 
actually uh laugh a little bit more. 22 
And you, you improve your chemicals 23 
by laughing more as well.24 
The physician begins his response by stating that he regards antidepressants to be a last-
choice option.  He argues that he is “never in favour of” (l. 2) antidepressant drugs “unless 
there’s no choice left” (ll. 2-3).  The use of the term “never” in his utterance constructs his 
position as an absolute but he qualifies his position with the term “unless.”  During several lines 
of text omitted from this extract, the physician does acknowledge that antidepressants are under-
prescribed in some cases and that people who are very depressed need antidepressants.  
However, he returns to state that all depressed patients, i.e., “everybody” (l. 4), do not require 
antidepressants.  He lists “chit-chat,” “exercise,” “help,” and “financial” assistance as potential 
“needs” (ll. 5-7) of his patients.  The term ‘need(s)’ positions these factors as essential and 
necessary targets of treatment.   
This physician poses a rhetorical question: “how is the antidepressant prescription 
enough” (l. 7-8).  The use of the term “enough” suggests that antidepressants are insufficient on 
their own in such cases, but does permit their inclusion in a treatment plan.  He continues the 
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rhetorical question, adding “if they have a financial problem” (l. 9) paired with “seventy-dollar 
drug for a month” (l. 10).  The link between the cost of the drug and the financial problem serves 
to construct the treatment with antidepressant drugs in this scenario as absurd and irresponsible.  
He answers the question by stating that such treatment would be “compounding” (l. 11) rather 
than “helping” (l. 12) the problem.  Unlike the physician in extracts 7 and 8, who added that he 
treats with or offers antidepressants even when he does not think it will be helpful, this physician 
does not make a similar utterance, which reinforces his earlier statement that antidepressants are 
his last option.  
While the physician makes the claim that he eschews routine antidepressant treatment for 
his patients, at the end of the extract, he talks about improving “chemicals” (l. 23) through 
“laughing more” (ll. 23-24), which speaks to the power and pervasiveness of the chemical 
imbalance explanation in shaping etiological understandings of depression.  The phrase “improve 
your chemicals” (l. 23) indirectly suggests that there is a chemical deficiency in patients with 
depression.  Similar to the physicians in extracts 4 and 5, where they constructed alternative 
treatments to medications as also influencing brain chemistry, this physician appears to endorse 
the chemical imbalance etiology of depression and multiple routes to treating the underlying 
imbalance.  
The final extract occurs in the context of a conversation about the addiction, poverty, and 
mental health issues prevalent among this physician’s patients.  
4.4.6.2 Extract 10.
Interviewer: And is it your sense 1 
that there’s- again, I don’t want to 2 
put words in your mouth but that 3 
there isn’t the kind of coordinated 4 
effort around that or even the 5 
resources really to- 6 
Physician 03: Well, I think often 7 
you don’t want to treat the symptom 8 
of depression without- it’s a 9 
symptom.  You don’t get into the 10 
root cause of it.  So if you just 11 
treat someone with an 12 
antidepressant, and nothing changes 13 
otherwise, then you can be just 14 
numbing their feelings, not lifting 15 
their mood.  I don’t think that’s 16 
very healthy.17 
In the opening of extract 10, the interviewer tentatively reflects some content from earlier 
in the conversation, focusing on the lack of “coordinated effort” (ll. 4-5) or “resources” (l. 6) 
toward addictions treatment and poverty reduction strategies.  The physician responds but 
abruptly stops her utterance at “symptom of depression without-” (ll. 8-9).  The halt in this 
utterance, and the subsequent exclamation, “it’s a symptom” (ll. 9-10), suggests that considering 
depression to be a symptom is not typical or self-evident.  Indeed, the rhetoric regarding 
depression in medical discourse is typically that depression is a disease entity, rather than a 
symptom.   
The physician states that the “root cause” (l. 11) of depression is not treated by 
antidepressants, which suggests that she is resisting the discourse that depression is caused 
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principally by a chemical imbalance in the brain.  She claims that treating a patient with an 
antidepressant alone is “just numbing their feelings” (ll. 14-15) and not “very healthy” (l. 17).  
These claims construct such treatment as ineffective and potentially irresponsible, since 
physicians are expected to improve the health of their patients.  While the term ‘antidepressant’ 
suggests that the medication will prevent or alleviate depression as a disease (Moncrieff, 2008), 
the physician counters this notion when she states that antidepressants on their own do not “[lift] 
their mood” (ll. 15-16).  
The physicians in extracts 9 and 10 construct some cases of depression as caused by 
social factors.  Antidepressants are described as counter-productive in instances of financial 
difficulty, and as ineffective for treating the underlying social causes of depression.  While the 
physician in extract 9 refers to laughter also improving chemicals in the brain, the physician in 
extract 10 constructs an alternative to the notion that antidepressants correct an underlying 
chemical imbalance, insisting instead that antidepressants treat depression by numbing a 
patient’s feelings.  Both physicians indicate that antidepressant treatment in cases where social 
causes are present is irresponsible.  
Throughout the entire corpus of data, there was no mention that scientific knowledge of 
depression is incomplete or that the mechanisms of antidepressant action are not fully 
understood.  That is not to say that the physicians would disagree that depression and 
antidepressants are not completely understood, but this omission is in contrast to statements 
found on depression information websites and by pharmaceutical companies.  For example, 
WebMD, a popular website for health information, states “Depression is an extremely complex 
disease. No one knows exactly what causes it, but it can occur for a variety of reasons” (para. 2, 
WebMD, n.d.); and the information pamphlet for the popular drug Prozac, states “Although the 
exact mechanism of PROZAC is unknown, it is presumed to be linked to its inhibition of CNS 
neuronal uptake of serotonin” (p. 20, Eli Lilly and Company, 2014).  The physicians instead 
focused on explaining depression based on the presumed mechanism of action of antidepressants 
and/or by focusing on salient stressors in the patients’ lives.      
4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 Uses of the Biochemical Model 
The physician participants in this study presented the utility of the biochemical 
explanation as a positive discursive device to (a) motivate patients to take and stay on 
antidepressants, (b) reduce self-blame and stigma, (c) contribute to building knowledge among 
laypersons that depression is a biological disease, and (d) instill hope and confidence that the 
condition is understood.  In addition, many physicians talked about using a biopsychosocial 
model to understand and guide their treatment of depression, but were limited by available 
treatment options.   
4.5.1.1 Motivating patients. 
When the physician participants talked about the biochemical explanation of depression, 
it was often in response to the question, “do you ever feel you need to motivate your patients to 
take antidepressants?”  The etiological model they presented when motivating their patients to 
take an antidepressant was that depression is caused by an imbalance/deficiency of 
neurotransmitters.  While this discursive move is not entirely surprising given that the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis is a pervasive and persuasive explanation of depression (France et al., 
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2007), and that the pharmaceutical advertising supporting this claim is widespread (Leo & 
Lacasse, 2008), physicians who use this explanation are arguably not upholding the principles of 
informed consent.   
According to Blease (2014), a social scientist who focuses on medical ethics, physicians 
diagnosing and treating depression should inform their patients that depression is not fully 
understood, the causes are multifactorial and complex, and that there is a lack of scientific 
consensus about how antidepressants work.  However, the physicians in the course of our 
interviews did not make statements to suggest that they routinely present depression to their 
patients as not fully understood or that antidepressant mechanisms of action and efficacy is 
lacking scientific consensus.  Arguably, presenting depression and antidepressants as not fully 
understood could undermine the perceived benefit of communicating to the patient that his/her 
condition is diagnosable and treatable.  In addition, the chemical imbalance narrative offers a 
quick and simple description that dovetails with a description of antidepressant medications as 
neurotransmitter reuptake inhibitors that can correct a chemical imbalance in the brain.  Patients 
are more likely to accept a treatment as valid and credible when it matches the etiological 
description (Iselin & Addis, 2003).   
 The physician participants did talk about depression as a complex condition with 
biological, psychological, and social inputs, but several physicians delineated biological 
depression from depression symptoms in the presence of external factors (e.g., the death of a 
loved one or financial hardship).  Depression in the absence of external factors was presented as 
a legitimate condition of neurotransmitter deficiency.  The “diagnosis of exclusion,” as one 
physician described his diagnostic routine, is reminiscent of the classification of depression as 
endogenous versus reactive, which was popular before the advent of the DSM-III.  In practice, 
the distinction between depression caused by biological versus psychological/social factors could 
have unwanted effects; physicians diagnosing a depression they construct as predominately 
biological might display less warmth and empathy toward their patients (Lebowitz & Ahn, 
2014).   
4.5.1.2 Reducing self-blame and stigma; building knowledge in the community. 
The benefits of the biochemical model with regard to mitigating self-blame and reducing 
stigma and to contributing to building knowledge about the biological causes of depression in the 
community are not straightforward.  The physicians constructed their biochemical explanation 
with patients as a positive factor in moving the patients from viewing their depression as a 
character flaw or something that they should be able to control, to accepting that they are not at 
fault for their own depression and to externalizing the problem.  However, while Deacon and 
Baird (2009) reported that self-blame decreased among undergraduate students who imagined 
they were depressed and were told their depression was caused by a chemical imbalance, Kemp 
et al. (2014) reported no change in self-blame among undergraduate students who had personally 
experienced depression and were told their depression was caused by a chemical imbalance.  
Thus, it is unclear whether physicians succeed in reducing self-blame in their patients by telling 
them their depression is caused by a chemical imbalance.  While the biochemical explanation 
might or might not reduce self-blame, the tradeoff is that patients expect a worse prognosis and 
view psychosocial interventions as ineffective (Deacon & Baird, 2009; Kemp et al., 2014).  In 
addition, while the biological causes of mental illness have gained prominence in recent decades, 
overall stigma has not decreased (Pescosolido et al., 2010; Schomerus et al., 2012).  
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Scholars have theorized that the biological explanations of mental illnesses lead to 
neuroessentialist thinking, i.e., that the primary way to view psychological phenomena is through 
the activity and structure of the brain, and that mental illnesses are associated with abnormal 
brain activity (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2001; Haslam, 2011; Haslam & Kvaale, 2013).  The 
biochemical explanation of depression can lead to attributions of uncontrollability, positioning 
depression like any other physical disease over which we have no control and thus reducing 
blame. However, it can also lead to neuroessentialism, which can increase other aspects of 
stigma, including a perception that those with mental illness are inherently different and possibly 
dangerous, that mental illnesses are resistant to intervention, and that for treatments to be 
effective they must target the brain directly (Haslam & Kvaale, 2013).   
If the biochemical explanation does not significantly reduce self-blame among affected 
individuals and has not contributed to a reduction of depression stigma in the population, then 
there is little value in building knowledge about the biochemical causes of depression in the 
community.  In addition, given that the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression has been 
widely discredited and abandoned in the scientific and psychiatric communities (Healy, 1997), 
continuing to promote this hypothesis contributes to the misunderstanding of depression with 
unintended consequences.   
As Lebowitz et al. (2013) suggested, the negative effects of neuroessentialism, such as 
prognostic pessimism, might be countered by information emphasizing the plasticity and non-
deterministic aspects of genes and the brain, and by promoting the notion that all behaviour, e.g., 
socializing, exercising, laughing, etc., can influence the chemistry in the brain.  While they did 
not talk of epigenetics and neuroplasticity, some physicians in the current study did report that 
they informed their patients that many different interventions could influence the brain.  Given 
that these interviews were conducted in 2009, it is highly likely that research on epigenetics and 
neural plasticity in mental illnesses had not been effectively translated to clinical practice.   
4.5.1.3 Instilling hope and confidence. 
Family physicians are in a difficult position.  In the absence of consensus on the etiology 
of depression, the chemical imbalance hypothesis offers a simple and compelling medical 
explanation for a patient’s symptoms.  Family physicians, who diagnose and treat the majority of 
depression cases, are generalists who are required to be familiar with a wide range of presenting 
problems; they are not psychiatric specialists.  While psychiatrists might not routinely explain to 
patients that their depression is caused by a chemical imbalance (Pies, 2011), many family 
physicians in our study described using this explanation, especially when recommending 
antidepressants.  While physicians constructed this discursive move as a way to communicate 
with their patients that their condition is understood and that treatments are available, if the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis leads to prognostic pessimism, then the narrative of instilling 
hope and confidence in recovery is undermined.  In addition, there is much controversy 
surrounding the chemical imbalance hypothesis and the efficacy of antidepressants.  After 
consulting their physician, patients might search the Internet about their condition and find that 
what their physician told them is disputed, which might affect trust in the physician-patient 
relationship.  Searching “depression chemical imbalance” in Google brings up a number of 
articles, opinion pieces, and depression FAQs that refer to the complexity of depression and the 
lack of scientific evidence that depression is caused by a simple chemical imbalance (e.g., 
Angell, 2011; Arkowitz & Lilienfeld, 2014; Harvard Health Publications, 2009; Moncrieff, 
2014; Mukherjee, 2012; Pies, 2011). As Blease (2014) suggested, presenting depression as 
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complex, multifaceted, and not fully understood has the potential to permit the patient to make 
an informed choice about treatment; such openness and transparency has the potential to exert a 
positive effect on the therapeutic relationship (Street, Makoul, Arora, & Epstein, 2009).   
4.5.2 Biopsychosocial Model of Depression: Treatment Limitations 
Physicians are trained to view depression as a multifactorial condition and many 
endorsed using the biopsychosocial model of depression in their practice.  However, pragmatics 
of treating patients overruled any link between model and treatment recommendations.  For 
example, the physicians’ accounts contained references to antidepressant medications being 
offered regardless of perceived effectiveness for the given situation, and some physicians 
expressed feeling powerless to make substantial impact into the personal and social lives of their 
patients and being constrained by limited access to counselling and social assistance resources.   
Access to social, psychological, and other mental health services is limited in primary 
care in Canada (Romanow & Marchildon, 2003; Grenier et al., 2008; Anderssen, 2015).  Some 
participants stated they are "lucky" and "fortunate" to work in salaried positions at community 
and university clinics where they have time and ready access to mental health professionals such 
as counsellors, social workers, clinical psychologists, and mental health nurses.  However, these 
types of clinics are rare and are available only to certain populations (e.g., students at the 
university).  Primary universal health care, touted as the ideal model of care in Canada, is often 
unattained because access to mental health care providers is not universally accessible. 
The Mental Health Commission of Canada (2012) has published a broad-based mental 
health strategy for improving mental health services in Canada.  One of six strategic directions is 
aimed at improving access to services, treatments, and supports.  To this end, the Commission 
recommended increasing the capacity of primary healthcare workers to address mental health 
concerns of a large number of people.  The Commission recommended increasing resources and 
capacity of community-based care, including improved access to psychotherapy and standards 
for wait times.  The Commission also recommended better social supports, such as housing and 
employment assistance.  In 2016, the Mental Health Commission of Canada released a five-year 
action plan document to improve mental health services.  This document was created following 
consultations with stakeholders and citizens, and it outlined 17 specific recommendations in the 
areas of leadership and funding, promotion and prevention, access and services, and data and 
research (Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2016).  Implementation of these 
recommendations would permit and encourage family physicians to make treatment 
recommendations that are congruent with the biopsychosocial model of depression that many of 
them espoused.    
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5.1 Introduction 
The clinical features of depression have been described similarly for over two millennia, 
with many predisposing and precipitating factors proposed over the years (Healy, 1997; Jackson, 
2008).  While biological research and theories into its causes abound, depression has an 
unknown etiology.  Currently, investigations into the etiology of depression are occurring in the 
field of neuroscience, a hybrid scientific discipline focused on the brain and nervous system, 
with origins in molecular biology, chemistry, genetics, and anatomy and physiology (Abi-
Rached & Rose, 2010; Abi-Rached, Rose, & Mogoutov, 2010).  Current explanations in clinical 
neuroscience propose that its causes and correlations are manifold, with social factors, 
psychological factors, genetic vulnerabilities, and impairments in neuroplasticity, 
neurotransmitter functioning, endocrine functioning, and immune functioning all implicated in 
some form (Kendler, 2012; Krishnan & Nestler, 2008; Wong & Lucino, 2001).   
While the etiological understanding of depression is complex and incomplete, the idea 
that depression is caused by a chemical imbalance in the brain remains pervasive and persuasive 
in Canadian and American society (e.g., Pescosolido et al., 2010; Sigurdson, 2019, unpublished 
manuscript).  Until recently, pharmaceutical advertising promoted depression as a simple 
chemical imbalance in the brain that can be corrected with medication (Leo & Lacasse, 2008).  
While pharmaceutical advertisements no longer refer to depression being caused by a chemical 
imbalance (Lacasse & Leo, 2015), there is widespread espousal of the chemical imbalance 
explanation of depression among laypersons (Cohen & Hughes, 2011; France, Lysaker, & 
Robinson, 2007; Pescosolido et al. 2010).  In the following section, I summarize the major 
biologically-based etiologies of depression, including the chemical imbalance explanations and 
contemporary ideas in neuroscience literature.  
5.1.1 Biologically-Based Etiologies of Depression 
5.1.1.1 Humoral explanations. 
For many years, human illnesses, including what we now refer to as depression or major 
depressive disorder, were conceptualized within the humoral system of medicine (Jackson, 2008; 
Healy, 1997).  In the humoral system, diseases were thought to be caused by imbalances of the 
four humors, i.e., blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile.  The humoral conception of illness 
was prominent from the time of Ancient Greece up until the 18th century (Healy, 1997).  
Melancholia, meaning black bile (“Melancholia,” n.d.), is an historical term for severe 
depression which was thought to be caused by an excess of black bile in the blood (Jackson, 
2008).  The spleen, thought to be responsible for filtering black bile that originated in the liver, 
was the site of pathology in this system.  Treatment of melancholia according to the humoral 
system typically involved bloodletting and purging, which was believed to remedy the excess of 
black bile built up in the body (Healy, 1997).   
5.1.1.2 Mechanical explanations. 
In the 18th century, mechanical and hydrodynamic explanations were proposed to explain 
the etiology of melancholia and began to displace the humoral explanation.  Jackson (2008), 
psychiatrist and medical historian, summarized the mechanical explanations as being first 
vasocentric, with symptoms of melancholia thought to be caused by sluggish blood or reduced 
circulation, and later neurocentric, with symptoms of melancholia thought to be caused by 
sluggish nerve fluid or depleted energy levels in the brain.  By the 19th century, the vasocentric 
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and neurocentric explanations merged, and symptoms of melancholia were posited to be caused 
by impaired blood circulation within the brain, effecting nerve cells, as well as hereditary factors 
(Jackson, 2008).  At this time, mental disorders, including what we now call depression, were 
increasingly viewed as brain diseases rather than diseases of the soul (Healy, 1997).  Jackson 
(2008) concluded that, while the mechanical explanations diverged from explanations derived 
from the humoral system, treating depression continued to involve bloodletting and purging.  In 
the 20th century, the advent of drugs that became known as the antidepressants made an impact 
upon the etiological explanation of depression.    
5.1.1.3 Influence of antidepressants and the monoamine hypotheses. 
The discovery of the drugs classified as antidepressants led to a new conceptualization of 
depression.  In the late 1950s, Roland Kuhn and Nate Kline independently reported their 
observations that two drugs appeared to have mood lifting properties (Healy, 1997).  Roland 
Kuhn (1958) reported that imipramine, an antihistamine, appeared to have “potent antidepressant 
action” (Kuhn, 1958, p.  464) and Loomer, Saunders, and Kline (1957) described iproniazid, 
used to treat tuberculosis, as a “psychic energizer” (p. 129).  The observations that certain drugs 
seemed to have antidepressant properties spurred research examining their mechanisms of action.  
Schildkraut (1965) proposed that the tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) and monoamine oxidase 
inhibitors (MAOIs) function by increasing the concentrations of monoamine neurotransmitters in 
the synaptic cleft, specifically the catecholamines (epinephrine, norepinephrine, and dopamine), 
by either preventing enzymes from breaking them down or by preventing their reuptake into the 
releasing cell.  Coppen (1967) further argued that a lack of serotonin, another monoamine 
neurotransmitter, at important receptor sites in the brain was responsible for depression.  Both 
Schildkraut and Coppen argued that reserpine, a drug thought to induce a depressed state, 
functions by reducing levels of monoamine neurotransmitters available in the synaptic cleft.   
The shortcomings of the monoamine hypothesis of depression have been well 
documented (e.g., Bentall, 2009; France, Lysaker, & Robinson, 2007; Healy, 1997; Kirsch, 
2010; Leo & Lacasse, 2008; Valenstein, 1998; Whitaker, 2010).  The most significant challenge 
to the monoamine hypothesis of depression is the observation that antidepressant drugs influence 
neurotransmitters within hours but treatment response of antidepressants takes several weeks 
(Wong & Lucinio, 2001).  Kirsch (2010), a psychology researcher known for his controversial 
claim that antidepressant effects are due to the placebo response, provided a comprehensive 
argument against the tenability of the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  Kirsch (2010) argued 
against the monoamine hypothesis by citing research that was available to Coppen and 
Schildkraut; he noted that reserpine does not deplete monoamines, does not cause symptoms of 
depression at a high rate, and inhibits reuptake of serotonin and norepinephrine, similar to 
imipramine.  Kirsch also argued that upwards of 90 experiments have been unsuccessful in 
causing depression by depleting monoamines in healthy people.  Review articles summarizing 
the biological bases of depression provide a nod toward depleted monoamines but ultimately 
come to the same conclusion as Kirsch with regard to veracity of the monoamine hypothesis.  
For example, Wong and Lucinio (2001) wrote, “Thirty years of research have revealed some 
serious gaps and limitations in the monoamine hypothesis” (p. 347), and Krishnan and Nestler 
(2008) wrote, “The cause of depression is far from being a simple deficiency of central 
monoamines” (p. 895).  Current ideas regarding the biological bases of depression are complex 
and there is no unifying etiological model for depression.   
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5.1.1.4 Genetics and heritability hypotheses.   
While heritability is estimated at approximately 40% (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013), genetic variants associated with increased risk for depression have not been consistently 
replicated.  The most extensively studied gene potentially related to depression is 5-HTTLPR.  
This gene is responsible for promoting the coding of the serotonin transporter protein, which is 
responsible for the reuptake of serotonin at synapses.   Caspi et al. (2003) posited that depression 
is caused by an interaction of stressful life events and a genetic vulnerability in 5-HTTLPR.  
Subsequently, much research was devoted to studying the relationship between 5-HTTLPR and 
stressful life events, with some researchers replicating these results (e.g., Kendler, Kuhn, Vittum, 
Prescott, & Riley, 2005) and others failing to do so (e.g., Risch et al., 2009).  In an attempt to 
settle the conflicting results, Culverhouse et al. (2017), working as a large consortium of 
scientists who had previously published on the topic, reanalyzed a large corpus of published and 
unpublished data.  They reported that there was no evidence for an interaction between stressful 
life events and 5-HTTLPR genotype.  They concluded that future research into the topic be 
curtailed, given the lack of a strong, robust association.   
5.1.1.5 The neuroendocrine hypotheses. 
Stressful life events are associated with an increased risk of developing symptoms of 
depression.  Stress produces a response in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis in the 
body, culminating with the release of cortisol.  The HPA axis is central to the body’s 
sympathetic, or fight-flight response.  Sustained elevated activity of the HPA axis can lead to 
hypercortisolemia, which is associated with disturbances in anxiety regulation and 
monoaminergic systems, cognitive impairments, and volume reductions in limbic brain 
structures, similar to those observed in depressed individuals (de Kloet, Joels, & Holsboer, 
2005).  Among the correlational data for stress as a risk factor in the etiology of depression is the 
impaired suppression of cortisol following an injection of dexamethasone, a synthetic form of 
cortisol.  Once thought to be a potential diagnostic biomarker for depression, the dexamethasone 
suppression test lacked the specificity to differentiate depression from comorbid conditions such 
as Alzheimer’s disease, alcohol withdrawal, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia 
(Nierenberg & Feinstein, 1988).  After a comprehensive meta-analysis of studies assessing 
depression and stress hormones, Stetler and Miller (2011) concluded that HPA hyperactivity in 
depression varies across patient groups and depression subtypes, with the greatest effect 
observed in older patients with more severe symptoms.  The data on stressful life events and 
their impact upon the endocrine system are robust but correlational, and the search for a reliable 
biomarker has so far been inconclusive. 
5.1.1.6 The neuroplasticity hypotheses. 
In the past two decades, neuroplasticity has shaped much debate and theorizing about the 
brain and behaviour, including depression.  Neuroplasticity is an umbrella term that describes the 
brain’s ability to adapt and change, functionally and structurally, to environmental stimuli and 
experiences throughout the lifespan (Pascual-Leone, Amedi, Fregni, & Merabet, 2005).  A 
central problem with the monoamine hypothesis of depression was the observed delay between 
elevated synaptic concentrations of monoamines and the therapeutic effect of antidepressants, 
and mechanisms underlying neurogenesis were purported to account for the delay (e.g., Castrén, 
2005; Krishnan & Nestler, 2008).  Castrén (2005) proposed that brain derived neurotrophic 
factor (BDNF), which plays a role in the maintenance of neurons and the survival of new 
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neurons, was a possible mechanism for altering activity-dependent neural plasticity.  Krishnan 
and Nestler (2008) summarized the support for the role of BDNF in depression, noting that 
scientists have measured reduced postmortem hippocampal BDNF in people who were 
depressed, reduced BDNF expression following chronic stress in animal models of depression, 
and increased BDNF expression following antidepressant treatment in animal models of 
depression.  A potential rapid-acting antidepressant, ketamine, appears to increase synaptic 
plasticity (Berman et al., 2000; Krystal, Sanacora, & Duman, 2013; Li et al., 2010).  While 
neurogenesis and synaptic plasticity hold promise for the future of understanding the etiology of 
depression, much remains to be known.  
5.1.1.7 The neuroimmunity hypothesis. 
Finally, the immune system appears to play a role in the onset and course of depression.  
Cytokines, which are small signaling proteins created by immune cells, influence a number of 
basic functions that are disturbed during a depression, namely sleep, appetite, and cognition 
(Wong & Lucinio, 2001).  Krishnan and Nestler (2008) summarized that cytokines appear to 
influence mood in humans and rodent models, but that the effect is inconsistent and the neural 
circuitry and pathways to behaviour are largely unknown.  Hodes, Kana, Menard, Merad, and 
Russo (2015) reviewed the scientific evidence from studies with humans and animal models of 
depression and concluded that neuroinflammation contributes to the precipitation of a mood 
disorder.  Schwartz (2015), in her book on neuroimmunity, posited that the immune response to 
acute stress facilitates recovery by restoring levels of BDNF and improving neuroplasticity.  She 
also argued that under chronic stress, the immune response is disrupted, and the body is less able 
to recover to homeostasis.  She proffered that improving immune response in cases of chronic, 
long-term stress, might improve outcomes for people with depression.   
5.1.1.8 Summary of biologically-based etiological explanations. 
Overall, depression appears to be associated with a number of factors that are not fully 
understood.  The idea that depression is caused by a chemical imbalance of monoamine 
neurotransmitters in the brain has been displaced by theories implicating genetics, the 
neuroendocrine system, the immune system, and neuroplastic mechanisms in the brain.  While 
the exact causes of depression are still unknown and no reliable biological markers currently 
exist, we seemingly know more about depression and the nervous system than ever before and 
neuroscience is at the forefront of this research.   
While serotonin and the serotonin transporter may still be implicated among the causal 
mechanisms of depression, the current research that scientists are conducting with regard to 
depression is complex, nuanced, and manifold when compared to the chemical imbalance 
explanation as espoused by laypersons.  The discrepancy between the pervasiveness and 
persuasiveness of the chemical imbalance hypothesis in lay society and the lack of conclusive 
scientific evidence to support the hypothesis in scientific literature led to the following research 
question: How do scientists working on the biological understanding of depression account for 
the use of the chemical imbalance hypothesis and structure arguments for and/or against it?  The 
following analysis and discussion has the potential to add to the literature critical of the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis by adding the voice of scientists who are researching the mechanisms 
underpinning depression.  It also has the potential to inform future directions on clinician-patient 
communication strategies for depression by articulating contemporary scientific views of the 
etiology of depression and the potential arguments for and against these explanations.   
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5.2 Analytical Perspective: Discursive Psychology 
Discursive psychology applies concepts and ideas from discourse analysis to questions in 
psychology (Potter, 2003; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  Consistent with social constructionist 
epistemology, I assume that multiple versions of an event, person, and/or object are available to 
individuals through language, and those versions are created and shared between people.  As a 
methodology, discursive psychology guides a systematic examination of how talk and text 
relevant to questions of psychological significance are structured via linguistic resources, the 
social actions that are performed via the use of these resources, and the possible functions of 
these actions (Potter, 2003).  As recommended by Wetherell (1998) and employed in other 
discourse analytic work (e.g., Lafrance, 2007), I situate the content and style of discourses and 
the social actions they perform within broader social discourses of depression in Canadian and 
American medical and lay society.   
5.3 Method 
The data for the present analysis were derived from semi-structured interviews conducted 
in 2013 and 2014 with 10 neuroscientists working in the field of depression research.  The 
interviews contained a broad range of questions regarding the science of biological psychiatry in 
general and depression in particular.  The University of Saskatchewan Behavioral Research 
Ethics Board approved this research project. 
5.3.1 Participants 
Potential participants were first identified as authors who published review and opinion 
articles in the journals Nature (including Nature Reviews Neuroscience) and Science and who 
appeared, from website biographies, to be principal investigators of research programs on the 
neuroscience of depression.  Further, a convenience sample of neuroscientists (also principal 
investigators) geographically close was solicited to participate.  Finally, snowball sampling was 
used to identify additional scientists.  Twenty-six potential participants were e-mailed a letter 
inviting them to take part in an hour-long interview about the science of depression (Appendix 
G).  Ten scientists agreed to participate.  I conducted one-on-one interviews with these scientists, 
either in-person (n = 4) or by telephone (n = 6).   
The ten participants (seven males) ranged in age from 34 to 66 years (median = 53) and 
had worked as a researcher for 3 to 38 years (median = 24.5). Seven participants had PhD 
degrees (three in psychology, one in cell biology, one in neuroscience, one in biological 
psychiatry, and one in pharmacology/medicine); two participants had MD/PhD degrees; and one 
had an MD degree.  All participants had advanced training as postdoctoral researchers (n = 8) or 
psychiatric fellows (n = 1), or both (n = 1).  All participants ran laboratories with multiple 
postdoctoral researchers and/or graduate students.  Reported yearly grant funding for the 
laboratories ranged from approximately $40,000 to $1,000,000 USD (median = $250,000; one 
participant did not disclose funding).   
5.3.2 Procedures 
Each participant was informed of the purpose of the research and his or her rights both 
verbally and through a written, signed consent form (Appendix B).  Participants who were 
interviewed over the telephone received a copy of the consent form in advance by e-mail and 
provided verbal consent.   Consent was also obtained to e-mail completed transcripts (Appendix 
C).  The interview began with collecting demographic information (Appendix D).  Interviews 
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with scientists lasted approximately one hour (range = 50 to 80 minutes; median = 59 minutes).  
The interviews were guided by a semi-structured schedule (Appendix E).  The interview 
schedule contained questions and prompts regarding defining and studying depression, the 
challenges and controversies present in depression research, and the future of depression 
research.  
The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim by the author with all 
personally identifying information omitted.  Consistent with University of Saskatchewan 
research ethics guidelines, the participants were provided with a copy of the transcript and they 
were permitted to modify, delete, or add to the transcript before releasing the transcript for 
purpose of analysis (Appendix F).  One participant modified his transcript for clarity, but did not 
significantly alter the content.  Jefferson transcription notation was not used because the high 
level of detail it provides was not required for the analysis.  Instead, a more readable form of 
transcript notation was used (see Appendix G), and is similar to the notation used in other 
discourse analysis in social psychology research articles (e.g., Lafrance, 2007).   
The analysis was an iterative process of reading the transcripts, listening to the audio 
recordings, and extracting segments of text related to the etiology of depression.  These segments 
included talk about the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression and alternative explanations 
regarding the mechanism of depression and purported causes.  I compiled and organized these 
extracts using NVivo software (QSI International, n.d.) and chose a final collection of extracts 
that included responses from each participant related to the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  I 
was principally interested in how the scientists accounted for the chemical imbalance hypothesis 
of depression and other explanations, and the functions achieved by these accounts.  To this end, 
I drew upon analytic concepts in discourse analysis in social psychology: I paid attention to the 
way I and the interviewees constructed arguments in content and style and the similarities and 
differences among accounts (Wood & Kroger, 2000);  I also paid attention to rhetorical features 
of justifying a position and warding off criticism utilized by myself and the interviewees (Billig, 
1996).  In the analysis, I make inferences about the possible motives and functions of specific 
rhetorical strategies. 
5.4 Analysis 
In the following analysis, I show the varied responses of the scientists to the question of 
whether the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression is controversial or has impaired 
scientific and/or clinical progress in the understanding of depression.  I then present extracts 
regarding alternative etiological models of depression.   
5.4.1 Depression and the Chemical Imbalance Hypothesis 
5.4.1.1 Chemical imbalance as a general problem with brain function. 
Some scientists argued that since depression involves altered function of the brain and 
brain circuit function involves chemical transmissions, the chemical imbalance hypothesis, while 
simplistic, is not controversial.  
5.4.1.1.1 Extract 1a. 
SCIENTIST J: I think that uh if you 1 
look at, um, brain imaging or if you 2 
look at the responses to 3 
psychotropic medications there’s 4 
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little doubt that these are 5 
alterations in brain circuit 6 
functioning, and that changes in 7 
functioning of the brain circuits 8 
have to do with the 9 
neurotransmitters, neurochemicals.  10 
And so hence the neurochemical 11 
imbalance or altered function, makes 12 
perfect sense.  But that imbalance, 13 
may be different in different 14 
people.  That is the problem.  That 15 
is something that needs more 16 
attention.   17 
I: right 18 
SCIENTIST J: the fact that something 19 
must be going awry in the brain, I 20 
don’t think there are issues about 21 
that.22 
In extract 1a, the scientist presents an argument in support of a general chemical 
imbalance hypothesis of depression.  He begins his response by outlining the logic to arrive at a 
conclusion that depression involves a neurochemical imbalance.  He appeals to the interviewer 
generally, “if you look at” (ll. 1 & 2), and he suggests that brain imaging and medication 
responses leave “little doubt” (l. 4) that neurochemical changes are occurring in the brain (ll. 5-
9).  The phrase “little doubt” constructs depression as almost certainly a neurochemical problem 
with the brain.  He reinforces his argument with the statement, “makes perfect sense” (ll. 11-12), 
which constructs his conclusion as both realistic and evident.  The scientist qualifies his 
conclusion with the phrase, “but that imbalance may be different in different people” (ll. 12-14), 
which acknowledges the lack of specificity regarding chemical imbalances in the brain – “that is 
the problem” (l. 14).  He contends that “the problem” (l. 15) with knowing the etiology of 
depression lies in the variance seen across persons with depression.  However, he argues, 
“something must be going awry in the brain” (ll. 17-18).  The use of the term “something” is 
non-descript but he does suggest that the etiology of depression has a basis in dysfunctional brain 
chemistry and circuits.  A brain-based etiology is presented as a “fact” (l. 17), bolstering his 
argument as a certainty, and he argues that from his viewpoint it is uncontroversial; i.e., “I don’t 
think there are issues about that” (ll. 18-19).  Extract 1b continues directly from extract 1a. 
5.4.1.1.2 Extract 1b.
I: right.  But it’s, you know it’s 1 
overly simplified to say that, you 2 
know depression is caused by a lack 3 
of serotonin or, or norepinephrine 4 
in the brain.   5 
SCIENTIST J: yes, so that becomes 6 
like the lay language.   7 
I: yes, and this is the language 8 
that, you know a lot of general 9 
practitioners are using as well.   10 
SCIENTIST J: exactly.  And so, I 11 
mean not that, they’re necessarily 12 
right, but, sometimes when you’re 13 
dealing with laypeople, to be able 14 
to let them understand that there 15 
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might be something that’s going awry 16 
in brain chemistry, I think it’s a 17 
good thing.  Because that’s, we all 18 
agree that, that there is, that 19 
underpinning, at play.   20 
I: yes 21 
SCIENTIST J: but the use of a 22 
description of it, may be overly 23 
simplistic.  And, and, not correct.24 
In extract 1b, I provoke the scientist to consider that the chemical imbalance is “overly 
simplified” (l. 2).  The scientist responds by stating that it becomes a “lay language” (l. 7), which 
functions to distance the explanation from scientific discourses.  When I state that general 
practitioners are also using the language, expanding on the claim that the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis is a lay discourse, the scientist agrees (ll. 8-11).  He argues that while physicians who 
explain depression as a deficiency of neurotransmitters are not “necessarily right” (l. 12), the 
overall message that is communicated, i.e., “there might be something that’s going awry in brain 
chemistry” (ll. 15-17), is valuable.  This appears to be an example of a consequentialist ethical 
position, as the end result is positioned as more important than the fidelity of the explanation.  
With the phrase, “there might be” (l. 15), the scientist does construct his position as a possibility 
rather than an actuality, but then states, “we all agree” (l. 18) that abnormal brain chemistry is the 
“underpinning” (l. 20), or the foundation for the etiology of depression.  It is unclear who he is 
referring to with the pronoun “we” (l. 18) but he is arguably referring to the general group of 
depression scientists and perhaps also to clinicians.  I reply “yes” in agreement with his general 
statement that brain chemistry is implicated in depression (l. 21), thus including myself within 
the group he may be referring to.  While I am suspicious of the veracity and primacy of the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis, as the interviewer I am aligning myself with the interviewee in 
this moment.  I construct the position I took here as one of conversation facilitator rather than 
interrogator.  The scientist, also taking up a socially mediated position in response to my 
provocation, then reiterates my utterance that the chemical imbalance hypothesis is “overly 
simplistic” (l. 23) and adds that it is “not correct” (l. 24).   
Scientist J maintains a consistent position that depression is a brain-based disorder and 
that this position is generally accepted as fact by scientists in the field of depression research.  
While the idea of a serotonin deficiency in depression is acknowledged as an incorrect 
construction, he contends that communicating to patients that depression involves abnormal 
brain activity is beneficial. Thus, the value of the chemical imbalance hypothesis as an 
explanation for depression is maintained by its overall ability to construct depression as a brain-
based disorder.   
In extract 2, Scientist E presents an argument that our brains and bodies function through 
chemical interactions and depression likely involves a dysregulation of brain functioning. 
5.4.1.1.3 Extract 2.
SCIENTIST E: We have you know, our 1 
neurons they work on, basically our 2 
bodies, it’s a chemical body.  So 3 
the interaction that we have, both 4 
physical and psychological, are 5 
transmitted through chemical, made 6 
into- transduced into chemical 7 
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interactions.  So um, is there a 8 
dysregulation of um, brain function? 9 
Probably yes.  But is that the 10 
primary, culprit of the disease? I’d 11 
say it isn’t clear.  We still don’t 12 
know.  13 
The scientist begins her response by stating that the human body is a “chemical body” (l. 
3).  The use of the term “basically” (l. 2) constructs the chemical nature of the human body as a 
fundamental property.  The word “interaction” (l. 4) is vague and appears to be utilized in a 
broad sense to encompass all behaviour, “physical and psychological” (l. 5).  She builds on this 
argument by adding that these ‘interactions’ are “transduced into chemical interactions” (ll. 7-8).  
The parallel construction of physical/mental interactions and chemical interactions within the 
brain serves to reinforce her claim that chemical interactions in the brain are fundamental.  She 
constructs all interactions, i.e., those external and internal to the body, as associated with 
chemical messaging within the nervous system.  She asks rhetorically, in the overall context of 
talk about depression, “is there a dysregulation of brain function?” (ll. 8-9).  Given her premise 
that the human body is a chemical body, and functions via chemical transduction, she concludes 
that the answer is “probably yes” (l. 10).  The word “probably” leaves some room for doubt but 
communicates that it is almost a certainty.  Then, she interjects with another question: “is that the 
primary, culprit of the disease?” (ll. 10-11).  She appears to be referring to the specific chemical 
imbalance hypothesis as the etiological mechanism of depression and she answers, “it isn’t clear” 
(l. 12).  Thus, similar to the scientist in extract 1, she contends that depression is associated with 
a dysregulation of brain function, but rather than stating the chemical imbalance hypothesis is 
incorrect, she constructs its status as “the primary culprit” as unknown.   
By arguing that all ‘interactions’ involve a corresponding chemical interaction in the 
brain, Scientist E constructs the conditions for depression to be associated with a chemical 
dysregulation.  However, by proposing that chemical changes in the brain may not be a primary 
precipitating mechanism, she positions her support in line with the prevailing understanding of 
depression: that the etiology is currently unknown.   
In extract 3a, Scientist G argues that there is enough truth to the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis to warrant its current use.   
5.4.1.1.4 Extract 3a. 
SCIENTIST G: so you know, there’s 1 
always an attempt to say, oh we’ve 2 
left the monoamine or the 3 
neurotransmitter hypothesis.  Well 4 
there are neurotransmitters they do, 5 
you know cross synapses, we do know 6 
that serotonin transporter plays an 7 
important role, we do have, genetic 8 
data about differences in, um, 9 
promoter regions of the serotonin 10 
transporter, in some groups, um, the 11 
problem is that if you do the same 12 
study twice you don’t actually know 13 
if you’ve recruited the same type of 14 
depressed people into, the two 15 
studies.  So you may find something 16 
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with um, a promoter region in one 17 
study that you don’t find in the 18 
other and maybe you just recruited a 19 
different, subtypes of depression in 20 
each study.  21 
The scientist begins his response by addressing the dismissing of the monoamine 
hypothesis of depression (ll. 1-4).  He then lists truth claims that are consistent with the 
hypothesis.  He states in very simple terms, “well there are neurotransmitters” (ll. 4-5) that “cross 
synapses” (l. 6).  This line of argument is similar to the previous extracts wherein the scientists 
argued that all behaviours or interactions involve chemical transmissions in the brain.  He also 
claims the serotonin transporter, a protein that functions to move serotonin out of the synaptic 
cleft and back to the originating neuron, “plays an important role” (ll. 7-8).  He emphasizes this 
claim as truth with the phrase “we do know” (l. 6).  The serotonin transporter protein 
functionally reduces synaptic levels of serotonin and is the target of most antidepressant drugs, 
such as the SSRIs.  To bolster his argument he argues that “we” (l. 6), presumably the scientific 
community, have “genetic data” (ll. 8-9) regarding differences in the genes that code for the 
serotonin transporter.  The genetic data on serotonin transporter in depressive disorders are 
mixed, and he acknowledges this with the qualifying statement, “in some groups” (l. 11).   
He shifts from a claim about the importance of the serotonin transporter to address “the 
problem” (ll. 11-12) in replicating data.  He constructs the problem in the science as one of 
diagnosis and recruitment, arguing that depression encompasses a diverse range of individuals 
with different “subtypes of depression” (l. 20).  The problem is a significant one in psychiatric 
research, which bases clinical diagnoses on clusters of symptoms that meet a defined threshold, 
rather than biological markers of disease.  Thus, the truth claim that the genes that promote the 
encoding of the serotonin transporter protein play an important role is maintained by claiming 
that it occurs in a particular, but unknown, subtype of depression.  Extract 3b continues directly 
from extract 3a. 
5.4.1.1.5 Extract 3b.
I: so, just getting back to this, 1 
would you find it uh, you know 2 
controversial with, you know, a 3 
family physician telling a patient 4 
that they’re, they’re depressed 5 
because they have a chemical 6 
imbalance in the brain? 7 
SCIENTIST G: uh, would I find it 8 
controversial? 9 
I: mmhm 10 
SCIENTIST G: no I would find it um, 11 
simplistic but you know, there’s 12 
nothing wrong with simple messaging 13 
if that has some legitimacy and if 14 
uh, it actually has some relevance 15 
to treatment.16 
In the extract, a direct continuation from extract 3a, I ask the scientist if the chemical 
imbalance explanation is controversial. The scientist responds to my prompt with a short 
response.  He states that the chemical imbalance explanation is “simplistic” (l. 12).  He sets up 
two qualities that substantiate the acceptability of the simple explanation: that it has “some 
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legitimacy” (l. 14) and “some relevance to treatment” (ll. 15-16).  By using the word “some” (l. 
14; l. 15), he qualifies the level of accuracy required to justify the use of the explanation.  Stating 
that there is “nothing wrong” (l. 13) with the simple explanation, which is an extreme case 
formulation, appears to contradict the ethical position espoused by Blease (2014) if, for example, 
the explanation is not also prefaced with a statement that the etiology of depression is not fully 
understood.  
In extracts 3a and 3b, Scientist G constructs an argument in partial support of the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis.  Similar to previous extracts, the scientist builds a logical 
argument that brain chemistry and genetics play an important role in the etiology of depression 
and refers to current knowledge in support of this claim.  While the scientist later stated that he 
would use an alternative explanation with patients (see Extract 12), he clearly reported that 
simple messaging is valid when there is some truth to the explanation and when it is related to 
the treatment being offered.  The argument serves to reinforce the received views in biological 
psychiatry that the brain is a neurochemical signaling mechanism, that behavioural and affective 
dysfunction involves disruption of certain brain circuits, and that antidepressant treatments are 
effective.   
5.4.1.2 Chemical imbalance as a specific problem with serotonin function. 
When arguing against the chemical imbalance hypothesis, scientists constructed the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis as a specific problem with serotonin function, while maintaining 
that depression likely involves problems in brain function.  In extracts 4a and 4b, Scientist I 
supports the idea of dysfunctional brain chemistry in depression, but also argues for the eschewal 
of the simple messaging of the chemical imbalance hypothesis.   
5.4.1.2.1 Extract 4a. 
SCIENTIST I: yeah, I mean I guess it 1 
depends on how you call, I mean, the 2 
idea of a chemical imbalance is, 3 
hhh, I would guess that there’s 4 
something, probably, dysfunctional 5 
with the brain chemistry of someone 6 
who has full-blown depression.  7 
Like, I would guess that there’s 8 
something that’s not functioning, 9 
the way that it should be.  But.  I 10 
think that the way that the drug 11 
companies have spun, a chemical 12 
imbalance like a sad neuron having 13 
less serotonin and a happy neuron 14 
having more serotonin, has really 15 
permeated the public quite a bit 16 
and, even the medical community I 17 
would say yes, that’s true as well 18 
with physicians, because that’s the 19 
way they learn about it and I think 20 
that’s really, impaired, progress in 21 
the field.   22 
I: mmhm23 
The scientist opens his response by beginning to articulate the boundaries of the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis.  He states, “I guess it depends on how you call” (ll. 1-2), which opens a 
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discursive space for multiple interpretations of the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  He audibly 
exhales (l. 3) when talking about the chemical imbalance hypothesis, which could be interpreted 
or received as a sign of exasperation.  In support, he constructs, albeit somewhat hesitantly – i.e., 
“guess” (l. 4) and “probably” (l. 5) – that there is a dysfunction of brain chemistry.  The use of 
the term “something” (l. 4) is vague and imprecise, and leaves the chemical imbalance open to a 
number of chemically-based mechanistic possibilities.   
Further delineating the boundaries of a valid chemical imbalance hypothesis of 
depression, the scientist, emphasizing the word “But” (l. 10) with a halting intonation, indicates 
there are things that he does not agree with.  The use of the phrase “the way that the drug 
companies have spun” (ll. 10-11) directly implicates the pharmaceutical industry as having 
crafted a particular interpretation of the data to present to the public.  He constructs the spin used 
by the pharmaceutical industry with the aid of an evocative simile: “like a sad neuron having less 
serotonin and a happy neuron having more serotonin” (ll. 12-14).  The simile constructs the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis as told by the pharmaceutical industry as very simplistic, and 
anthropomorphizes neurons as emotive beings.  This simile functions to delegitimize the direct-
to-consumer advertising of antidepressants as unscientific.  The scientist also implicates the 
pharmaceutical industry in influencing physicians’ understanding of depression when he states, 
“because that’s the way they learn about it” (ll. 18-19).  The statement functions to absolve 
physicians of responsibility for using the chemical imbalance explanation of depression with 
patients and to place the blame on pharmaceutical companies.  Further, the scientist states that 
the simple chemical imbalance spin by the pharmaceutical industry as was widely adopted has 
“impaired progress” (l. 20) in the science of depression, denigrating its continued use.   
Continuing his argument in extract 4b, the scientist builds a case against the simple 
chemical imbalance explanation of depression.   
5.4.1.2.2 Extract 4b.
SCIENTIST I: Because people look at 1 
things in this very simplistic view, 2 
and I just don’t understand like 3 
whenever I try to talk to someone 4 
about it at a public level I just 5 
say well, I mean if it was, if it 6 
was as simple as that how come the 7 
second you take Prozac you wouldn’t 8 
improve? Because within minutes 9 
Prozac is going to elevate synaptic 10 
levels of serotonin so, if it was 11 
just, a sad neuron doesn’t have much 12 
serotonin, then as soon as you boost 13 
it you should immediately feel 14 
better and that’s definitely not 15 
what the clinical course of 16 
antidepressant treatment is.17 
The scientist argues that the lay public views depression in simple terms; by using the 
term, “people” (l. 1), he initially constructs the issue as occurring broadly, but further refines 
with the phrase “public level” (l. 5).  The use of the term ‘public’ suggests that he may speak 
differently when talking to a lay audience than when speaking privately with colleagues.  His 
statements, “I just don’t understand” (ll. 2-3) and “whenever I try” (ll. 3-4) construct the 
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chemical imbalance story as incredulous and suggest that he may be met with resistance when 
talking to a layperson about depression.  The scientist then describes his retort as simple: “I just 
say” (l. 5).  An often-cited phenomenon that is incompatible with the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis of depression is that patients must take antidepressants for several weeks before they 
might report symptom improvement despite rapid increase of synaptic monoamines such as 
serotonin.  The scientist draws upon this shortcoming of the hypothesis and presents a rhetorical 
question he uses in conversation (ll. 6-8).  To solidify his argument, he constructs an extreme 
case formulation within the question with the phrase, “the second you take” (l. 7), referring to the 
time it takes for the antidepressant to influence brain chemistry.  The scientist describes a simple 
logical argument to refute the idea that “a sad neuron doesn’t have much serotonin” (ll. 11-12).  
The scientist positions himself as a credible expert by talking about “synaptic levels of 
serotonin” (l. 10) and by claiming knowledge of the “clinical course of antidepressant treatment” 
(ll. 15-16).   
In extracts 4a and 4b, Scientist I delineates the chemical imbalance explanation as (1) a 
general explanation of brain function, which, consistent with previous extracts, is deemed likely 
to be credible, and (2) the chemical imbalance hypothesis as presented in pharmaceutical 
advertising, which is deemed to be simplistic and fallible.  Constructing the explanation using the 
terms “sad neuron” and “happy neuron” functions to distance the simple explanation from 
scientific discourse.  The scientist presents how he talks to a layperson who might believe that 
depression is caused by a chemical deficiency of serotonin, presenting a common retort to the 
hypothesis in a logical and credible manner.   
Next, in extracts 5a and 5b, Scientist D rejects the chemical imbalance hypothesis and 
claims that depression scientists have moved beyond this explanation of depression.   
5.4.1.2.3 Extract 5a. 
I:  uh you talk to someone on the 1 
street today, and you say, you know 2 
what is depression? Oh it’s a 3 
chemical imbalance, you know it’s a 4 
chemical imbalance in the brain.  5 
Uh, even physicians, you talk to 6 
physicians and they’ll say well, 7 
yeah it’s caused by a chemical 8 
imbalance.  You see pharmaceutical 9 
advertisements, it’s a chemical 10 
imbalance.  Um, you know it’s a very 11 
simplistic view of things it’s 12 
SCIENTIST D: see I would never say 13 
that.  I would never call depression 14 
a chemical imbalance.  15 
Extract 5a occurs within the context of an exchange regarding the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis of depression wherein the scientist agrees that the explanation has dominated the 
scientific field for decades.  I then construct the chemical explanation of depression as pervasive 
among laypersons and “even physicians” (l. 6), which functions to provoke a response regarding 
the chemical imbalance explanation of depression.  My use of the word “even” functions to 
acknowledge that it might be surprising that physicians also report depression to be caused by a 
chemical imbalance.  Finally, I cite “pharmaceutical advertisements” (ll. 9-10) and make the 
claim that the explanation is “a very simplistic view” (ll. 11-12).  The scientist responds to this 
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argument by distancing herself from the explanation: “see I would never say that” (l. 13).  She 
uses the word “see” to communicate that her response is different than those who might uphold 
the argument as constructed by me.  Her response is brief and she uses repetition – “I would 
never...  I would never” (ll. 13-14) – to affirm her position that depression is not a chemical 
imbalance.  Her use of the word “never” functions to construct her position as an absolute, but by 
using the first-person pronoun “I,” she constructs the statement as a personal opinion rather than 
a scientific declaration; e.g., ‘depression is not caused by a chemical imbalance.’  In the 
following extract, she continues her argument against the chemical imbalance hypothesis, before 
opening up a possibility that chemical imbalance could mean many different things.  
5.4.1.2.4 Extract 5b. 
SCIENTIST D: I think in this example 1 
[the chemical imbalance hypothesis] 2 
you’re right, that wasn’t- well, I 3 
mean maybe, maybe the argument is 4 
that it’s just a hypothesis that 5 
took a really long time for people 6 
to get past.  But I think we are 7 
past it because I don’t think there 8 
is anybody in the field who would 9 
agree that that’s, related to 10 
depression.   11 
I: Right, but the effects are still 12 
lingering. 13 
SCIENTIST D: I guess it depends on 14 
what you mean by chemical imbalance 15 
too, because chemical imbalance 16 
could mean all different kinds of 17 
things. 18 
I: Right.  So specifically saying 19 
the serotonin hypothesis.   20 
SCIENTIST D: Right, well that’s 21 
clearly not the case in depression.  22 
At least not in my mind.23 
The scientist initially agrees with me that the chemical imbalance hypothesis is 
controversial, but stops short of restating the particular point with which she agrees: “that 
wasn’t-” (l. 3).  Instead, she formulates an argument that “maybe” (l. 4) it was “just a hypothesis 
that took a really long time for people to get past” (ll. 5-7).  Within this utterance she uses the 
phrase “just a hypothesis,” which functions to contrast with my assertion that the hypothesis has 
had broader societal implications on the lay understanding of depression.  By using the word 
“people,” rather than an inclusive word such as ‘us,’ she distances herself and perhaps her 
specific discipline from those who maintained the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  Then, she 
uses the pronoun “we” (l. 7) to argue that she and her discipline have moved beyond the 
hypothesis, and claims that it is her understanding – “I don’t think” (l. 8) – that no one in her 
field would contend that the hypothesis explains depression.  Setting up that it is her 
understanding creates a space that distances her from making a declarative truth claim.  
However, she does construct an extreme case to bolster the truth claim when she states that there 
is not “anybody in the field” (l. 9) that would agree with the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  
I prompt the scientist to comment on the broader implications of the hypothesis (ll. 12-
13), but she continues by raising doubt about the way I specifically construct the chemical 
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imbalance hypothesis: “I guess it depends on what you mean” (ll. 14-15).  The scientist argues 
that the term ‘chemical imbalance’ is extremely vague when she claims that it “could mean all 
different kinds of things” (ll. 17-18).  This utterance appears to unite with the argument made by 
the scientists above when they stated that depression is a brain-based disorder, and that since the 
brain functions through chemical signaling, depression might be considered as being caused by a 
general chemical imbalance.  However, she does not outline what these “different” (l. 17) things 
could be, to which I respond by defining it specifically as a deficiency of serotonin.  She 
responds with an unequivocal statement, “that’s clearly not the case” (ll. 21-22), but again 
hedges by personalizing this position: “at least not in my mind” (ll. 23). 
  Scientist D’s arguments function to construct the chemical imbalance hypothesis as an 
idea that is no longer supported by herself or other scientists in her immediate field.  She 
distances her position from laypersons and clinicians who might state that depression is caused 
by a chemical imbalance.  She does open the possibility that there is some truth in stating that 
depression is associated with a chemical imbalance if the parameters are defined broadly enough; 
however, she unequivocally rejects that depression is caused by a deficiency of serotonin.   
5.4.1.3 Chemical imbalance and the science of depression. 
Scientists argued that the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression and related ideas 
have had an impact upon scientific research.  In extract 6, Scientist B argues that a problem with 
the specific chemical imbalance hypothesis is that it hinders depth and breadth of understanding.   
5.4.1.3.1 Extract 6.
SCIENTIST B: Right now the, the only 1 
approved medications we have, are 2 
things that target monoamines, these 3 
chemicals that are presumably 4 
imbalanced within the brain.  And I, 5 
and I just don’t think that’s the 6 
whole story and I don’t even think 7 
that that’s the majority of the 8 
story I think there’s probably a 9 
number of underlying causes to the 10 
disease and that when we start 11 
thinking about it as just purely a 12 
chemical imbalance, it doesn’t 13 
really get us any more specific.  14 
The scientist begins by providing a time context, “right now” (l. 1), indicating the present 
day (the interview took place in early 2014), and states that “the only” (l. 1) medications for 
depression are ones that “target monoamines” (l. 3).  The term “approved medications” (l. 2) 
provides a space to accommodate a drug such as ketamine, which acts differently to the current 
antidepressants, since it is not yet an approved medication for depression.  The scientist 
expresses doubt regarding the chemical imbalance hypothesis in several ways.  He defines 
monoamines as “chemicals that are presumably imbalanced” (ll. 4-5), with the word 
‘presumably’ functioning to convey doubt and to distance him from the idea.  He states, “I just 
don’t think” (l. 6), and the use of the adverb “just” (l. 6) functions to emphasize his statement 
that the chemical imbalance explanation is not the “whole story” (l. 7); the use of the adverb 
“even” (l. 7) functions to emphasize that it is also not the “majority of the story” (ll. 8-9).   
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He argues that depression is “probably” (l. 9) caused by a “number of underlying causes” 
(l. 10), with the term “probably” functioning to cast his statement as very likely but leaves room 
for doubt.  He chooses the word “disease” (l. 11) to refer to depression, as opposed to ‘disorder.’  
In the DSM, the word ‘disease’ is reserved for those conditions with a known underlying 
pathology, such as Alzheimer’s disease; the scientist’s use of the term ‘disease’ does function to 
construct depression as a legitimate medical diagnosis, in spite of the uncertainty with respect to 
etiology.   
The scientist provides a critique of the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  He states that 
when “we” (l. 11), depression scientists, think about depression “as just purely a chemical 
imbalance” (ll. 12-13), it does not “get us any more specific” (l. 14).  The terms “just purely” (l. 
11) function to acknowledge that a chemical imbalance might be associated with depression but 
that other aspects or mechanisms must be considered.  Ultimately, he constructs the goal of the 
scientific endeavour in depression research to increase specificity.   
In extracts 7a and 7b, Scientist H expresses disbelief when presented with a question 
about the use of the chemical imbalance hypothesis by laypersons and medical professionals, 
before arguing that it should not be completely eliminated from scientific research.   
5.4.1.3.2 Extract 7a. 
I: What do you think about, um the 1 
use of the chemical imbalance 2 
hypothesis of depression? um, both 3 
by medical professionals and as well 4 
as laypersons, given that the 5 
science of depression has most moved 6 
quite a, you know a distance past 7 
this simplistic, what depression is 8 
caused by.   9 
SCIENTIST H: do people really talk 10 
about that still? (laughs) 11 
I: they sure do yes.   12 
SCIENTIST H: I guess in my community 13 
they’re not really.  I mean I guess 14 
there are, there are definitely 15 
people who just like to hang onto 16 
things but17 
Extract 7a opens with my question regarding the use of the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis.  As seen in previous extracts, I pose a provocative position and construct the 
hypothesis as passé by calling it “simplistic” (l. 8) and state that the science of depression has 
moved on.  The scientist responds with a short utterance and uses laughter to express her 
disbelief.  The question “do people really talk about that still?” (ll. 10-11) functions to convey 
that she is either not aware that the chemical imbalance hypothesis is still prevalent or as a 
rhetorical question that denigrates the hypothesis.  After I affirm that people still do talk about it, 
she reaffirms her own stance by making the claim that in her “community” (l. 13), presumably 
research scientists, they are not talking about depression as a chemical imbalance.  Then she 
backtracks slightly by opening the argument that there are “definitely people” (l. 15) who “just 
like to hang on to things” (l. 16).  The term “people” is vague, but presumably she is still talking 
about scientists in the field of depression.  The phrase, “just like to hang on” is a derisive 
utterance that constructs the other as archaic and not progressive.  In extract 7b, she furthers this 
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line of argument and she concludes with a statement which suggests that depression is potentially 
caused by a chemical imbalance and it should not be completely ruled out.   
5.4.1.3.3 Extract 7b. 
SCIENTIST H: Um, I don’t think, I 1 
don’t think it’s- as long as people 2 
don’t hang on, I mean theories, 3 
theories are useful constructs, um 4 
but like, Tim Minchin says, you 5 
should, you know opinions, and 6 
theories, I use the word theories 7 
instead of opinions, we got to 8 
examine them every day.  Look at our 9 
data, look at our theory, and refine 10 
them.  So, is there a chemical 11 
imbalance? Well, maybe there is and 12 
maybe there isn’t in a subset, but I 13 
wouldn’t necessarily throw it out.  14 
I think people need to be open.   15 
While in extract 7a, the scientist states that she and her community do not talk about 
depression as being caused by a chemical imbalance, in extract 7b she adds more nuance to her 
argument about the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  She begins with a repeated utterance, “I 
don’t think” (ll. 1-2) and then halts her utterance to begin a new line of argument.  She argues, 
“theories are useful constructs” (ll. 3-4).  The use of the term ‘theory’ suggests that her argument 
applies to all scientific hypotheses that have been verified by empirical means and are believed 
to have a greater probability of being correct.  She cites the comedian Tim Minchin (l. 5), who 
has stated that people need to be hard on their opinions and evaluate their prejudices and biases 
in their beliefs.  She appropriates this argument and applies it to the process of science.  She 
argues that theories must be examined “every day” (l. 9), which suggests that the testing and 
refining of theories is a continual and common practice.   
Once she has laid out the argument that theories must be examined every day, she returns 
to the topic of the chemical imbalance etiology of depression by presenting a simple question, 
“So, is there a chemical imbalance?” (ll. 10-11).  She answers with equivocation, “maybe there is 
and maybe there isn’t” (l. 12), which functions to present herself as neither holding on to a 
theory nor completely refuting it.  By adding, “in a subset” (l. 13) she adds further nuance to the 
argument, suggesting that depression might have different causes in different people.  She 
concludes that she “wouldn’t necessarily throw it out” (ll. 13-14).  In contrast to her derisive 
statement that some people “hang on” (l. 3) to ideas, she constructs openness as an ideal and 
necessary quality of a scientist with the statement, “I think people need to be open” (ll. 14-15).  
Thus, while she claims to not talk about depression as being caused by a chemical imbalance, she 
constructs herself as open-minded and willing to examine the data to refine the theory.   
In extract 7a and 7b, Scientist H moves from expressing disbelief that clinicians and 
laypeople are still talking about the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression, to expressing 
that the explanation might still be true and warrant further examination.  Through this, she 
positions herself as an ideal scientist who is open to ideas and willing to engage with the data to 
refine a theory.  
 In extract 8, Scientist C alludes to the chemical imbalance hypothesis and describes it as 
a problem stemming from excessive reductionism.    
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5.4.1.3.4 Extract 8. 
SCIENTIST C: Neuroscientists, 1 
usually we are quite reductionistic 2 
and that’s not good.  We try to 3 
simplify things to ah, I don’t say 4 
to go from molecules to behaviour, 5 
but it’s almost so.  Then you find 6 
an alteration in your molecule that 7 
correlates with an alteration in 8 
behaviour, you made a common mistake 9 
of oh, then the alteration of this 10 
molecule is that one that causes 11 
that behaviour.   12 
I: mmhm 13 
SCIENTIST C: that happened with 14 
antidepressants 15 
I: right16 
In this extract, the scientist does not directly reference the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis, but instead presents a “common mistake” (l. 9) made in neuroscience.  He begins by 
making the claim that neuroscientists are “reductionistic” (l. 2).  Indeed, methodological 
reductionism is a central component of most neuroscience research, where scientists attempt to 
explain phenomena at the most primary level possible.  While reductionism might be a common 
goal among most neuroscience researchers, he states, “that’s not good” (ll. 2-3).  He dampens the 
statement, “go from molecules to behaviour” (ll. 4-5), an extreme case formulation, by 
introducing it with, “I don’t say” (l. 4).  However, he constructs the extreme case as close to truth 
when he adds, “it’s almost so” (l. 5).  He provides a simple, general example that fits with the 
extreme case formulation, and constructs it as a “common mistake” (l. 9), which suggests that 
causation is frequently erroneously assumed with correlational evidence.  Finally, the scientist 
alludes to the chemical imbalance hypothesis when he states, “that happened with 
antidepressants” (ll. 13-14).  While the scientist does not state that he is talking about the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis directly, it is commonly known that depression as a chemical 
imbalance was hypothesized in light of observational evidence of clinical improvement of 
depressed patients with antidepressant medication treatment, the depressive effect of the drug 
reserpine, and the chemical effect of the TCA and MAOI medications.   
Making an assumption of causation based on correlational data is a fallacy.  In extract 1, 
for example, Scientist J makes the claim that depression is associated with altered brain circuit 
function based on evidence from brain imaging data and medication response, and, from this 
evidence, he concludes that abnormal functioning in the brain must cause depression.  While this 
relation is potentially correct, the argument relies on correlational data.  Scientist C in extract 8 
warns that neuroscientists are prone to making this mistake and alludes to the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis, which was derived in an attempt to explain the action of antidepressants.   
In extract 9, the scientist presents a similar argument against the way the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis was created.   
5.4.1.3.5 Extract 9. 
SCIENTIST A: you know people call me 1 
depression researcher but I don’t 2 
want to call- be called depression 3 
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researcher because I don’t think we 4 
are investigating that.  So we’re 5 
investigating how the drugs act.  6 
And ah that I think is not- it’s a 7 
different thing. 8 
I: mmhm 9 
SCIENTIST A: I mean, and I think 10 
it’s dangerous and and you know even 11 
though I’m doing you know I have to 12 
say I’m doing that thing myself, as 13 
well, but it’s dangerous. 14 
I: how so? 15 
SCIENTIST A: I mean, hhh, it’s you 16 
know, so the fact that if if you 17 
know that the drugs do something, 18 
then it’s very easy to assume that 19 
the disorder is caused by the 20 
opposite.  So if there is an 21 
increase in BDNF by these drugs then 22 
people think that depression is 23 
caused by a lack of BDNF.  Ah, or 24 
serotonin for that matter, the same 25 
way.  And I think it’s it’s not 26 
proper logic to to think that way.  27 
The scientist states that he does not want to be called a “depression researcher” (ll. 3-4).   
Rather, he positions himself as a researcher “investigating how the drugs act” (l. 6).  He argues 
that conflating research on how antidepressants function with depression research is “dangerous” 
(l. 11).  However, separating research on antidepressants from research on depression is difficult 
given their close relationship, and the scientist acknowledges that he is “doing that thing” (l. 13) 
himself, i.e., conflating antidepressant drug effects with the etiology of depression.  Thus, while 
the scientist is interested in depression, he is careful in how he constructs his identity as a 
researcher lest he be trapped into going beyond the data regarding the effect of an antidepressant 
drug to commenting on the nature of depression.   
I prompt the scientist to clarify how conflating antidepressant research and depression 
research is dangerous (l. 15) and the scientist argues that it is “very easy to assume” (l. 19) the 
cause of depression based on the action of an antidepressant, which is similar to the argument in 
the previous extract where the scientist called it a “common mistake.”  He furthers his argument 
with a more specific example: BDNF (brain-derived neurotrophic factor; ll. 21-24).  The scientist 
argues that the hypothesis that a lack of BDNF causes depression was based on a faulty 
assumption and is the same as what happened with serotonin and the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis of depression.  The extract closes with his statement, “I think it’s it’s not proper logic 
to think that way” (ll. 27).  The scientist, as opposed to other “people” (l. 22) who may make 
‘dangerous’ assumptions about causation, positions himself as thinking responsibly and logically 
about the data.   
In extract 9, Scientist A distances himself from controversy surrounding the construction 
of depression via indirect means, i.e., defining depression based on the actions of 
antidepressants.  By denying that he is a depression researcher per se, and claiming that it is easy 
to make the assumption that depression etiology is the opposite of an observed mechanistic effect 
of an antidepressant, he constructs himself as a responsible researcher.  Similar to how the 
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scientist in extract 9 argues against assuming causation from correlational data, in extract 10 he 
also argues that those who make such assumptions are committing a logical fallacy.   
Extract 10 is a long passage of talk broken into three extracts, wherein Scientist A voices 
criticism of the chemical imbalance hypothesis.   
5.4.1.3.6 Extract 10a. 
SCIENTIST A: Yeah it’s, you actually 1 
are right.  I mean it is something 2 
which is very much uh penetrated 3 
popular press and uh and and also 4 
even you know, I’ve been to meetings 5 
with with clinicians and if you go 6 
to the poster they show something 7 
and you talk with these people and 8 
they would say they would say that 9 
well of course it’s not, we know 10 
it’s not that simple as this and 11 
it’s sort of more multidimensional 12 
problem and blah blah blah.  But uh 13 
if you sort of you know if you 14 
scratch the surface a little bit you 15 
would find out in the deep in their 16 
mind they think that it is about 17 
serotonin after all (slight 18 
chuckle). 19 
I: mmhm, yes 20 
SCIENTIST A: So this is- it is it is 21 
uh it is I think uh, depressing.  22 
(both laugh) 23 
The scientist responds in an affirmative way to my prompt regarding the adoption of the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis as an explanation for depression by laypersons and clinicians, 
and emphasizes this affirmation with the word, “actually” (l. 1).  The use of the word ‘actually’ 
might be received by the listener as conveying surprise or signaling an unexpected admission.  
He states that the chemical imbalance hypothesis has “penetrated popular press” (ll. 3-4), which 
constructs the hypothesis as a powerful force capable of infiltrating the media.  The term 
‘popular press’ typically refers to media intended for the general public, as opposed to academic 
books and journal articles.   
The scientist then moves to clinicians and provides an anecdotal example of interactions 
he has had with clinicians at academic conferences, which functions to bolster his claim with 
evidence.  The use of plural, e.g., “clinicians” (l. 6), “they” (l. 7), “people” (l. 8), constructs the 
anecdotal report as having occurred multiple times with different clinicians.  He uses reported 
speech of the clinicians to construct his argument that the chemical imbalance hypothesis is an 
idea that some clinicians support, which again functions to reinforce his argument.  He uses 
repetition – “of course it’s not, we know it’s not” (l. 10) – to emphasize that clinicians assert that 
they do not construct the etiology of depression as simply a chemical imbalance of serotonin, but 
then diminishes and dismisses the reported speech of the clinicians with the phrase, “blah blah 
blah” (l. 13).  The phrases “scratch the surface” (ll. 14-15) followed by “deep in their mind” (l. 
16) construct the viewpoints that depression is a “multidimensional problem” (l. 12) as 
superficial and that depression is a problem with “serotonin” (l. 17) as entrenched.  The scientist 
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uses humour to convey his disagreement, employing the word “depressing” (l. 21) in a 
conversation about the etiology of depression.   
5.4.1.3.7 Extract 10b. 
SCIENTIST A: I find it’s uh you 1 
know, uh and this is one of- these 2 
are among the things that that sort 3 
of hold back, progress in in the 4 
field, that people don’- people 5 
aren’t open minded to looking at 6 
the-.  You know it could be that, 7 
I’m not saying that, it might very 8 
well turn out that that depression 9 
is about a problem with serotonin in 10 
the end.  But I don’t think it is in 11 
such a simple manner that people are 12 
thinking about it at the moment.  So 13 
I think what the- there would be a 14 
lot of important nuances there.  So 15 
yeah you’re right and what, it is 16 
sort of not, and you know 17 
pharmaceutical industry definitely 18 
has their have their hands in the 19 
fact that this has penetrated the 20 
popular press  21 
I: yes 22 
SCIENTIST A: and sort of sort of 23 
layman understanding so so deeply.24 
The scientist continues by arguing that adherence to the chemical imbalance hypothesis 
of depression has a negative effect on the science of depression.  He constructs his argument 
with a claim that “people aren’t open minded” (ll. 5-6).  The general and vague term “people” 
positions the problem as occurring among others.  He halts his utterance about open-mindedness 
(l. 6) to interject with the possibility that depression “is about a problem with serotonin in the 
end” (ll. 9-10).  While in the midst of constructing an argument for being open-minded, the 
scientist stops to present himself as being open-minded by acknowledging that serotonin may in 
fact be a causative agent for depression, pre-emptively countering any claim against his openness 
to ideas, which is consistent with the talk of several of the scientists.  With the use of the phrase, 
“at the moment” (l. 13), the scientist presents the problem of the widespread use of the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis as occurring in the present.  The scientist begins a couple unfinished 
utterances as he attempts to articulate his position (ll. 16-17), and ends up indicting the 
pharmaceutical industry as responsible for the translation of the chemical imbalance hypothesis 
to the mainstream media and lay understanding of depression.  The phrase, “have their hands in” 
(l. 19), suggests purposeful action by the pharmaceutical industry in promoting the hypothesis.   
5.4.1.3.8 Extract 10c. 
SCIENTIST A: We don’t have 1 
unfortunately- I mean a part of it 2 
is that the story is very 3 
compelling.  I mean it’s it is 4 
simple  5 
I: mmhm 6 
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SCIENTIST A: and uh, and it’s not 7 
something that is uh, as you know 8 
the format of the story is not new, 9 
because if you think about if you 10 
think about Hippocrates he was 11 
thinking about depression as an as 12 
an excess of black bile, 13 
I: mmhm 14 
SCIENTIST A: which is very much the 15 
same kind of thinking.  I would say 16 
that you just changed the you know 17 
the pluses plus to minus.  You would 18 
say that there is, it’s not about 19 
too much black bile it’s too little 20 
serotonin. 21 
I: yes 22 
SCIENTIST A: so, in a sort of, the 23 
kind of context is very similar.  So 24 
this has been with us, you know two 25 
and a half millennia.  So I’m not 26 
surprised that it’s, you cannot 27 
change these things overnight.  28 
Plus, we don’t have anything, simple 29 
to offer.30 
Turning to the reasons why the chemical imbalance explanation persists, the scientist 
begins his claim that scientists studying depression do not have a simple alternative to offer.  He 
halts his utterance at “unfortunately-” (l. 1) and does not return to it until the final line in the 
extract.  He interjects to describe the “story” of depression as a chemical imbalance as 
“compelling” (l. 3), “simple” (l. 4), and “not new” (l. 8).  The scientist does not elaborate upon 
how it is compelling, but he does compare the chemical imbalance hypothesis to “Hippocrates” 
(l. 10) and humourism.  Hippocrates, the ancient Greek physician known as the father of 
medicine, proposed that the balance of four bodily fluids influenced health and temperament, 
with one of the four humors, black bile, being associated with a melancholic temperament.  The 
scientist argues that it is “very much the same kind of thinking” (l. 14), and by comparing the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis to humourism, he constructs the fundamental principle of the 
hypothesis as archaic.  He presents the comparison as simple when he states, “just” (l. 16) 
change the “plus to minus” (l. 17).  He argues that depression has been considered a chemical 
imbalance, of black bile or serotonin or BDNF, for “two and a half millennia” (ll. 24-25).  The 
time reference functions to construct the chemical imbalance explanation as extremely persistent 
and he draws on that persistent construction to explain that he is “not surprised” (l. 25) that it 
remains.  Finally, he appears to continue the utterance started at the beginning of this extract 
when he states, “we don’t have anything simple to offer” (ll. 27-28).  Thus, the scientist argues 
that the chemical imbalance hypothesis has persisted because it is a simple explanation, 
consistent with long-held conceptualizations of depression, and because of the absence of simple 
alternative explanations.    
Across extracts 10a to 10c, Scientist A develops an argument against the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis and the influence on science and practice.  He agrees that clinicians 
espouse the chemical imbalance hypothesis and he proposes that the persistence of this idea 
limits the production of novel ideas regarding the etiology of depression.  He argues that others 
may not be open-minded to new and alternative ideas, which also inhibits progress.  He 
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implicates the pharmaceutical industry in spreading the message to a lay and clinical audience.  
However, he acknowledges that the explanation will need to be replaced by something and that 
scientists do not currently have a simple explanation for depression.   
As demonstrated in the analysis of accounts and arguments above, the scientists 
interviewed for this research project formulated a range of arguments for and against the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression.  In defense of the chemical imbalance hypothesis, 
scientists utilized a rhetorical construction of depression as a brain-based disorder and the brain 
as functioning through chemical transmissions.  Arguing against the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis, scientists constructed the chemical imbalance hypothesis specifically as a deficiency 
of serotonin and drew attention to the shortcomings of the hypothesis, most notably the 
observation that serotonin levels are rapidly increased and yet depression symptoms do not abate 
for several weeks.  Some of the scientists implicated the hypothesis in affecting the progress of 
science and presented themselves as good scientists who are open to novel ideas.  Overall, 
constructing the distinction between a general chemical imbalance and a specific serotonin 
deficiency allowed for the maintenance and support of the assumption that depression is a brain-
based disorder across arguments for and against.   
5.4.2 Alternative Explanatory Models 
If depression is not caused by a simple chemical imbalance, such as a deficiency of 
serotonin or norepinephrine in the brain, what might physicians tell their patients instead?  Some 
scientists argue that the chemical imbalance hypothesis, in a broad way, is accurate enough for 
physicians to continue to use it to explain depression to their patients.  Others argue that it should 
be abandoned in its specific form, i.e., that low levels of neurotransmitters such as serotonin and 
norepinephrine cause depression, and suggest that an explanation involving reduced neural 
plasticity in depression may be more in-line with the current understanding of depression.  
However, they express skepticism that physicians would use such a description and that 
laypersons would understand.  While no scientist explicitly states that physicians should tell their 
patients that the causes of depression are unknown, several scientists state that we do not 
understand the causes of depression.  The following extracts are a selection of talk on alternative 
explanatory models.   
5.4.2.1 Modifying the chemical imbalance explanation. 
In the first extract on alternatives, Scientist G argues for the use of the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis with the addition of information about brain circuits.   
5.4.2.1.1 Extract 11. 
SCIENTIST G: I think we personally 1 
would be more likely to talk about, 2 
um, how, neurotransmitters and if 3 
you want to call it brain chemicals, 4 
influence the way um, circuits work 5 
in the brain, to regulate mood, 6 
sleep, appetite, sexual interest, 7 
thinking, concentration, and 8 
equally, hopelessness, suicidal 9 
ideation, um, various other issues. 10 
I: mmhm 11 
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SCIENTIST G: So I think you can 12 
weave them together, it’s not an 13 
either-or, kind of model.14 
The scientist in extract 11 continues a defense of the use of the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis by physicians.  He uses the pronoun “we” (l. 1), which may refer to himself and other 
collaborators in his research group.  The phrases “I think” (l. 1) and “more likely” (l. 2) may be 
received by the listener as qualifying statements signaling that he is not entirely certain how his 
colleagues describe depression.  He states that “neurotransmitters” (l. 3), which could also be 
simplified to “brain chemicals” (l. 4), “influence the way circuits work in the brain” (ll. 4-5).  
This adds some complexity to the explanation while maintaining simplicity, and is consistent 
with the talk of other interviewees who constructed neurotransmitters as having a general 
influence on various circuits in the brain.   
He continues his explanation by linking talk of brain circuits to specific symptoms 
involved in depression, from “mood” (l. 6) to “suicidal ideation” (l. 9).  This talk fits with the 
assumption that neural circuits regulate behaviour and that mental illnesses are associated with 
disruption or dysregulation of the circuits.  Finally, the scientist argues that the explanation 
described above and the chemical imbalance explanation can be used in conjunction with each 
other, i.e., “you can weave them together” (ll. 12-13).  By stating that it is not an “either-or kind 
of model” (ll. 13-14), the scientist presents an alternative to the simple chemical imbalance 
hypothesis that adds a level of complexity while maintaining simplicity.   
Overall, Scientist G argues for retaining the chemical imbalance hypothesis, while adding 
that neurotransmitters influence circuits in the brain that regulate mood and behaviour.  
Underpinning this explanation is the assumption that all behaviour is associated with the 
functioning of neurotransmitters and brain circuits.   
5.4.2.2 Replacing the chemical imbalance explanation. 
If the chemical imbalance hypothesis is inadequate, what alternative explanations are 
possible?  Some of the scientists presented neuroplasticity and neuroimmune dysfunction as 
possible explanations. 
5.4.2.2.1 Extract 12. 
SCIENTIST D: exposure to chronic 1 
stress really what it does is 2 
dampens the brain’s ability to be 3 
plastic.  So our brain is constantly 4 
changing and adapting to everything 5 
that we’re doing....  So, the 6 
question is what is the specific 7 
mechanism and that’s where we fail 8 
because we don’t have the answer....  9 
But what I can tell you without any 10 
doubt, is that the depressed brain 11 
is less plastic.   12 
I: Right, okay 13 
SCIENTIST D: Uh, I don’t know if, 14 
family physicians will start saying 15 
that because it doesn’t sound nearly 16 
as good as you have a chemical 17 
imbalance....  You tell them your 18 
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brain is like quiet or not plastic 19 
or whatever and they’re going to be 20 
like, oh my god, you know, and how 21 
can a pill fix that? 22 
The scientist states that “chronic stress” (l. 1), which she had previously constructed as a 
precipitant of depression, reduces neuroplasticity.  She defines a “plastic” (l. 3) brain as one that 
is capable of “changing and adapting to everything” (ll. 4-5), which constructs plasticity as a 
basic, fundamental feature of a healthy brain.  She does state that the mechanism underlying 
plasticity is unknown (ll. 6-9), but follows that with a statement of certainty, “without any doubt” 
(l. 10), that depression is associated with reduced plasticity.  Despite the earlier claim that 
plasticity is reduced under conditions of chronic stress (ll. 1-3), she chooses the word 
“depressed” (l. 11), which draws upon the assumption that at least some depression is 
precipitated by chronic stress.   
She argues that physicians might not be willing to adopt the plasticity explanation.  She 
indicates that the plasticity explanation “doesn’t sound nearly as good” (ll. 15-16).  She does not 
elaborate on how the chemical imbalance hypothesis sounds good, but she does seem to suggest 
that the way the explanation sounds to the patient is important.  She goes on to question the 
effect on patients.  She constructs the potential plasticity explanation in its simplest terms, i.e., 
“your brain is like quiet or not plastic or whatever” (ll. 18-19), and imagines that the patient 
would react with shock – “oh my god” (l. 20) – and despair – “how can a pill fix that?” (ll. 20-
21).   
This scientist initially presents neuroplasticity as a potential explanation for depression 
that is more accurate than the chemical imbalance explanation.  While she is unequivocal in her 
support for the brain being less plastic under chronic stress and while in an episode of 
depression, she does not talk favourably about it being used to explain depression to patients, 
arguing that physicians will not like the explanation and that it could have a negative effect on 
patients’ view of their condition.   
In extract 13, Scientist I also questions whether a plasticity explanation could replace the 
chemical imbalance explanation. 
5.4.2.2.2 Extract 13.   
I: Maybe, plasticity, would, you 1 
know allow for some, you know some 2 
sort of, broader view some more 3 
options? Um  4 
SCIENTIST I: Mmhm, yeah, that’s 5 
definitely possible I think it’s 6 
just, hhh, plasticity is a bit more 7 
of a loaded gun because it’s already 8 
a term that’s less, that the public 9 
is less familiar with so, it 10 
requires some sort of base knowledge 11 
of what the concept of 12 
neuroplasticity even is.  I mean 13 
chemical imbalance is an easy sell 14 
because you can just say there are 15 
chemicals in the brain.  And in 16 
people who are depressed there’s an 17 
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imbalance in these chemicals.  18 
(chuckle)19 
I prompt the scientist to consider plasticity as an alternative explanation.  The scientist 
initially agrees, stating, “that’s definitely possible” (ll. 5-6), but he audibly exhales (l. 6) and 
calls plasticity a “loaded gun” (ll. 7-8), which is an evocative phrase that suggests it is an 
accident waiting to happen.  Thus, while he supports the explanation in principle, he constructs it 
as potentially very dangerous.  He argues that it is dangerous because it is not a common concept 
with which laypersons are familiar, and would require “some sort of base knowledge” (ll. 11-12), 
which implies that the plasticity explanation would be too complicated for a physician to explain 
in a short appointment.  He contrasts the plasticity explanation with the chemical imbalance 
explanation.  He states the chemical imbalance explanation is “an easy sell” (ll. 13-14), which 
identifies the importance of persuasive rhetoric on the part of physicians.  As opposed to 
plasticity, he constructs the chemical imbalance explanation as simple, e.g., “just say” (l. 14), 
because it only requires knowing “there are chemicals in the brain” (ll. 14-15) and “there’s an 
imbalance in these chemicals” (ll. 16-17).  The scientist chuckles, potentially because the 
explanation is so simple and that there is no definitive scientific evidence that chemicals are 
imbalanced in depression.   
Scientist I initially agrees that plasticity may be an alternative explanation for depression, 
but he also argues that an explanation of depression involving neuroplasticity might not be 
accepted as an alternative explanation.  He constructs the plasticity explanation as potentially 
dangerous, and cites a lack of knowledge among the public about the concept of plasticity and 
reluctance among physicians to replace a simple explanation with a more complicated 
explanation as reasons why it might not be possible to replace the chemical imbalance 
explanation.    
In extract 14, the scientist denigrates the specific chemical imbalance hypothesis by 
suggesting that it is potentially responsible for increasing the stigma of depression, and then 
presents an alternative conceptualization.   
5.4.2.2.3 Extract 14. 
SCIENTIST B: Um, and and it [the 1 
chemical imbalance hypothesis] 2 
probably does kind of, further the 3 
stigma associated with it....  And 4 
there’s a clear correlation between, 5 
um, the immune system an- 6 
dysregulation of the immune system 7 
and depression and anxiety and other 8 
psychiatric illnesses.  And I think 9 
when you start talking to people 10 
about those types of data, 11 
comforting in some ways and those 12 
types of data could destigmatize it 13 
because it’s not about some vague 14 
general chemical imbalance that 15 
causes this vague general cluster of 16 
behavioural symptoms, it’s about an 17 
underlying disease that could be 18 
targeted therapeutically to correct 19 
a symptom.20 
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While the scientist does use hedging statements, “probably” (l. 3) and “kind of” (l. 3), he 
argues that the chemical imbalance hypothesis might “further the stigma” (ll. 3-4) of depression.  
This argument is consistent with the research on stigma and the chemical imbalance hypothesis 
of depression, which generally suggests that understanding depression as being caused by a 
chemical imbalance in the brain is associated with higher perceived stigma of the disorder (e.g., 
Deacon & Baird, 2009; Haslam & Kvaale, 2015; Kemp, Lickel, & Deacon, 2014; Pescosolido et 
al., 2010; Schomerus et al., 2012).  The scientist then begins to talk about an alternative 
conception of depression, linking “dysregulation of the immune system” (l. 7) with depression 
and other mental illnesses.  He halts his utterance to add the word “dysregulation” (l. 7), which 
conveys that he is talking about an impairment in the body’s ability to control or maintain proper 
functioning.  His use of the phrase ‘immune system’ is a powerful reference to the body’s ability 
to counter infections and diseases.  It is important to note that the scientist describes this link as a 
“clear correlation” (l. 5), rather than causation.   
He returns to the concept of stigma by stating that data on the dysregulation of the 
immune system in depression is “comforting in some ways” (l. 12) and “could destigmatize it” 
(l. 13).  He contrasts the talk of immune system data with the chemical imbalance explanation, 
calling it a “vague” (l. 14) and “general” (l. 15) imbalance that causes “vague” and “general” (l. 
16) symptoms.  This contrast casts the immune system data as indicating a specific and precise 
cause, despite being correlational data.  Further, while never suggesting that the immune system 
is the culprit of depression, the scientist does construct the immune system data as an indicator 
that there is “an underlying disease” (ll. 17-18).  He constructs the disease as amenable to 
pharmacological treatment when he states that the disease could be “targeted therapeutically” (l. 
19).  Finally, the singular term, “a symptom” (l. 20) contrasts with the plural term, “cluster of… 
symptoms” (ll. 16-17).  Earlier in the interview, this scientist discussed moving away from DSM 
nosology in research in favour of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), which focuses on 
discrete symptoms rather than syndromes.  His use of the term, “a symptom” is consistent with 
his preferred approach to defining depression for research purposes.   
Overall, he argues that an explanation that includes the data regarding immune system 
dysregulation could benefit patients by reducing the stigma associated with depression and the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis.  His construction of depression as a disease involving the 
immune system functions to further legitimize depression as a biological pathology.  
5.4.2.3 Depression etiology as an unknown. 
Many scientists stated that the etiology of depression is unknown.  Indeed, some 
scientists stated that their interest in depression research is due to the fact that it remains a 
mystery.  The following extract is an example of how one scientist talked about depression and 
its unknown etiology.   
5.4.2.3.1 Extract 15. 
SCIENTIST A: So if you, if you’re 1 
asking more about, about what I 2 
think about depression, what 3 
depress- so I think that, the short 4 
answer is we have no idea.  I don’t 5 
think that we really know, and this 6 
is ah, many people think that we 7 
know and sometimes it’s uh, I’ve 8 
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been wondering whether it is more 9 
dangerous, you know, that we don’t 10 
know, is it more dangerous that we 11 
don’t know or, or the fact that we 12 
think we do,  13 
I: right 14 
SCIENTIST A: do know.  And it’s 15 
almost better I think that if if 16 
you, if you, if you know that you 17 
don’t know, then then you have to 18 
sort of then you’re curious about 19 
what might be happening.  If you 20 
think you know, ah, that you know, 21 
then, then you’re not interested in 22 
alternative, uh  23 
I: mmhm, right 24 
SCIENTIST A: alternative ideas.  And 25 
I think that you know the former is 26 
true, I don’t think we really know 27 
what what what depression is about.28 
The scientist clarifies my question about depression etiology (ll. 1-3), and provides what 
he calls the “short answer” (l. 4), which is, “we have no idea” (ll. 4-5).  The term ‘short answer’ 
qualifies the statement as being the endpoint of what could potentially be a long answer.  Indeed, 
there are many potential leads about the causes of depression with many ongoing investigations.  
However, the phrase “we have no idea” functions to construct the nature of depression as 
absolutely unknown.  The scientist is careful in his statements to express that it is his opinion, 
(i.e., “I think” (l. 3); “I don’t think” (l. 5)), which is not universally shared (i.e., “many people 
think that we know” (ll. 6-7)).  He is not clear who he is referring to by the vague term “people” 
(l. 6), but it might be argued that in the context of an interview about the science of depression 
that he is talking about other scientists.  By acknowledging that there are “many” who think 
otherwise, the scientist is positioning himself as a person who is “curious” (l. 18) and “interested 
in alternative...ideas” (ll. 21-23). 
The scientist continues to present himself as inquisitive with the statement, “I’ve been 
wondering” (l. 8), and argues that constructing depression as having known etiology is 
potentially as “dangerous” (l. 9) as not knowing the etiology of depression.  While he does not 
explicitly say so, not knowing the etiology of depression could have negative consequences, 
especially for those who suffer from depression and for whom the available treatments do not 
work.  However, he concludes, “it’s almost better” (l. 14) to “know that you don’t know” (l. 16).  
The phrase “almost better” concedes that it would still be better to know the etiology of 
depression, but he concludes that if a scientist thinks he or she knows what depression is, then 
she or he will not be as “curious” (l. 18) and will not be interested in “alternative ideas” (l. 23).  
The argument relies on his stated assumption that we do not know “what depression is about” (l. 
26).  Thus, while there are scientists working to understand the etiology of depression and 
following several different lines of explanation, this scientist warns about the dangers of 
prematurely concluding that the etiology of depression is known.   
While the chemical imbalance hypothesis did not have the widespread support of all the 
scientists who were interviewed for this project, there is little that they offered with regard to 
modifying or replacing the explanation.  Scientist G supported the use of the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis but added additional details to the explanation, such as talk about the role of 
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neurotransmitters in the function of circuits in the brain.  While Scientist A in extract 15 made an 
argument in favour of acknowledging that we do not know the etiology of depression, he 
appeared to be referring to scientists rather than clinicians, since the benefit of acknowledging 
the unknown etiology was to spur creative and novel ideas about underlying cause(s).  The other 
scientists who talked about plasticity as an alternative explanation did so hesitantly and were 
reluctant to suggest it could supplant the chemical imbalance hypothesis as a more accurate 
description of depression because of the convenience and simplicity of the latter.  Scientist B 
(Extract 6) referenced the immune system as implicated in depression, and argued that such an 
explanation could be comforting to the patient, presumably because it leverages the legitimizing 
force of the immune system to cast depression as a veritable biological disease state.  Overall, 
depression was constructed by the interviewees as a complex brain-based disorder with no 
simple explanation.   
5.5 Discussion 
The etiological explanations for depression have shifted, along with the received views of 
the way the brain and body function, from an excess of black bile to impaired neuroplasticity and 
neuroimmune functions (Jackson, 2008; Krishnan & Nestler, 2008).  The chemical imbalance 
hypothesis was proposed at a time when scientists had recently accepted that the brain functions 
using chemical messengers between neurons (Coppen, 1967; Schildkraut, 1965).  The chemical 
imbalance hypothesis, specifically a deficiency of serotonin and other monoamines, led to the 
creation of the SSRIs and the chemical imbalance explanation reached a wide audience through 
pharmaceutical promotion and direct-to-consumer advertising of SSRIs and related 
antidepressants (Leo & Lacasse, 2008).  In the five decades since the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis was proposed, there have been significant developments in how scientists understand 
the functioning of the brain. Alternative explanations for depression are being studied 
experimentally, and the research literature is vast and accumulating daily.  However, the 
etiological understanding of depression is complex and incomplete, and the purported 
mechanisms underlying depression might not be possible to explain in a brief television 
advertisement, such as was done with the chemical imbalance hypothesis in 15 seconds in a 
Zoloft commercial (https://youtu.be/twhvtzd6gXA), or in a short office visit with a family 
physician. The chemical imbalance hypothesis remains a pervasive discourse among laypersons 
and clinicians.   
5.5.1 Arguments in Defense of the Chemical Imbalance Explanation 
Scientists defended the chemical imbalance explanation for depression by constructing a 
chemical imbalance as a general concept rather than a specific deficiency of serotonin.  They 
argued that neurotransmitters are integral to the function of circuits in the brain, and circuits in 
the brain are responsible for behaviour, so functional and behavioural impairments in depression 
must result from a dysfunction or dysregulation of chemical messengers in brain circuits.  While 
defining chemical imbalance as a general concept of brain functioning bolsters the argument that 
depression is caused by a chemical imbalance, the lack of evidence for a specific serotonin 
deficiency threatens to undermine the explanation. The scientists acknowledged that the specific 
serotonin deficiency explanation was incorrect but argued that it is more important to 
communicate to patients that their depression is a biological illness than to try to articulate the 
exact state of scientific understanding, which is complex and incomplete.  The argument 
involves a persuasive appeal to pathos, evoking sympathy for sufferers of depression who face 
stigma and self-blame.  
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For many people, depression is viewed as a character flaw or a sign of being weak, and 
biological explanations are purported to reduce stigma and self-blame (e.g., Andreasen, 1985; 
2001).  Appealing to relieve the sufferer of guilt and shame through a biological explanation is a 
persuasive defense of the chemical imbalance hypothesis, but biological explanations for 
depression, such as the chemical imbalance hypothesis, might not be the route to reduced stigma 
and self-blame.  For example, Pescosolido et al. (2010) analyzed survey responses to vignettes 
about depression and other mental health diagnoses.  They described increased public 
endorsement of neurobiological causes between 1996 and 2006, with no effect upon stigma.  The 
authors concluded that relying exclusively on neurobiological explanations “is at best ineffective 
and at worst potentially stigmatizing” (p. 9).  Kemp, Lickel, and Deacon (2014) reported that 
understanding depression to be caused by a chemical imbalance had no significant association 
with self-blame, but was associated with increased prognostic pessimism and decreased 
expectations regarding mood regulation ability.  The argument that the chemical imbalance 
explanation will improve patient outcomes rests upon the assumption that biological 
explanations reduce stigma and self-blame; however, equating a person’s distress to the action of 
molecules in the brain might have negative effects.  While efforts should continue to focus on 
reducing stigma and self-blame among persons with depression and in society, the general 
chemical imbalance explanation might actually reify discourses that stigmatize depression. 
5.5.2 Arguments in Opposition to the Chemical Imbalance Explanation 
 While constructing the phrase chemical imbalance as a general dysfunction or 
dysregulation of neurotransmitters in brain circuits permitted a compelling defense of the 
chemical imbalance explanation of depression, scientists also argued against the explanation by 
constructing it in terms of a specific deficiency of serotonin.  The separation allowed the 
scientists to maintain the presentation of depression as a brain-based disorder while also 
countering a specific hypothesis prevalent in lay and medical discourses.   
 One way of arguing against the specific chemical imbalance explanation was to draw 
attention to incompatible evidence, such as the observation that while antidepressants increase 
synaptic concentrations of monoamines immediately, therapeutic effects are delayed.  The 
therapeutic delay is one of the most problematic observations not explained by the specific 
serotonin deficiency hypothesis, and while others have outlined several problems with the 
hypothesis (e.g., Healy, 1997; Kirsch 2010), no scientists referred to those additional 
inconsistencies in the course of the interview.  
 Another line of argument involved critiquing past scientific endeavours.  Reductionism, a 
hallmark of scientific inquiry, was implicated in the erroneous inference of depression causality 
when attempting to explain the mechanism of antidepressant action.  Openness to ideas and a 
willingness to test and refine theories to fit the data was presented as an ideal position, and was 
coupled with denigrating those who still held fast to the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  The 
scientists taking up this argument defended themselves against potential counter-arguments that 
they are not open to ideas by presenting themselves as willing to accept depression as caused by 
a problem with serotonin.  The hallmark of a good scientific hypothesis is falsifiability, and these 
scientists positioned themselves as good scientists by presenting their ideas tentatively and 
acknowledging the possibility of serotonin being a major etiological factor in depression.  
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5.5.3 Possible Alternative Explanations 
In the current study, several scientists described depression as associated with problems 
of neuroplasticity, but expressed skepticism regarding physicians’ and patients’ willingness and 
ability to utilize and understand an explanation based on neuroplasticity.  Their skepticism may 
be due to the communicative power and pervasiveness of the chemical imbalance explanation.  
The idea that depression is caused by a chemical imbalance has permeated lay and medical 
discourses, and it can be leveraged as a persuasive rhetorical device to influence medication 
adherence.  
In an attempt to counter the negative effects associated with the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis, Lebowitz, Ahn, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2013) played an educational video which 
highlighted that environmental factors and life experiences can influence brain chemistry and 
genes for a subset of participants.  They concluded that endorsing a biomedical etiology of 
depression was associated with prognostic pessimism, but that those who watched the video 
about the plasticity of genes and brain chemistry had lower prognostic pessimism and increased 
sense of agency and hope.  In addition to the concepts of epigenetics and neural plasticity, the 
concept of neuroimmunity may be a persuasive explanation that contributes to the construction 
of depression as a legitimate illness rather than a deficit of character or personal strength.  By 
promoting the knowledge that the brain is malleable and capable of changing under a variety of 
stimuli, e.g., medication, exercise, and talk therapy, we might one day augment or replace the 
chemical imbalance explanation for depression. 
5.5.4 Conclusion 
The present study highlights how the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression, while 
simple and incomplete, can be maintained by defining chemical imbalance in a general manner.  
The study also highlights that many scientists have moved past the chemical imbalance 
hypothesis when thinking about depression and its causes, and that they consider depression as 
of unknown etiology with multiple potential causes.  A unified theory of depression that 
accounts for all predisposing and precipitating factors and all known therapeutic interventions is 
likely to be elusive, and in time, depression, as we know it, might be divided into a number of 
different disorders or diseases with unique etiologies.  The study raises several questions: What 
role do neuroscientists have in providing and promoting explanations of depression to medical 
professionals and the lay public? What level of scientific explanation is acceptable to physicians 
and patients?  And, what type of explanation, if any at all, is most beneficial to a patient’s 
recovery?  These questions might be productively explored in a variety of ways – quantitatively 
and qualitatively – in future research.  
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Chapter Six: General Discussion 
The research questions that directed the individual analyses and overall project originated 
with the observation that there was a discrepancy between the scientific literature and the general 
talk among laypersons regarding the etiology of depression.  Of interview data with family 
physicians and scientists, I asked the following research questions: How do family physicians, 
who are responsible for the vast majority of the diagnosis and treatment of depression in Canada, 
describe and account for their etiological explanations of depression and what discursive 
resources do they use to explain depression to their patients?  And, how do scientists who are 
working toward a biological understanding of depression account for and construct arguments 
for or against the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression?  In this general discussion, I 
bridge the conclusions of the two studies and offer commentary on additional questions left 
unanswered.    
6.1 The Chemical Imbalance Hypothesis: Challenges and Opportunities  
Does the chemical imbalance hypothesis need a replacement?  From the data I analyzed 
and presented in these research projects, it is apparent that at least some physicians are utilizing 
the chemical imbalance hypothesis as a persuasive rhetorical device to motivate patients toward 
treatment, to attempt to minimize self-blame and stigma, to instill hope and confidence in the 
treatment, and to contribute generally to scientific knowledge among patients.  However, from a 
read of the literature on stigma and prognostic pessimism associated with the chemical 
imbalance hypothesis of depression, reducing stigma and instilling hope is not as self-evident as 
the physicians suggested (Deacon & Baird, 2009; Fullagar, 2009; Fullagar & O’Brien, 2013; 
Kemp, Lickel, & Deacon, 2014; Kvaale, Gottdiener, & Haslam, 2013; Kvaale, Haslam, & 
Gottdiener, 2013; Pescosolido et al., 2010; Schomerus et al., 2012; Speerforck, Schomerus, 
Pruess, & Angermeyer, 2014).  Further, there is an ethical responsibility of the clinician to 
provide sufficient information for a patient to make an informed decision regarding treatment 
(Blease, 2014).  The scientists interviewed for this study were somewhat reluctant to endorse any 
one alternative etiological account of depression, and some maintained the chemical imbalance 
narrative by describing the brain as functioning through chemical signals that they argue are 
impaired in states of depression.   
While the chemical imbalance explanation was defended by these scientists, it was also 
evident that they had a sophisticated understanding of the brain and how it adapts as we interact 
with our environment.   The scientific method in neuroscience is fundamentally reductionistic, 
but the scientists avoided neuroessentialist talk that might be evident among laypersons (e.g., 
Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2001; Haslam, 2011; Haslam & Kvaale, 2013).  Some family physicians 
also talked about stating to their patients that many things can alter the chemical composition of 
the brain.  These learned individuals have a nuanced view of depression that might be difficult to 
communicate to a layperson in a brief exchange.  Building knowledge of the brain and 
depression among laypersons in the community is an important step toward reducing stigma and 
building awareness of available treatments.  However, it is also important to aspire to achieving a 
relatively sophisticated and contextualized understanding of how the brain works in concert with 
the environment.  If neuroessentialist thinking promotes prognostic pessimism and stigma, then 
explanations that include a description of environment-dependent factors, such as epigenetics 
and neuroplasticity for example, might promote prognostic optimism and reduce the tendency for 
a person to construct mental illnesses as dangerous and immutable.   
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When considering a replacement for the chemical imbalance hypothesis, it is important to 
consider the knowledge and understanding that is already held by laypersons and clinicians.  
Steven Polgar (1962), a medical anthropologist, wrote of the fallacy of the empty vessel.  The 
metaphor conveys that laypersons already have constructions of illnesses and new knowledge 
might not be readily accepted.  Some scientists drew attention to this general notion when they 
expressed their expectation that a new explanation for depression, such as reduced 
neuroplasticity, would not be readily accepted by laypersons and clinicians.  However, as some 
scientists demonstrated, a rhetorical construction of the brain as a chemical signaling mechanism 
in general can maintain the notion that depression is associated with a chemical imbalance.  
Since a majority of laypersons likely already endorse that depression is caused by a chemical 
imbalance, it may be fruitful to augment the explanation, rather than to expect it to be displaced 
by an entirely new explanation.  The arguments in defense of the chemical imbalance hypothesis 
can scaffold the creation of a more complex and nuanced explanation for depression – one that 
builds upon the knowledge already prevalent in the talk of laypersons and physicians.  Thus, 
augmenting, rather than replacing, the chemical imbalance hypothesis might be most favourable. 
 There are several potential routes to constructing discourses of depression that 
encompass the gamut of potential explanations among clinicians and laypersons.  Trainee 
medical students learn that illnesses are often biopsychosocial, and among the sample of family 
physicians, several endorsed biopsychosocial explanations of depression.  Encouraging family 
medicine students to explain that depression is not well understood but likely involves brain 
chemistry and structure that is malleable might build knowledge among laypersons with 
depression without the detrimental effects noticed with pure chemical imbalance explanations.  
Kandel (1998) called for the specialized training of psychiatrists to emphasize the structure and 
function of the brain and how the body interacts with its environment.  Bringing forth current 
knowledge and debates in neuroscience to clinical training programs could result in increased 
translation of basic science to clinical application.   
A brief educational video for patients with depression might be an effective intervention 
to increase feelings of personal agency and prognostic optimism.  For example, Lebowitz, Ahn, 
and Nolen-Hoeksema (2013) successfully reduced self-report ratings of prognostic pessimism 
and increased self-report ratings of personal agency through a six-minute educational video 
explaining epigenetics and experience-dependent plasticity, followed by an instruction to write a 
persuasive letter to a person with depression using the information in the video.  A similar 
intervention might be utilized in an office-based visit for depression, either through an 
educational video or simply by taking the time to explain depression’s many potential causes 
within the body, in the environment, and in the interaction between the two.   
Scientists studying pre-clinical models of depression might also contribute to the public 
discourses regarding depression.  Several Canadian scientists I interviewed talked about the 
Canadian Depression Research and Intervention Network (CDRIN, 2015).  The CDRIN project 
connects scientists across the country and beyond, and includes laypersons living with 
depression in the hopes of improving clinical outcomes.  This network provides a platform for 
scientists to share their work more broadly and encourages the involvement of people living with 
depression in basic research.  Such initiatives have the potential to add to public discourses about 
the causes of and treatments for depression.  
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6.2 The Intersection of Neuroscience and Clinical Practice  
The research project is an example of research conducted across disciplinary lines.  I 
employed a qualitative, social science approach to studying social/psychological research 
questions involving clinicians and neuroscientists.  The research was not interdisciplinary per se, 
but I was principally concerned with how both clinicians and scientists viewed depression and 
the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  The discipline concerned with the intersection between 
clinical and neuroscience research is termed translational neuroscience.  Ultimately, the goal is to 
translate basic research into improved clinical outcomes for patients.   
Of the interview data generated as part of these research projects, what did clinicians say 
about scientists? And what did scientists say about clinicians?  I analyzed the scientist interview 
data with regard to translational science for a paper presentation at the 2016 Qualitative Research 
on Mental Health conference (Sigurdson & McMullen, 2016).  I present three quotes below to 
highlight the intersection of neuroscience and clinical practice.  
When searching the family physician interview transcripts, there was only one instance of 
a physician talking about scientific research related to depression etiology.  In the context of 
talking about communicating the neurochemical basis of depression to his patients when 
prescribing antidepressants, this physician stated, “There’s some trust... from our scientists.... 
People tell us that this is how it works and we believe that.”  The term “people” is vague, but 
could include scientists, other clinicians, professors, and pharmaceutical 
advertising/representatives.  The word “it” most likely refers to antidepressant medication given 
the context surrounding the statement.  By talking about trust in scientists, this physician 
acknowledges that the explanation he provides to his patients relies upon a confidence in the 
scientific community.  Translation of clinical research to clinical practice has many potential 
routes, but from interview data with the sample of physicians, it appears to be lagging behind the 
current discourses in depression science.   
By comparison, scientists talked about clinicians significantly more.  Several scientists in 
the sample described their work as translational and talked about the necessity of engaging with 
clinicians.  For example, one scientist stated,  
We need more interaction between basic scientists and clinicians. Um, you know I need 
to talk to clinicians so I understand that clinical situation. And they need to talk to me so 
that they are abreast of research and new ideas and new ways of thinking.   
This scientist makes the point that cross-talk between scientists and clinicians is 
important for both researchers and scientists alike.  She makes the assumption that talking will 
lead to understanding and new ways of thinking.   
However, scientists also drew attention to limitations to translation.  The language of 
scientists and clinicians was often cited as a barrier to translating science to practice.  Another 
scientist stated,  
I think that, as a field... it’s taken us a long time to, be able to speak um, I wouldn’t even 
say a common language but I’d say a language that, um, people who do different work 
can respect. And what do I mean by that?... The, lack of understanding or awareness of 
gene environment interaction, led to people having uh, well is it a psychological 
depression or is it a biological depression? Which in our field today would be nonsense 
because people understand, levels of analysis. 
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The scientist makes the claim that while the two groups have not reached a consensus or a 
common language, there is more mutual regard for the other’s way of working and speaking 
about depression.  He goes on to provide an example of the historical division of reactive vs. 
endogenous depression in psychiatry.  In our previous interviews with family physicians, many 
of them still referred to depression in the absence of external factors as a true medical/biological 
depression. Such division, in the words of this scientist, is nonsense. 
  I observed several key assumptions within the talk of scientists when speaking on 
translational science.   Translation of neuroscience research into practice was routinely 
constructed as a necessity, even by those scientists who were not directly engaged with clinicians 
in their work.  There was an assertion that the research literature might already hold key findings 
that could improve the outcomes of patients with depression but that research is not being 
translated to clinical interventions.  In addition, clinicians and scientists differ in the language 
they use, and this difference was constructed as a limiting factor that must be overcome.  There 
was an assumption that, if two groups are brought together, they will reach a common ground 
and/or develop insights into the worldview of the other.  To examine this assumption, Brosnan 
and Michael (2014) conducted an ethnographic study of a laboratory/clinic designed to foster 
cross-talk between clinicians and scientists concerned with Parkinson’s disease.  The space 
included a medical clinic and a neuroscience research laboratory in close proximity.  Brosnan 
and Michael (2014) concluded that the two groups, scientists and clinicians – with the exception 
of the group leader – were still very divided in their work and vision.  Narrowing the gap 
between science and practice as observed in the talk of scientists and clinicians, while a 
commendable pursuit, is likely to remain complicated and fraught with barriers.    
6.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
I acknowledge that my analysis is one of many potential interpretations of the data.  I 
included large extracts of interview text and referred specifically to the text for each analytic 
claim.  Doing so allows the reader to evaluate the analysis and also to bring his or her own 
knowledge to bear on the selected extracts.  Since an “analysis is never complete” (p. 208, 
McMullen, 2011), including large sections of text is likely to spur other research questions and 
interpretations of the data.   
Both sets of interviews contained wide-ranging questions related to depression.  This 
general approach produced interview data that covered a wide-range of potential research 
questions.  The approach has benefits and limitations.  A benefit is that the general questions 
allowed for many research questions to be asked of the data.  For example, because of the 
general questions related to the diagnostic practice of family physicians, I observed many 
utterances regarding the chemical imbalance hypothesis and could ask a research question not 
conceived of when the interview schedule was created.  A limitation is that the focus of the 
interview might go in a different direction than it would if the chemical imbalance hypothesis 
was the focus of the conversation.  Additionally, the interviews produced a vast amount of data 
that will go unanalyzed unless specific research questions are asked.  To further the research 
related to explaining the causes of depression, future researchers could formulate specific 
questions to narrow the scope of the interviews or utilize surveys and quantitative methods.   
Interview data can be potentially problematic, as they are a co-construction between 
interviewer and interviewee.  For example, when interviewing scientists, I often referred to the 
chemical imbalance hypothesis as “simple” or “simplistic” when prompting for further 
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discussion from the scientists.  With regard to the physician data, it would be very interesting to 
obtain direct recordings of physicians explaining depression to their patients.  While “naturalistic 
records” (p. 301, Potter & Hepburn, 2005) – data generated without significant researcher 
involvement – might be ideal for many research questions, such records would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain ethically.  Despite this limitation and the potentially 
complicated physician recruitment and ethics approval process, future researchers might want to 
partner with physicians to record and analyze the diagnostic and treatment communications 
between physician and patient.  The data and analysis will contribute to the understanding of the 
communication of depression.   
Further, the interviews were conducted by a clinical psychologist and clinical psychology 
graduate students.  It is conceivable that this had an effect upon the interview data produced.  For 
example, it might have prompted the physicians/scientists to talk more about psychological 
treatments than they otherwise would have if they were speaking with a peer.  Future researchers 
building upon this work will need to remain mindful that the interviews were a situated 
encounter between psychologists and physicians/scientists.   
New developments in science and practice will affect the discourses of depression over 
time.  The latest biomedical treatment for depression is ketamine infusion.  Ketamine continues 
to be studied for its antidepressant efficacy, but because it is a medication already approved for 
use with human patients, it is currently being used to treat depression in some clinics.  Scientists 
are unsure as to why it appears to have an antidepressant effect, but they have observed that 
ketamine starts a signaling cascade in the brain that promotes the growth of dendritic spines, 
ultimately enhancing neuroplasticity and the number of connections between neurons.  Thus, 
while the effect is achieved by a chemical process in the brain, it results in a change in structure.  
It is likely that now, or in the near future, family physicians will be referring their patients to 
ketamine clinics.  When that happens, how will these physicians explain depression and the 
ketamine treatment to their patients?  Will the chemical imbalance narrative survive or will talk 
of enhanced neuroplasticity replace or augment the chemical imbalance explanation for 
depression?  What effect will an explanation of depression involving ketamine treatment have on 
the explanation of how SSRIs and related medications work?  As ketamine treatment becomes 
more common, it will be interesting to examine and compare explanations for depression among 
laypersons and medical professionals as they relate to treatment.  
6.4 Reflexivity  
The analysis and discussion presented here are dependent on my position as a researcher.  
I acknowledge that the analysis is a co-construction involving my own perspectives, background, 
and knowledge which I brought to bear upon the data generation and data analysis.  In the 
interview data with scientists, I followed a semi-structured interview schedule that I created from 
my reading and understanding of the scientific literature.  However, I focused most on review 
articles in neuroscience rather than original research.  I read that literature through the lens of a 
trainee in clinical psychology.  As such, I was principally interested in the broad constructions of 
depression and its causes, rather than the detail-oriented focus that is often prevalent in 
neuroscience research.  I focused on a general question: what do we know about depression from 
scientific studies? 
Despite my clinical focus, I attempted to immerse myself in neuroscience.  I gained a 
great deal of perspective on neuroscience research from discussions with neuroscience graduate 
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students about their work.  I attended a Society for Neuroscience Annual Meeting.  Here, in 
addition to one formal interview, I was able to have informal conversations with researchers and 
students studying depression.   
As I reflect upon the analysis and interview data in general, I acknowledge that this 
research has had an effect upon how I talk about depression.  While conducting psychotherapy 
with individuals with depression, it is not uncommon to hear, “My depression is a chemical 
imbalance,” or to be asked, “Do you think I have a chemical imbalance?”  Knowing that a pure 
chemical imbalance explanation of depression might be associated with prognostic pessimism 
and might potentially undermine the perceived effectiveness of psychotherapy, I have become 
careful to explain depression first as not completely understood but to also utilize the argument 
by the scientists in support of the chemical imbalance hypothesis.  By explaining that the brain 
functions by chemicals known as neurotransmitters and adding there are many routes to 
changing the structure and functioning of the brain, I hope to augment the explanation without 
undermining the clinician who potentially described depression as a chemical imbalance.  When 
I first embarked on this journey, I would have been more inclined to be silent with my position 
on the chemical imbalance hypothesis because I constructed it to be erroneous and outdated.  I 
aspire to present depression in a way that is consistent with the scientific literature, recognizes 
the held-view of the person experiencing depression, and fosters prognostic optimism.   
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Appendix A 
 
Invitation to Participate Email 
Dear [Name], 
 
I am a PhD student at the University of Saskatchewan in Canada and I am writing to invite you 
to participate in a research study entitled “The Neuroscience of Depression: A Discourse 
Analysis of Scientists’ Accounts of Knowledge Generation.” You were identified as an expert in 
the field of depression research who has made significant contributions to the understanding of 
the science of depression.  
 
Neuroscience is a relatively new discipline emerging as an important and pervasive contributor 
to the understanding of mental illness. The objective of the proposed research is to contribute to 
a broader understanding of how such knowledge generation is understood by scientists who are 
experts in the field. 
 
Involvement in the project includes participating in a 1 to 1 ½ hour individual interview. [I will 
be attending the Society for Neuroscience 2013 Annual Meeting in San Diego, California, and 
will be conducting face-to-face interviews on-location. Alternatively, if you are not attending this 
meeting and would like to participate, we can arrange a telephone interview.] [Personalized 
message] 
 
All interviews will be audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. All identifying information will 
be removed from the transcripts and data will be reported in the form of quotations using a 
pseudonym. In the analysis, I will summarize the themes of the interview and conduct a detailed 
examination of the text, which will include, for example, how interviewees employ language 
categories, frame arguments, and construct metaphors about the neuroscience of depression. The 
data will be used in a student thesis, published in peer-reviewed journals, and presented at 
academic conferences.  
 
If you are interested in learning more about this project, please contact Kristjan Sigurdson at 
306-966-2322 or at kristjan.sigurdson@usask.ca and more details will be provided. The project 
is supervised by Dr. Linda McMullen (linda.mcmullen@usask.ca; 306-966-6666). For 
information about ethics board approval, please call the Ethics Unit at the University of 
Saskatchewan (306-966-2084). 
 
Sincerely,  
Kristjan J. Sigurdson 
Graduate Student in Clinical Psychology  
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Appendix B 
Consent Form 
 
 
 
Participant Consent Form  
   
Project Title:  The Neuroscience of Depression: A Discourse Analysis of Scientists’ Accounts of 
Knowledge Generation      
 
Researcher(s): Kristjan J. Sigurdson, Graduate Student, Department of Psychology, University of 
Saskatchewan, (+1) 306 966-2322, kristjan.sigurdson@usask.ca 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Linda McMullen, Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, (+1) 
306 966-6666, linda.mcmullen@usask.ca 
 
Purpose(s) and Objective(s) of the Research:  
 The purpose of the proposed research is to contribute to an understanding of knowledge 
generation practices and the epistemological foundations employed by eminent 
behavioural neuroscientists working toward a biological understanding of depression.  
 The objectives of the research are to study how neuroscientists: 
o define and make sense of the science of depression in biological psychiatry, 
including etiological claims, and epistemology and methodology in research. 
o contend with controversy over (a) the use of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of 
depression by medical and lay persons despite a lack of scientific support, and (b) 
the failure of psychotropic medications, including antidepressants, to reduce the 
burden of mental illness despite increased use of these medications. 
o define the challenges and dilemmas faced by scientists and the field of 
neuroscience regarding biological research of depression. 
o account for the historical and recent promises by scientists and biological 
psychiatrists for innovation and a greater understanding of depression. 
 
Procedures:  
 Participating in this research involves taking part in an individual interview lasting 
approximately 1 to 1.5 hours. 
 The interview will be conducted face-to-face at the Society for Neuroscience annual 
meeting, 2013, or via telephone. 
 I will interview up to a maximum of 15 scientists. 
  
 
107 
 The interview will be recorded with a digital audio recorder and transcribed verbatim.  
 Once the interview is transcribed, you will have a chance to read the transcript and sign a 
transcript release form. 
 Please feel free to ask any questions regarding the procedures and goals of the study or 
your role. 
 
Potential Risks:  
 There is potential for a breach of confidentiality in email and telephone interactions. In 
particular, for participants living in the United States, the US Patriot Act allows 
authorities access to the records of Internet and telephone service providers.  
 You may choose to have the transcript of your interview sent to you via email in a 
password-protected document or you may choose to have a hard-copy of the transcript 
mailed to an address of your choice.  
 
Potential Benefits:  
 The research has the potential to contribute to our understanding of the state of 
knowledge regarding neuroscience of biological psychiatry for depression. 
 There is no guarantee that you will personally benefit from this research. 
 
Confidentiality:  
 Measures will be taken to ensure the confidentiality of all participants.  
o Data will be reported in the form of written quotations (i.e., interview audio will 
not be presented). 
o All directly identifying information will be removed from the interview 
transcripts (i.e., locations, names, employers, etc.) 
o Pseudonyms will be used in the place of real names.  
 Because the participants for this research project have been selected from a relatively 
small group of people, it is possible that you may be identifiable to other people on the 
basis of what you have said. 
 Storage of Data:  
o After the interview, the audio file of the interview will be saved as an encrypted, 
password protected file on Kristjan Sigurdson’s computer and the original file 
deleted from the audio recorder. Backup files will be stored with Linda 
McMullen.  
o The electronic transcript files will be password protected in Microsoft Word. 
o The paper transcripts will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in a university 
office. 
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o The transcripts and interview recordings will be stored with Linda McMullen for 
a minimum of 5 years after the final publication of research results.  
 
Right to Withdraw:   
 Your participation is voluntary and you can answer only those questions that you are 
comfortable with. You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any 
time without explanation or penalty of any sort. 
 Should you wish to withdraw from the research, the audio recording and transcript data 
will be deleted at your request.  
 Your right to withdraw data from the study will apply until results have been 
disseminated. After this date, it is possible that some form of research dissemination will 
have already occurred and it may not be possible to withdraw all of your data.   
 The researcher will advise you of any new information that could influence your decision 
to participate in the ongoing parts of the study. 
 
 
 
Follow up:  
 Once the study is complete, a summary of the results will be available to participants 
upon request.   
 
Questions or Concerns:   
 Contact the researcher using the information at the top of page 1. 
 This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board.  Any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant may be addressed to that committee through the Research Ethics Office 
ethics.office@usask.ca (306) 966-2975. Out of town participants may call toll free (888) 
966-2975. 
 
 
Signed Consent (for face-to-face interviews): 
  
Your signature below indicates that you have read and understand the description provided; I 
have had an opportunity to ask questions and my/our questions have been answered. I consent to 
participate in the research project. A copy of this Consent Form has been given to me for my 
records. 
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__________________       ________________________ 
Name of Participant    Signature 
 
______________________        ____________________ 
Researcher’s Signature   Date 
 
A copy of this consent will be left with you, and a copy will be taken by the researcher. 
 
 
 
 
 
Oral Consent (for telephone interviews): 
 
I read and explained this Consent Form to the participant before receiving the participant’s 
consent, and the participant had knowledge of its contents and appeared to understand it.  
 
______________________         ____________________ 
Researcher’s Signature   Date 
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Appendix C 
Transcript Consent 
Transcript Review 
 
There is potential for a breach of confidentiality in email and telephone interactions. In 
particular, for participants living in the United States, the US Patriot Act allows authorities 
access to the records of Internet and telephone service providers. You may choose to have the 
transcript of your interview sent to you via email in a password-protected document or you may 
choose to have a hard copy of the transcript mailed to an address of your choice.  
 
☐ via email 
☐ via mail 
 
Name: __________________________________________________________ 
Address: _______________________________________________________ 
                  _______________________________________________________ 
Postal Code: _____________________ 
Email address: ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Would you like a summary of the results when the project is completed: 
☐ No, thank you 
☐ Yes, by mail 
☐ Yes, by email 
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Appendix D 
Demographic Form 
Participant Number: ________ 
 
Gender: ______________________ 
 
Age: __________________________ 
 
Degree(s): ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Additional training/ specialization: _______________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Length of time in research: ______________________________________________________ 
 
Annual grant funding:  $_______________________________________________ 
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Appendix E 
Interview Questions  
 Please describe your current work and how you came to have expertise in the area of the 
science of depression. 
 What interests you most about depression research? 
 How do you define depression? How do you study depression? Are there differences 
between how you think about depression in the context of your work as a scientist and 
how you might employ the word ‘depression’ in your everyday encounters outside of the 
context of your work? 
 What are the challenges and dilemmas that scientists and the field of neuroscience face 
with regard to the biological understanding of depression?  
o Prompt for (a) the defining of depression in psychiatry and the lack of a biological 
test, (b) the modeling of depression in research, (c) the limited understanding of 
the neurobiology of mental health and illnesses, and (d) the funding of psychiatric 
research. 
 What are the major controversies in the science of depression? 
o Prompt for (a) the use of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of depression by 
medical professionals and lay–persons, (b) the controversy regarding the 
effectiveness of antidepressants, and (c) the data suggesting that the advent of 
psychotropic medications has not reduced the overall burden of mental illness. 
 How successful has the neuroscience of biological psychiatry been? Where has it 
contributed and where has it fallen short? 
 What do you foresee for the future of the science of depression? Are we on the right path 
to help sufferers of this illness? If you had the power to control all depression research 
funding, how would you allocate the resources?  
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Appendix F 
Transcript Release 
 
TRANSCRIPT RELEASE FORM 
 
 
Neuroscience of depression: A discursive analysis of scientists' accounts of knowledge 
generation 
 
I,__________________________________, have reviewed the complete transcript of my 
personal interview in this study, and have been provided with the opportunity to add, alter, and 
delete information from the transcript as appropriate. I acknowledge that the transcript accurately 
reflects what I said in my personal interview with Kristjan Sigurdson. I hereby authorize the 
release of this transcript to Kristjan Sigurdson to be used in the manner described in the Consent 
Form. I have received a copy of this Data/Transcript Release Form for my own records.  
 
_________________________    _________________________  
Name of Participant     Date  
 
_________________________    _________________________  
Signature of Participant    Signature of researcher 
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Appendix G 
Transcription Notation 
Symbol Use 
, Indicates a brief pause in utterance 
- Indicates an abrupt halt or interruption in utterance 
. Indicates falling pitch or a stopping intonation 
? Indicates a rising, questioning intonation  
hhh Audible exhale 
... Intentionally omitted text 
 
 
